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Presence has various definitions, but can be understood as the sensation that a virtual environment is a 
real place, that the user is actually in the virtual environment rather than at the display terminal, or that 
the medium used to display the environment has disappeared leaving only the environment itself. We 
present an attempt to unite various presence approaches by reducing each to what we believe is a 
common basis – the psychology of behaviour selection and control – and re-conceptualizing presence 
in these terms by defining cognitive presence – the mental state where the VE rather than the real 
environment is acting as the basis for behaviour selection.  
The bulk of this work represents the construction of a three-layer connectionist model to explain and 
predict this concept of cognitive presence. This model takes input from two major sources: the 
perceptual modalities of the user (bottom-up processes), and the mental state of the user (top-down 
processes). These two basic sources of input competitively spread activation to a central layer which 
competitively determines which behaviour script will be applied to regulate behaviour.  
We demonstrate the ability of the model to cope with current notions of presence by using it to 
successfully predict two published findings: one (Hendrix & Barfield, 1995) showing that presence 
increases with an increase in the geometric field of view of the graphical display, and another (Salln?s, 
1999), which demonstrates the positive relationship between presence and the stimulation of more than 
one sensory modality. Apart from this theoretical analysis, we also perform two experiments to test the 
central tenets of our model. The first experiment aimed to show that presence is affected by both 
perceptual inputs (bottom-up processes), conceptual inputs (top-down processes), and the interaction of 
these. We collected 103 observations from a 2x2 factorial design with stimulus quality (2 levels) and 
conceptual priming (2 levels) as independent variables, and as dependent variable we used three 
measures of presence (Slater, Usoh & Steed’s scale (1995), Witmer & Singer’s (1998) Presence 
Questionnaire and our own cognitive presence measure) for the dependent variable.  
We found a significant main effect for stimulus quality and a significant interaction, which created a 
striking effect: priming the subject with material related in theme to the content of the VE increased the 
mean presence score for those viewing the high quality display, but decreased the mean of those 
viewing the low quality display. For those not primed with material related to the VE, no mean 
presence difference was discernible between those using high and low quality displays. The results 
from this study suggest that both top-down and bottom-up activation should be taken into account 
when explaining the causality of presence. 
Our second study aimed to show that presence comes about as a result not of raw sensory information, 
but rather due to partly-processed perceptual information. To do this we created a simple three group 
comparative design, with 78 observations. Each one of the three groups viewed the same VE under 
three display conditions: high-quality graphical, low-quality graphical, and text-only. Using the model, 
we predicted that the text and low-quality graphics displays would produce the same presence levels, 
while the high-quality display would outperform them both. The results were mixed, with the Slater, 
Usoh & Steed scale showing the predicted pattern, but the Presence Questionnaire showing each 
condition producing a significantly different presence score (in the increasing order: text, low-quality 
graphics, high-quality graphics). We conclude from our studies that the model shows the correct basic 
structure, but that it requires some refinement with regards to its dealings with non-immersive displays. 
We examined the performance our presence measure, which was found to not perform satisfactorily. 
We conclude by proposing some points relevant to the methodology of presence research, and by 
suggesting some avenues for future expansion of our model.  
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
“Professor [Thomas B.] Sheridan agreed that the development of a cognitive theory of presence would 
be a highly desirable goal. He suggested that ‘pieces of it are lying around’” 
Synopsis of general audience discussion, 1987 symposium of the NRC 
Committee on Human Factors (from Sheridan, Kruser, & Deutsch, 1987). 
 
This dissertation deals with presence in virtual environments, and specifically with the problems of 
explaining and predicting presence. Presence has many definitions and it is difficult to define 
operationally (see chapter two for some of the most influential of these definitions), but it is not 
difficult to attain a “gut feeling” for this phenomenon. Presence has been defined as a feeling of “being 
there” in the virtual environment (Sheridan, 1992; Slater & Wilbur, 1995), or the sense that the medium 
you are watching disappears to leave only the scene you are watching (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). 
Others define presence as the desire to interact with computer controlled agents as if they were real 
people (Sheridan, 1996). Generally, presence is a feeling, derived from experiencing a virtual 
environment or other medium, that one is involved with the medium at more than face value, or that it 
is affecting one more than simply watching a scene would. 
 
If presence is simply a feeling, then why is it, to paraphrase Sheridan, a highly desirable goal to 
develop a cognitive theory of presence? Again, the answer is complex, and the complexities are 
discussed fully in chapter two. The basis of the answer lies in the fact that presence is more than a 
simple feeling; the feeling is akin to the tip of an iceberg, whose submerged mass includes a vast 
number of potential psychological effects. These range from an improvement in the task being 
performed in the VE (Barfield, Zeltzer, Sheridan, & Slater, 1995) to a sense of companionship and 
social inclusion in a virtual group (Blake, Casanueva & Nunez, 2001). To maximize the benefits of 
presence, it is necessary to understand its causes and consequences. A theory is thus a necessity if one 
is to take advantage of these effects.  
 
Many other researchers have created explanations of presence. However, none have, in our opinion, 
created an explanation of presence which takes enough advantage of recent findings in cognitive 
psychology. Most presence researchers agree that perception plays an important role in presence, 
although very few extend beyond perception to include the processes which control behaviour in the 
environment. We contend that the richness of psychological research into the link between perception, 
cognition and action (see Chapter three for a review) can be applied to the presence problem to create 
not only an explanation of presence, but also a means by which it could be predicted. We attempted to 
create such a theory by combining the pieces which Sheridan alerted us were ‘lying around’. This 
dissertation contains our synthesis of findings from the presence research community with those of 
cognitive psychology, together with a preliminary empirical validation of our ideas.
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1.1 Aims of the project 
This project aims to produce a model which will both explain current presence findings in a unified 
way, and have the capacity to predict a subject’s feeling of presence from a given set of initial 
conditions. To perform this task, we synthesized findings from the presence field with theories from 
cognitive psychology (see section Error! Reference source not found. below for more detail on the 
method used). The major theoretical aims of this dissertation are: 
 
1. To attempt to unify the various strands of presence conceptualization by redefining them in 
terms of well-understood psychological processes which are responsible for ensuring 
environmentally appropriate behaviour. We call our unified concept cognitive presence. 
 
2. To create a conceptual model to explain and predict cognitive presence. To do this, we make 
use of a connectionist architecture defined by McClelland & Rumelhart (1986). This model 
will include both top-down and bottom-up processes. This is, we believe, the first model of its 
kind in the presence field to give equal importance to these two fundamental perceptual 
processes. 
 
3. To create a measure of cognitive presence. We wish to not require questionnaires or 
introspection. Preferably, it should be administered during the VE experience to minimize 
memory distortions. We call our measure the Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI). 
 
4. To establish the validity of our theory by means of empirical investigation (see 1.2.2 below for 
more details of how this will be achieved). 
 
 
Finally, we aim to investigate the psychometric properties our own presence measurement (the 
COCI), as we as of two published scales, namely the Slater, Usoh & Steed scale (1995), and the 
Presence Questionnaire of Witmer & Singer (1995).  
1.2 The research 
The method we used in this dissertation is unremarkable, and makes use of established empirical 
research practices from the fields of experimental psychology. We first engaged the theoretical goals of 
the project (outlined in 1.1 above), and then proceeded to empirically validate those ideas. Although 
our research aimed to support our theoretical model, we found one unexpected and powerful effect; 
namely, we found that creating an expectation in our users of the theme of the VE they were about to 
visit (by means of conceptual priming), lead to a differential effect on presence for users viewing high 
and low quality displays. 
1.2.1 Theoretical development 
We began the project by conducting a thorough analysis of current views and concepts of presence. 
Also, we investigated the views of cognitive psychology on the problem of maintaining behaviour 
appropriate to environmental conditions. Once this review was complete, we developed our concept of 
cognitive presence. 




The next step was to create a method of measuring cognitive presence. We looked at the presence 
measurement literature, paying special attention to the criticisms of existing measures. We also 
reviewed the psychometrics literature, to determine the constraints and requirements of a psychological 
measure. From these elements, we created the concept of the Contents of Consciousness Inventory. 
 
With these two goals achieved, we then turned to the central problem of creating an explanatory and 
predictive model of presence. We turned first to the presence modeling literature, to examine the 
successes and failures therein. Also, we looked at how cognitive psychologists model complex 
behaviour, and selected the connectionist architecture based on this review. We then proceeded to 
slowly create the model presented in Chapter five, by reviewing the literature at each stage to ensure 
that there was enough evidence to support each change we made to the model. 
 
To ensure that the model we created was coherent with respect to the current body of presence 
literature, we selected two major published studies identifying causes of presence, and predicted their 
results with the model. The model was capable of predicting the actual findings (see Chapter 6 for the 
details of this process). 
1.2.2 The empirical component 
To test our theories empirically, we decided to identify a few of the foundation elements of our theories 
and test those. We reasoned that testing the foundations was preferable to testing the periphery, because 
a weakness in the foundations implies weakness in the periphery, but not vice-versa. 
 
We identified the two major foundational components of our model to test: 
 
1. The quality of the display will affect the degree of presence experienced by the user, and 
simultaneously, the user’s mental state will affect how much they respond to the display.  
 
2. Presence does not come about as a consequence of sensory information, but rather as a 
consequence of the mental processing of an environment. 
 
Each of these points was investigated by means of an experiment. We designed each experiment and 
then used the model to predict the presence level in each case. We then conducted the experiments, and 
compared the empirical finding to the model’s prediction 
 
Experiment 1: This experiment investigated the degree to which display quality affects presence, and 
also the degree to which the user’s mental state affects how they process the display. A secondary goal 
was to ascertain the validity and reliability of our presence questionnaire, the contents of consciousness 
inventory (COCI). Our hypotheses were that higher stimulus quality would improve the presence 
experience, and that priming (i.e. providing the subjects with information about the setting of the VE) 
would improve the presence experience. Details of this experiment are in Chapter eight. We used a 2x2 
factorial design, with display quality and priming (manipulation of the user’s mental state) as 
independent variables. The dependent variable was presence, as measured by Slater, Usoh & Steed’s 
scale (1995), Witmer & Singer’s Presence Questionnaire (1998), and our own COCI scale. We used 
two separate VEs, one representing a medieval monastery, the other a contemporary hospital. This was 
done to ensure generality; if the results were repeated in two such different settings, we would have 
more confidence in our findings. 
 
The results from this experiment supported the first hypothesis (higher quality stimuli result in higher 
presence scores), but the second hypothesis was only partly satisfied. Specifically, we found a 
significant interaction between stimulus quality and priming. The effect of this is that priming lead to 
higher presence scores in the case of the subjects viewing the VE in a high quality display, but 
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decreased the presence scores of those viewing the VE in a low quality display. This finding is quite 
surprising, particularly as the priming manipulation only related the setting of the VE (i.e. hospitals or 
monasteries) , and made no references to virtual environments or to display technology. 
 
Experiment 2: This experiment tested the degree to which a text-based display is able to produce 
presence in subjects. Our hypotheses were that text displays would produce lower scores than text 
displays, and that priming would reduce the difference between text displays and graphical displays. 
We compared the presence scores collected on Slater, Usoh & Steed’s scale (1995), Witmer & Singer’s 
Presence Questionnaire (1998), and our own COCI scale of three groups of users. The first experienced 
a VE using a text-based display, and the other two groups viewed the same VE in the high quality and 
low quality graphical display conditions used in experiment 1. The details of this experiment are in 
chapter nine. We used a simple three group comparative design, with VE display as the independent 
variable, and presence as the dependent variable. 
 
Our results showed that text displays produced lower presence scores that high quality graphical 
displays under all experimental conditions, but it was superior to low quality graphical displays under 
certain conditions. We surmise that this instability was due to artifacts of the questionnaires, 
particularly the PQ.  
 
Apart from testing the basic tenets of our model, we also used the data collected in both experiments to 
conduct an analysis of the validity and reliability of our COCI scale, as directed in Anastasi & Urbina 
(1996). We also performed these analyses on the Slater, Usoh & Steed scale (1995), as well as Witmer 
& Singer’s Presence Questionnaire (1998), to determine the quality of these scales. 
1.3 Outline of this dissertation 
Chapter 2:  In Chapter 2, we present a discussion of presence, based on the literature available at 
the time of writing. We begin by discussing the various conceptualizations of 
presence which exist in the literature. We then present a detailed overview of 
presence measurement by considering five broad categories of presence measure, 
examining examples of each class, and providing a brief discussion of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of each. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an 
examination of presence models. We consider major classes of presence models, and 
provide a detailed examination and critical evaluation of six important models: the 
causal model of IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & Avons (2000), Steuer’s model 
(1992), Slater & Usoh’s representation systems theory (1993), Thie & van Wijk’s 
general presence theory (1998), the Immersion, Presence and Performance model 
(Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix, 1999), and Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht’s 
path-analysis model (1999). 
 
Chapter 3:  Chapter 3 presents an introduction to the various psychological concepts which we 
make use of in the development of our model. Specifically, we focus on the theory 
created by cognitive psychologists to explain the selection and regulation of 
environmentally appropriate behaviour. We provide detailed discussions of the 
concepts of schemata (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) and of scripts (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). The chapter closes with an introduction to connectionist 
architectures, with a detailed description of the workings of the interactive activation 
and competition architecture (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Martindale, 1981), 
which we use for our presence model. 
 
Chapter 4:  This chapter introduces and discusses the problems created by the diversity of 
presence conceptualizations and measurement strategies which currently exist. We 
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then critically consider Lombard & Ditton’s (1997) solution to this problem, and 
present an argument as to why that solution is not complete. The use of the 
psychology of behaviour selection (described in Chapter three) is suggested as 
another possible unifying component for presence, and we derive the notion of 
cognitive presence from this psychological research. We them consider the 
measurement of cognitive presence, and introduce the Contents of Consciousness 
Inventory (COCI) as a measuring instrument for this concept. The chapter closes 
with a critical discussion of our suggested solution. 
 
Chapter 5:  Chapter 5 defines our connectionist model of presence, and discusses how it relates 
to previous models (presented in Chapter two). After demonstrating the basic 
architecture, we provide a detailed description of each component, namely the 
conceptual layers, the action layer, and the perceptual analyzers. For each of these 
components, we discuss its derivation from the basic architectures defined by 
McClelland & Rumelhart (1986) and Martindale (1981). We also justify the structure 
and existence of each component in terms of psychological theory and findings from 
the presence field. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of how presence is 
expressed by the model. 
 
Chapter 6:  In this chapter, we present examples of how our model operates, by showing the 
reader how the model was used to successfully predict two published results in the 
presence field. We show how the model predicts the effect of manipulating the 
geometric field of view (Hendrix & Barfield, 1995), as well as the effect of using 
multimodal rather than unimodal display systems (Salln?s, 1999). 
 
Chapter 7:  This chapter proposes a strategy for evaluating the validity of our model. We 
describe four conditions which the model will be tested with, and use the model to 
predict a level f presence for each. The present the results which we expect, if the 
model is indeed valid. 
 
Chapter 8:  Chapter 8 describes the first experiment which we conducted as an implementation of 
the validation strategy described in Chapter seven. This experiment tested the 
relationship between priming and display quality, with respect to three measures of 
presence. The major finding is that priming affects the way that the display quality 
creates presence, and that, disregarding priming, display quality is a reliable cause of 
presence. We also found that the presence measures of Slater, Usoh & Steed (1995) 
correlates closely with the scale of Witmer & Singer (1998), and that both of these 
scales display good validity. We also found that our experimental COCI measure is 
not suitable for measuring presence. 
 
Chapter 9:  This chapter describes the second experiment we conducted, in line with the 
validation program outlined in Chapter seven. This experiment tested whether 
extremely low immersiveness displays (text-based) could induce presence, as 
predicted by our model. We found slightly mixed results, suggesting that text-only 
displays could induce presence as well as low-quality graphical displays, but not as 
high as high-quality displays. 
 
Chapter 10:  In Chapter ten we present a summary of the results collected in experiments 1 and 2. 
We conclude that the data provide some support for the validity of the model. The 
model was not able to predict the unique relationship between priming and presence. 
Also, the model predicted that, given the right conditions, non-immersive displays 
could bring about presence as effectively as immersive displays. The data collected 
in this regard was inconclusive, and so the question remains an open one. After 
considering these results, we discuss their implications for the model, and re-evaluate 
the model’s usefulness as a presence-predicting tool. 




Chapter 11:  This chapter presents some discussion of methodological issues raised during the 
conduct of this research, including an analysis of the psychometric properties of the 
presence measures used. We find that Witmer & Singer’s scale presents high 
reliability, and adequate validity, although it is not suited for use with non-immersive 
displays. We also find that Slater, Usoh & Steed’s (1995) scale shows unacceptably 
low reliability, but adequate validity. We then consider some of the implications 
raised by the experiments to the field of presence research, focusing on the role of 
priming, its possible existence as a confound variable, and how this may be 
overcome. 
 
Chapter 12:  This chapter concludes the dissertation by providing a summary of the obtained 
results, and the conclusions drawn. We close with some suggestions for future work.  
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Chapter 2  
Presence: concepts, measures, 
models 
The concept of presence in virtual environments is complex, and there exist many interpretations of it. 
It is impossible to enter into a substantial discussion of presence without first considering the various 
shades of meaning which compose the term presence. This diversity of meaning has lead to an equally 
diverse set of philosophies of presence measurement and explanation. This chapter considers the major 
schools of thought on presence conceptualization, and critically evaluates the various presence 
measurement methodologies. To close the chapter, we conduct a critical and detailed examination of a 
selection of models and other theoretical structures which have been proposed in the literature to 
explain and predict presence.  
2.1 Immersion 
A term which often appears in the presence literature is immersion. The term presence is complex and 
will be discussed in detail below, but the term immersion, although more simple, leads perhaps to more 
confusion, due to the fact that it has two quite different definitions. The first definition is psychological. 
In this sense, immersion refers to a feeling of being deeply involved in the virtual world, and entering it 
as if it were real (Coomans & Timmermanns, 1997, in Smith, Marsh, Duke & Wright, 1998), Witmer 
& Singer (1998) provide a more precise psychological definition for immersion. For them, immersion 
is “a psychological state characterized by perceiving oneself to be enveloped by, included in, and 
interacting with an environment that provides a continuous stream of stimuli and experiences” (Witmer 
& Singer, 1998, p. 227). They further explain that immersion in a virtual environment (VE) is a 
function of isolation from real-world stimuli, the perception of self-inclusion in the VE, natural modes 
of interaction with the VE, and the perception of self-motion through the VE. 
 
It is clear from Witmer & Singer’s definition that immersion (in the psychological sense) can be greatly 
affected by the hardware used to display the virtual environment. A head-mounted display (HMD), for 
example, provides more isolation from real world stimuli, and head tracking provides a natural mode of 
interaction. Similarly, a surround-sound system can provide a better sense of being surrounded by the 
VE than stereo speakers alone can. This notion is embodied in the second definition of immersion, 
which considers immersion in terms of display quality. Slater & Wilbur (1995) define immersion as a 
list of technologies which are necessary to induce presence. They agree with the notion that to be 
immersed is to be surrounded, but they argue that this can only be achieved with display technologies, 
such as head-mounted displays, which block out real world stimuli and provide virtual environment 
stimuli to the user’s senses. It is thus possible to express the degree of immersion by simply stating the 
display technology used (Slater &. Wilbur, 1995). Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht summarize this 
idea by stating, “immersion can be described objectively” (1999, p. 269). Witmer & Singer (1998) 
oppose this stance, arguing that immersion is a user experience, and although technology is the means
 by which immersion is achieved, immersion cannot be reduced to a list of the technology used to 
display it. 
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2.2 Telepresence and presence 
Historically speaking, the concept of presence seems to have been derived from the term telepresence, 
which comes from the remote operation field. Akins, Minsky, Thiel & Kurtzman (1983, in Held & 
Durlach, 1992) reported that operators of high performance teleoperation systems often experienced the 
sense of being at the remote worksite rather than at the operator’s terminal. Sheridan (1992) discusses 
this concept, and argues that telepresence arises from the mental representation that the teleoperator 
creates of the remote manipulator. Sheridan argues that if the remote manipulator presents a view of the 
remote site which matches that which the teleoperator would view were she at the site, and the lag 
between the operator’s input and the feedback on those inputs were minimized, then telepresence 
would occur. Sheridan goes further, and states that the remote site need not be real; a virtual place with 
a virtual remote manipulator could also induce this sense of telepresence. To distinguish between 
telepresence felt for a real remote site and for a virtual site, Sheridan suggests referring to the latter as 
virtual presence. 
2.3 Major schools of presence conceptualization 
The rather straightforward concept of presence put forward by Sheridan (1992) has become more 
complex as more research has been done. Many researchers have since identified various forms of 
presence. Lombard & Ditton (1997) reviewed their contemporary conceptualizations of presence and 
created six categories of definitions, which they term dimensions of presence. Schuemie, van der 
Straaten, Krijn & van der Mast (2001) identify a further eleven uses of the term. Although there is a 
great deal of variety in these terms, we create three broad categories of presence conceptualizations for 
the purposes of this discussion  (namely social, personal and environmental conceptions). Our 
categorization is similar to that used by IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & Avons (2000), who 
summarize Lombard & Ditton’s taxonomy into two broad categories: physical and social. Our first 
category, social, contains all concepts of presence which emphasize social interaction, communication, 
or the existence of entities in the VE other than the user. The second category, personal, includes 
conceptualizations which focus on individual users and their psychological states. The final category, 
environment, includes conceptualizations which emphasize the environment or task performed in the 
VE. 
2.3.1 Social conceptualizations 
Researchers working in the area of computer mediated communication and collaborative virtual 
environments are interested in the degree to which presence is capable of supporting intimate personal 
communications, collaborative work, and other social experiences (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Such 
researchers consider users to be present in an environment when they are engaging in meaningful 
communication or other forms of social interaction. Several examples of this type of concept exist in 
the literature. Heeter (1992) proposes the term social presence, arguing that finding another person in 
the VE provides further evidence for the existence of the VE as a real place. She also argues for the 
importance of socially constructed realities for presence, which may arise as a consequence of having a 
group sharing a VE. These social realities will help to add meaning to the world, and further increase 
the sense that the VE is more than simple images (Heeter, 1995). 
 
A term related to this idea is co-presence, which refers to the degree that a user feels that other agents 
in the VE represent real users (Durlach & Slater, 2000). Unlike social presence, co-presence is not 
thought to contribute to the personal varieties of presence (Slater, Sadagic, Usoh, & Shroeder, 2000), 
although there is evidence to suggest that the two are related (Blake, Casanueva & Nunez, 2001). 
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Slater, Usoh, Benford, Snowdon, Brown, Rodden, Smith, & Wilbur (1996) propose four aspects that 
are necessary to co-presence, and distinguish it from personal presence: 
 
1. Personal presence must occur logically before co-presence. 
2. A graphical representation of the user in the virtual world is necessary 
3. The user must perceive the possibility of interaction or exchanging of information with the 
others in the VE; their static existence is not sufficient. 
4. Graphical representations of the others in the VE. Slater et al (1996) suggest that the form of 
representation required may vary from user to user. 
 
Lombard & Ditton (1997) propose the idea that a form of presence can also exist when the user acts as 
social actor inside the VE. They argue that when a VE contains other interactive entities, a present user 
will respond to them by behaving in accordance with the social rules which would apply to a similar 
situation in the real world. Cassell & Thorisson (1999) provide examples of how gaze direction and 
conversation pauses can be used by intelligent agents to encourage users to engage them with natural 
social modes. This type of agent in the VE can lead to another of Lombard & Ditton’s dimensions, 
namely the environment performing as a social actor to the user. The interaction between agents and 
users in this way can, according to Delaney (1992, in Heeter, 1995), lead to a strong sense of social 
presence.  
2.3.2 Personal conceptualizations 
Sheridan’s (1992) concept of presence is an example of the personal type. In Sheridan’s view, presence 
occurs under two conditions. Firstly, the user must be viewing images of the VE from the perspective 
that the user would see if the VE were truly occupied. Secondly, the user must be able to interact with 
the VE in some way (even if only by moving through it), and must receive timely feedback for their 
actions. Once these conditions are met, then the subject will begin to feel if they are in the virtual world 
rather than in the room where the display equipment resides (Sheridan, 1992). This notion is quite 
similar to that expressed by Slater & Usoh (1993), who define presence as “the (suspension of dis-) 
belief that they are in a world other than where their real bodies are located” (Slater & Usoh, 1993, p. 
222). Like Sheridan (1992), Slater & Usoh also see an important link between the hardware used 
(which they term immersive properties), and presence (Slater & Usoh, 1993). The basic notion of 
presence as “being there” is a common feature of many personal conceptualizations. Lombard & Ditton 
categorize definitions which emphasize this “being there” factor as transportation concepts (1997). 
Heeter (1995) takes a slightly different line to Sheridan and Slater & Usoh. Rather than suggesting that 
presence spontaneously occurs when particular display criteria have been met, she argues that each of 
the features of the VE, display system or otherwise, provides the user with a piece of evidence about 
their existence in the VE. For instance, seeing your body (or self-representation) moving in a natural 
way in the VE presents convincing evidence that you are in the VE. However, there can also be 
evidence working to the contrary, such as poor rendering quality, and other features of the display 
system (Held & Durlach, 1992). On balance, however, the more positive evidence that exists, the more 
present the user will feel (Heeter, 1995). Zeltzer (1992) also works with a more active definition that 
those of Sheridan and Slater & Usoh. Zeltzer proposes that interaction, which he defines as “the degree 
of access to model parameters at runtime (i.e. the ability to define and modify states of a model with 
immediate response)” (Zeltzer, 1992, p. 127) is an important aspect of presence, and that interacting 
with an environment can contribute to the sense of presence. However, Zeltzer also recognizes the 
importance of the deterministic character of presence, and suggests a component simply called 
presence, which is similar to Slater & Usoh’s use of the term. Unlike Slater & Usoh, however, Zeltzer 
does not consider this component alone to be enough for presence. He justifies this position by writing, 
“[w]e are immersed in a very high bandwidth stream of sensory input, organized by our perceiving 
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systems, and out of this ‘bath’ of sensation emerges our sense of being in the world. This feeling is also 
engendered by our ability to affect the world through touch, gesture, voice, etc.” (Zeltzer, 1992, p.128).  
Schloerb (1995) argues against the use of transportation definitions (i.e. definitions which emphasize 
the sensation of being somewhere other than at the display apparatus), as he believes that making 
reference to user’s feelings is imprecise; to replace it, he proposes the concept of subjective presence. 
According to Schloerb, a subject is said to be subjectively present when they cannot accurately identify 
whether they are in the real world, or in the virtual world. Subjective presence, says Schloerb, can exist 
in degrees, although it is not made clear how this would occur. 
 
A final, significant, conceptualization to consider in our personal category is the one proposed by 
Lombard & Ditton (1997). They attempt to unify the various presence definitions, arguing that each 
shares a common core. They identify each concept as representing one or more aspects of an illusion of 
non-mediation. They define the illusion of non-mediation as the psychological state where a viewer 
fails to perceive the medium of communication, and responds as if the medium were not there 
(Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Lombard & Ditton suggest that there are four consequences for the user 
when this illusion of non-mediation occurs: 
 
1. An invisible medium can provide stimuli which are more rich and meaningful. This includes 
both physical stimuli (of the VE) as well as social stimuli. 
 
2. The dissolution of mediation means that the barrier between “inside the VE” and “outside the 
VE” disappears. Objects and persons previously on opposite sides of the barrier now share a 
common space 
 
3. Actors in the medium will be perceived as being non-mediated, which in turn will encourage 
the user to respond to them with the social responses which are normally reserved for 
inhabitants of the real world 
 
4. Because the barrier between the VE and the real world have disappeared, social cues produced 
by actors in the VE are more likely to be interpreted by the user as if they were real social cues 
coming from real persons. 
2.3.3 Environmental conceptualizations 
The final category of presence concepts groups those definitions which emphasize the role of the 
environment, or of the user’s interaction with the environment. Two philosophical positions which 
have been applied to arrive at definitions of presence are those of Heidegger and Gibson (Sheridan, 
1999). Each one of these positions expresses the relation between a person and their environment, and 
are thus suitable to understanding the relationship between users and virtual environments (Sheridan, 
1999). Sheridan (1999) explains that Heidegger posits that it is quite difficult for a person in the normal 
course of everyday interaction to perceive the components of an environment. During normal 
interactions with the environment, tools are completely transparent to the user, and they are not thought 
of as independent objects (Zahoric & Jenison, 1998). However, when a breakdown in this pattern 
occurs, the disparate components of the situation become apparent. For instance, during hammering a 
nail into a wall, the user is not aware of the hammer; it is simply an extension of their will to have the 
nail in the wall. However, if the hammer should slip out of the hand, then the user would become aware 
of the hammer as a separate entity. 
 
Gibson’s view is similar (in Sheridan, 1999). For Gibson, perception exists primarily to acquire 
information from the environment about how action can be performed on it (to perceive affordances, in 
Gibson’s terminology). For Gibson, affordances are not objects outside the user, but rather parts of the 
user’s perception itself (Mantovani, Riva, 1999). This implies a strong link between perception and 
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action (Gibson, 1979), because perception exists primarily to support appropriate action in the 
environment (Sheridan 1999). 
 
These two environmental positions on perception have been incorporated into a presence 
conceptualization by Zahoric and Jenison (1998). Based on the positions of Heidegger & Gibson, 
Zahoric and Jenison arrive at an environmentally centered definition of presence: “[P]resence is 
tantamount to successfully supported action in the environment” (Zahoric & Jenison, 1998, p. 87). In 
this definition, the term successful means that when the user interacts with the VE, the VE responds in 
a way that seems logical and in concert with the user’s expectations. Zahoric and Jenison see this 
process as central, because, like Gibson, they see perception of an environment as existing only to 
allow meaningful action in that environment. In real environments, according to Heidegger and Gibson, 
action and perception exist in a feedback mechanism, which ensures that operation in the environment 
is always meaningful and directed (Zahoric & Jenison, 1998). Similarly, Zahoric and Jenison see 
presence as being possible only if the VE allows such a feedback mechanism to operate normally. 
2.4 Measurement of presence 
Many methods of measuring presence are currently available, but very few have gained widespread 
use. A few exceptions exist; for instance, Slater, Usoh & Steed’s questionnaire seems to have gained 
some acceptance, although it seems to have been abandoned recently by Slater in favour of 
physiological measures (Slater, 2002a; Slater 2002b). This variety in measurement practice doubtless 
arises from the youth of the subject, and inevitably leads to difficulties for researchers. Slater (1999) 
expresses this frustration succinctly:  “at the end of the day, I use questionnaires because, for the time 
being, I do not know what else to do, and in order to construct predictive equations, concerned with 
how presence varies with other factors in groups of people, some method of quantification is 
necessary” (p. 564). 
 
Presence researchers are currently trying a variety of techniques in search of an effective solution to the 
problem of measurement. Lombard & Ditton (2000) note that the lack of an established measure might 
be due to the wide variety of presence definitions which exist. This variety in definition, they note, 
leads to a variety in measurement philosophies. It is thus extremely difficult to list all the measures that 
are available, and complicating matters further is the problem that many measures are simply used in 
single studies, and are thus not validated. We propose thus to simply outline the major presence 
measurement methodologies, giving a notable measure as an example of each. 
2.4.1 Introspective measures 
This class measures presence by asking the subjects to report introspectively on their experience of 
presence. This is generally done retrospectively, usually directly after the exposure to the VE. There are 
exceptions to this, however. For instance, IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Hamberg, Bouwhuis & Freeman 
(1998) and Freeman, Avons, Pearson & IJsselstiejn (1999) make use of a continuous variation method, 
where the user modifies their response during the actual VE experience. An early measurement method 
making use of introspection is found in Schloerb (1995). Schloerb suggests setting up a situation in 
which subjects wear a head mounted display (HMD), and their task is to state if the images they are 
seeing are of a real environment or of a virtual environment. The HMD worn by the user in each trial 
will either be displaying images of a virtual environment, or footage from cameras filming a real 
environment. Each subject makes many such judgments, and the measure of presence is derived from 
the ratio of correct identifications to incorrect identifications. This strategy attempts to define presence 
purely in terms of the system, however, as the measurement refers not to the subject, but rather to the 
system’s capacity to evoke presence in a user (Schloerb refers to this as objective presence). In any 
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event, Schloerb did not implement his method, and there is thus no information on the method’s 
validity or reliability. 
 
Another well known example of the introspective method is the Slater, Usoh & Steed questionnaire 
(sometimes referred to as the SUS, for the authors’ names). This scale has existed in several revisions. 
Examples of its use can be found in Slater & Usoh (1993), Slater et al (1994), Slater et al (1995) and 
Usoh et al (1999). The last major revision of this scale was presented in Slater et al (1995), and no 
significant changes have been published since.  
 
The SUS consists of six items, each of which is an introspection task for the subject. The response 
format of each item is a semantic differential scale, allowing the subject an expression of degree. An 
example of an item of this scale is (semantic anchors in parentheses): 
 
When you think back to the experience, do you think of the virtual environment more as images that 
you saw or more as somewhere that you visited? 
(images that I saw) (somewhere that I visited) 
 
This scale has not been submitted to a formal reliability test by its authors. The scale has also not been 
validated against an independent measure. The measure has, however, shown a fair degree of construct 
validity, as several studies have shown it to be sensitive to changes in the immersive properties of a 
VE, in line with the presence theory of its authors (e.g. Slater et al, 1994; Usoh et al, 1999, Slater & 
Usoh, 1993, and 2.5.3 below). 
 
Another measure which uses the introspective method, is the Igroup Presence Questionnaire (Schubert, 
Friedmann & Regenbrecht, 1999). Note, however, that only some of the IPQ items are introspective. 
The IPQ consists of 13 items, which are aimed at measuring spatial presence (the sense that a VE is a 
real place). This scale also makes use of the semantic differential response format for quantifying 
subject responses. Several items of this questionnaire ask the subject to introspect on various aspects of 
the VE experience, for instance (semantic anchors in parentheses): 
 
How real did the virtual world seem to you? 
(about as real as an imagined word) (indistinguishable from the real world) 
 
The original IPQ was created in German, and a great deal of reliability and validity research was 
conducted to determine its psychometric properties (Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht, 2001). 
However, the English translation of the test has not been verified to be valid. Anastasi & Urbina (1996) 
warn that translating a test from one language to another can significantly alter its psychometric 
properties (particularly its reliability). Therefore, before the English version is widely adopted, further 
validation and reliability analyses should be undertaken. 
 
The criticisms of introspection based measures are many and varied. Slater (1999) criticizes them due 
to their subjectivity. He argues that self-reports of experience are unsuitable for measuring presence, 
because the measurement becomes inextricably tied into personal aspects of the user. Even if two 
subjects had the same experience, he argues, it is unlikely that they would provide the same report. 
Slater’s argument seems to extend itself to the reliability of these measure (i.e. the degree of noise it 
measures), but does not cover aspects of validity. Slater argues that other techniques (such as 
ethnography) could provide the same information as introspective measures, without the subjectivity 
penalty he perceives in introspective measures.  
 
Introspection measures attempt to tap directly into the user’s experience of presence. These measures 
assume that an individual has direct access to the information which makes up their experience. 
However, this might not be the case. A study by Nisbett & Wilson (1977) demonstrated the limits of 
introspection with a series of studies. In one study, subjects were asked to select, from a row of five 
identical pairs of stockings, the pair they thought was the best of the five. Once they had made their 
choice, they were asked to introspect as to why they chose that particular pair. Although most subjects 
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chose they right-most pair, the explanations of their choice varied widely, with subject quoting the 
colour, quality of cloth, and various other reasons for their choice. Nisbett & Wilson argued that 
introspective reports do not function as memories of mental process, but rather they are a process of the 
subject constructing an explanation of their behaviour based on their personal theories of behaviour. 
These theories, argue Nisbett & Wilson, are held a priori, and are used by subjects to maintain a sense 
of meaningful action, even if their behaviour has no rational basis. 
 
From the skepticism of Nisbett & Wilson we can infer that introspection is a less than ideal method of 
obtaining reports of a user’s psychological state, particularly if the report occurs after the event in 
question, where memory artifacts can further obscure the experience (Eysenk & Keane, 1995). These 
limitations of introspection translate into a decrease in the construct validity of the scale, because such 
scales will, apart from measuring presence, also measure the na?ve hypotheses held by the subjects.  
 
A recent development in introspective scales which partially overcomes Nisbett & Wilsons’s (1977) 
objections is the Breaks in Presence method of Slater & Steed (2000). This method relies on the subject 
detecting when they experience a discontinuity in their VR experience, such as that which might be 
caused by an artifact in the rendering process (for example, a sudden change in frame rates, tripping 
over the cables of the display, etc). Slater and Steed argue that by counting the number of reports of 
these breaks in presence (BIPs), an estimate of presence can be obtained. To support the validity of 
their technique, they present data from one empirical study using 20 subjects. In this study, subjects 
were immersed in one of two VEs (High activity and Low activity), one of which demanded interaction 
with the VE and the other did not. Apart from performing the VE task, subjects were asked to vocalize 
when a BIP occurred; they were also administered the SUS presence scale (discussed above). Across 
both groups (High and Low activity together) Slater and Steed found a positive, significant correlation 
between the BIP measure and SUS scores (r = 0.8, n = 20). They did not evaluate the reliability of their 
method. 
 
The BIPs method’s most intriguing characteristic seems to be its ability to overcome the fundamental 
scaling problems inherent in introspection scales, by allowing the subject only to respond to a stimulus 
extreme (although this obviously restricts the measurement of the variance of the phenomenon and thus 
hides a certain amount of information). However, the BIPs method can be criticized on several points. 
Firstly, the evidence presented by Slater and Steed for the BIPs method is not particularly compelling, 
given the very small sample used. Their method of validation can also be questioned on the basis of 
their choice of only one other presence scale to compare with. When validating scales by means of the 
concurrent validation method, as Slater and Steed have done, it is always preferable to compare one’s 
scale with as many other as possible, to reduce the likelihood that both scales are measuring the same 
third variable (Gregory, 1991; Cronbach, 1990). Their decision to use only a single measure to compare 
against seems odd, given the broad range of measures available in 2000, the year of that paper’s 
publication. 
 
The BIPs method can also be criticized, as Slater and Steed themselves admit (2000), on its theoretical 
grounds. They admit that there is not much evidence that presence occurs as a dichotomous 
phenomenon, although it is not unreasonable to suggest that breaks in presence are experienced as 
binary changes. A second criticism which they raise about their method, is the assumption that the 
requirement for the subjects to report BIPs will not affect their capacity to accurately report the BIPs. 
They point to findings from a study of the cognitive processing of ambiguous symbols (Girgus, Rock & 
Egatz, 1977 in Slater & Steed, 2000) which suggest that knowledge that a BIP might occur could 
increase the rate of BIP reporting, which would lead to under-estimates of presence. They counter this 
objection by arguing that subjects would only be conscious of the requirement to report BIPs after the 
BIP occurred; that is, the BIP itself would act as a recall cue to reporting the BIP. Slater (2002a) has 
recently argued that the BIPs technique could be improved by creating a physiological meaure of a 
BIP, such as by means of a polygraph. This technique has not yet been tested, so it remains to be seen 
if it will be effective (see 2.4.4 below for a discussion of physiological measures of presence). 
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2.4.2 Measures of cause 
This class of measure is largely indirect, and based upon a causal model of presence. Although many of 
these measures still rely on self-report by the subjects, we do not classify them as introspective 
measures as they do not expect the user to report on subjective experiences such as feelings or 
impressions. Rather, these measures gauge the subjects’ perceptions of various variables thought to 
cause presence, and so Nisbett & Wilsons’s (1977) criticisms do not apply. From these perceptual self- 
reports, the measures infer presence which the subject must have felt, based on the causal model used 
by the scale. The best known of these measures is probably the Presence Questionnaire (PQ) of Witmer 
& Singer (1998). The PQ consists of approximately 30 items (the number varies depending on the 
revision of the test), each of which is of the semantic differential type. The items are grouped into four 
conceptual groups, termed factors (note that these groups were derived conceptually, not via a factor 
analytic method). Briefly, the four groups are (examples are drawn from Witmer & Singer, 1998): 
 
1. Control: related to how well the subject was able to move or interact with the VE. For 
instance, How natural was the mechanism that controlled movement through the 
environment? 
 
2. Sensory: related to environmental richness, consistency of information, perception of 
movement, etc. For example, How closely were you able to examine objects? 
 
3. Distraction: related to the focusing of attention and awareness of the interface. An example: 
How much did the visual display quality interfere or distract you from performing assigned 
tasks or required activities? 
 
4. Realism: related to the realism of the scene and the meaningfulness of the experience, for 
instance, How well could you identify sounds? 
 
One of the essential features of the PQ is its lack of any items which directly query the subject about 
the experience of presence. All four factors are measuring the perception (in a direct, Gibsonian sense) 
of display system features. This implies that the PQ measures causes of presence rather than presence 
itself. Presence causality has not yet been fully determined, so this means that some of the causes 
which the PQ measures must have been arrived at by theoretical rather than empirical means. This 
implies that the PQ must rely, in part at least, on some theoretical model of presence causality. 
 
Slater (1999) points out that the PQ does not obtain a direct measure of the theorized causes of 
presence because it relies on the subject’s perceptions of them. This, argues Slater, leads to a confound 
between the stimuli and personal aspects of the subject which may affect their perceptions. This 
argument seems plausible, but contains the assumption that stimuli are experienced directly by 
subjects. It assumes, for example, that a particular change in the display properties of the VR system 
will always be perceptible to subjects. Clearly, not all display changes will be perceptible to subjects. 
Asking subjects for their opinions of display features does not, as Slater seems to suggest, simply add 
noise to the measurement, but rather takes a measurement of a signal after it has passed through the 
filter of perception. It seems that the confound that Slater identifies might be insurmountable, because 
presence is a personal experience, and as such is grounded on perceptions rather than stimuli. Even if 
one accepts that the PQ is a measure of perceptions of causes rather than of causes themselves, the PQ 
still does not escape methodological criticism. Because the PQ relies on introspection of perceptions, 
the arguments of Nisbett & Wilson (1977) presented in 2.4.1 above apply here as well. However, as 
Eysenk & Keane (1995) point out, introspections of perceptions are usually far more accurate than 
introspections of experiences. 
 
A different criticism (which can also be applied to Slater, Usoh & Steed’s questionnaire) is that the PQ 
is designed to be administered after the VE experience. This intention is evident by the past-tense 
formulation of the items, as well as by the choice of a 30 item questionnaire, which would be 
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cumbersome to use during a VE experience. This reliance on memory can lead to errors or distortions 
(Eysenk & Keane, 1995), and thus might affect the accuracy of the measurement.  The relative 
importance given to each factor is of concern. The PQ simply sums all the responses, and thus each 
item contributes equally towards the total. However, each of the four factors do not provide an equal 
weight to the total, as there are not an equal number of items in each factor. For example, in version 2.0 
of the PQ (which appeared in Witmer & Singer, 1998), the Control factor has 13 items (40% of all 
items), the Sensory factor 11 items (34% of all the items), the Distraction factor 6 items (19% of all 
items), and the Realism factor 7 (22% of all items). Furthermore, some items contribute to more than 
one scale. Realism shares items with Control (2 items) and with Sensory (1 item). Distraction shares 
one item with Control. Thus, the Control and Sensory factors contribute twice as much to the total 
compared to the Distraction and Realism factors. This uneven weight distribution is not discussed by 
the authors of the PQ to any degree of satisfaction, and without presenting any supporting evidence 
which suggests that control and sensory factors outweigh the others in determining presence. 
 
The Igroup Presence Questionnaire (IPQ) of Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht (1999) contains 
some items similar to those of Witer & Singer’s PQ. These ask the subject to respond with their 
impressions of particular perceptions. For instance, subjects are asked to respond to I was not aware of 
my real environment (fully disagree / fully agree) and to I felt like I was just perceiving pictures (fully 
disagree / fully agree). The discussions on the PQ presented above pertain to these items as well, due to 
their similarity to PQ items. However, the discussion should not be interpreted as applying to the scale 
as a whole, as it also includes a number of items requiring the subject to introspect on the presence 
experience directly; for those items, the arguments presented in 2.4.1 above should be applied. 
2.4.3 Behavioural measures 
This class includes those measures which attempt to detect presence by observing movement or posture 
changes in the user in response to the VE. The concept is simple: if the VE contains some structure or 
element which would trigger some movement or posture change if it were not virtual, and the subject 
responds to that element in the way that one would expect if that element were not virtual, then the 
subject is said to be experiencing presence. 
 
Perhaps the earliest example of such a measure was the observation of reflex responses suggested by 
Held & Durlach (1987, in Sheridan, 1996), and later refined by Loomis (1992). This method assumes 
that particular behaviours are initiated with little volitional input, occurring mainly as responses to 
certain externally originating inputs. Held & Durlach (1987) provide an example. If an object (a ball, 
perhaps) is thrown towards a person, a reflex reaction will occur. This might vary from person to 
person (some may try to catch, and others may try to duck away), but the response occurs reliably in 
most people. Loomis (1992) argues that if such a response occurs towards a virtual object, this 
indicates a belief in the subject that the object is somehow real. Of course, because reflexes occur 
below the level of consciousness, the subject may still rationally object that the VE is not realistic or 
convincing; however, their reflex response to the thrown object, argues Loomis, shows a degree of 
presence. 
 
This method is interesting because, unlike the introspective measures, the observation is not performed 
by the subject, and is carried out unobtrusively, thus reducing the influence of demand characteristics 
and other reactivity effects. Also, this measurement is done during the subject’s VE experience, and so 
the undesirable artifacts of memory can be eliminated. This particular method was used with some 
success by Usoh, Arthur, Whitton, Bastos, Steed, Slater, & Brooks (1999). They included a room with 
a large hole in the floor in their VE in order to investigate a display manipulation. One of the presence 
assessment methods they used consisted of noting if subjects reacted to the virtual precipice in the same 
way they would to a real one (peering over the edge, making exclamations, etc.). This particular 
method is clearly not suitable for use in all settings. Many VEs simply do not include the elements 
which may lead to a reflex reaction (such as holes in the ground, flying balls, etc.). In fact, the inclusion 
CHAPTER 2: PRESENCE: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, MODELS 31 
 
 
of such elements in a VE could act to reduce the realism of the VE, which itself can be a threat to 
presence.  
 
Less intrusive variations of this technique have been investigated. Sheridan (1996) suggests that 
spontaneous nonverbal social behaviours, such as automatic responses to greetings, could also be used 
to the same end. For example, Cassell, Torres, & Prevost (1999) argue that particular phrases and 
conversation structure allow participants in conversations to create a turn-taking order which allow 
conversations to continue without major interruptions. They argue that agents could be programmed to 
include these elements in their utterances to cue human participants and thus increase the realism of the 
interaction, and following Sheridan’s suggestion we suggest that presence could be estimated by noting 
the degree to which users respond to such cues. Similarly, Cassell, & Thorisson (1999) demonstrate 
that gaze direction is used as a social cue that a person’s attention has shifted. If a user is placed into an 
environment with agents displaying these cues, and responds appropriately to them, then this could be 
interpreted as a sign of presence. 
  
Another technique for estimating presence based on behaviour is the observation of subjects’ changes 
in posture during the VE experience. A subject’s posture can change in response to haptic inputs (as 
occurs when one responds to the movements of the carriage when riding in a train), but it can also 
occur in response to visual inputs only (for instance, Lee & Aronson, 1974, in IJsselsteijn, Freeman, de 
Ridder, Avons & Pearson, 2000). Based on this premiss, Freeman, Avons, Meddis, Pearson & 
IJsselsteijn (2000) argue that these changes in posture could be used as an estimator of presence, even 
if the VR system does not include any type of haptic feedback. They subsequently discovered a 
noticeable difference in postural responses between subjects viewing stereo displays and those viewing 
non-stereo displays; this finding was later replicated by IJsselsteijn, Freeman, de Ridder, Avons & 
Pearson (2000). However, these measures of posture were not significantly related to introspective 
measures of presence in either study.  
 
One possible interpretation of the data collected in these two studies is that the lack of relationship 
between the postural measure and the introspective measure suggests that the postural measures are not 
measuring presence. However, we feel that this interpretation is incorrect, as it assumes that 
introspective measure are valid measures of presence. Based on the discussion presented in 2.4.1 
above, we feel that there is not enough evidence to make this claim. Another interpretation of the lack 
of relationship is that postural measures of presence and introspective measures of presence actually 
measure two slightly different concepts. Specifically, introspective measures quantify presence as 
reported by the subject, while postural measures quantify presence as observed by the researcher. Each 
of these concepts will include a particular bias, based on the motives of each individual. Also, each 
method requires a different form of interpretation to quantify. In the first instance, the subject must try 
to quantify a personal sensation; in the second instance the researcher must try to decide if particular 
movement was a change in posture or not. It is conceivable for these differences to explain the lack of 
relationship between these two classes of measure.  
2.4.4 Physiological measures 
Some researchers, such as Barfield & Weghorst (1993) suggest that presence can be objectively 
measured by means of physiological measurements. They suggest the use of electromyography, 
electrocardiography and ocular motion. Prothero, Parker Furness & Wells (1995) suggest that 
electroencephalography could also be used. More recently, Meehan et al (2002) made use of 
electrodermal response, electrocardiography and respirometry. The attractiveness of these measures 
seems to lie with their objectivity. Because the measurements are of physical phenomena, it is possible 
to achieve extremely high levels of reliability (Gregory, 1991). However, as Anastasi & Urbina (1996) 
note, increasing the reliability of a measure does not guarantee a corresponding increase in its validity. 
They argue that the most important indicator of a measurement’s quality is its validity (the degree to 
which the scale measures the construct it aims to measure). An increase in the reliability of a scale, they 
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argue, simply shows the scale’s ability to discriminate the signal from the surrounding noise. 
Reliability, however, says nothing about whether the scale is measuring the correct construct or not. 
Prothero, Parker, Furness & Wells (1995) add to weight to this argument by stating that no 
physiological correlates of presence have been yet identified, and thus not enough evidence exists to 
support the hypothesis that presence can be estimated by observing the physiology of the subject. 
 
Lombard & Ditton (2000) agree with Prothero et al (1995) in principle, but argue for an exception. 
They propose that presence in a special class of virtual environments (those which are expected to 
create detectable physiological changes in users) could be evaluated by this method. An example of 
such an environment was used by Meehan, Insko, Whitton, & Brooks (2002), which presented users 
with a sudden precipitous drop. In such environments, where one can expect to create a reaction of fear, 
then physiological changes, such an increase in heart rate and a decrease in skin resistance, can be 
reasonably expected. Apart from such rather special cases, however, physiological methods offer little 
promise. Sheridan (1992) summarizes the arguments against physiological measures by stating,"[i]t is 
natural to seek an objective measure or criterion that can be used to say that telepresence or virtual 
presence have been achieved. However, telepresence (or virtual presence) is a subjective sensation, 
much like mental workload, and it is a mental model – it is not so amenable to objective physiological 
definition and measurement” (p. 209). 
2.4.5 Comparisons to other mental states 
A new trend in presence measurement is to estimate presence by means of indirect psychological 
measurement. This technique is quite similar to the behavioural measurement method, but does not rely 
on visible behaviours to indicate presence. This method is based on the simple idea that being in any 
environment leads to particular psychological effects, and measuring the degree to which the virtual 
environment is eliciting such effects can be used as a measure of presence. 
 
Based on this notion, simulator sickness is sometimes used as an inverse measure of presence. 
Simulator sickness occurs as a consequence of the mismatch between information presented to the 
visual system and to the vestibular system (Kennedy, Hettinger & Lilienthal, 1988), which can often 
arise from experiencing a poorly implemented simulation (Pausch, Crea & Conway, 1992). Biocca 
(1992) describes simulator sickness as a syndrome containing a host of symptoms which are quite 
similar to those experienced in motion sickness. Its use in measuring presence is twofold. Firstly, 
simulator sickness implies that the simulation is not complete (Pausch et al, 1992), and thus is unlikely 
to lead to presence. Secondly, subjects experiencing simulator sickness will experience difficulty in 
maintaining attention focused on the virtual environment (Witmer & Singer, 1998). This is expected to 
lead to a decrease in presence (Alison, Harris, Jenkin, Jasiobedzka, & Zacher, 2001). Based on these 
arguments some researchers argue that simulator sickness could be used to estimate presence. Witmer 
& Singer, for instance, used simulator sickness as a sign that subjects were not present during the 
validation of their Presence Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998). 
 
The use of simulator sickness as a presence measure is attractive for various reasons. Firstly, there 
exists a large body of research on the relationship between simulator variables, physiology and 
simulator sickness. Secondly, a reliable and valid measuring instrument, the Simulator Sickness 
Questionnaire, already exists to measure it (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum & Lilienthal, 1993). Finally, 
there is some evidence (for example Miller, Sharkey, Graham & McCauley, 1993) to suggest that 
simulator sickness can be evaluated physiologically, which again raises hope for an objective means for 
estimating presence. 
 
Simulator sickness, however, may not be a suitable method for measuring presence. Firstly, there exists 
very little information on the relationship between simulator sickness and presence, which means that it 
is lacking validation as a presence measure. Secondly, even if simulator sickness is found to impede 
presence reliably, that would only mean that one of the necessary conditions for presence to occur 
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would be the lack of simulator sickness. To assert that simulator sickness can be used as an inverse 
measure of presence is to imply that presence and simulator sickness exist in a perfect negative 
relationship. However, it is quite simple to imagine situations where simulator sickness and presence 
would both be zero, or conversely, both be maximized. Consider, for example, a VE which simulates 
sitting on a park bench. There will be no mismatch between the visual and vestibular systems (and 
hence no simulator sickness), as the subject is sitting in both the laboratory and the VE. However, if the 
scene is executed poorly, very little presence is likely to result. In this case, both simulator sickness and 
presence would be at zero (or at least, very low). A second example illustrates the opposite 
phenomenon. Consider a VE of an airplane doing aerobatics. In this situation, there is likely to be 
simulator sickness, as the vestibular and visual systems will be giving quite different messages to the 
user. However, the VE is one in which it might be appropriate to feel motion sickness (whose 
symptoms are similar to those of simulator sickness), so in this case simulator sickness might actually 
contribute to the presence experience. 
 
Another different technique which makes use of comparisons is that suggested by Waller, Hunt & 
Knapp (1998). They argue for investigating fidelity – the extent to which the user’s interactions with 
the VE are indistinguishable from the participant’s observations of and interactions with a real 
environment. This is a highly useful metric, as it provides a measure not only of how much the VE is 
impacting on the user’s mental state, but also allows a direct assessment of the degree to which the VE 
experience might impact performance on a particular task (for example, learning). Mania & Chalmers 
(2001) implemented this technique by comparing memory performance across four conditions: real 
world, HMD display, desktop display and audio only display. Once assigned to a condition, subjects 
experienced a lecture-style presentation in the environment. Mania & Chalmers then tested subjects’ 
memory for the content of the presentation, as well as for the space in which it was experienced. They 
found that presence (as measured by introspective scales) did not correlate with recall performance, but 
they did find that the type of memory for the spaces differed significantly across conditions, suggesting 
that manipulating the depth of immersion leads to a detectable difference in environment recall. 
 
It would be incorrect to dismiss Mania & Chalmer’s (2001) presence assessment method by arguing 
that they failed to find a correlation between their measure and other measures of presence. The fallacy 
of such a statement would be threefold; firstly, such a criticism assumes that there exists a universally 
accepted and operationalized concept presence, and as has been discussed in 2.3 above, this is currently 
not the case. Secondly, the statement assumes that current presence measures are valid and established, 
which as this discussion on measurement attests to, is currently not the case. Finally, even if a universal 
concept of presence existed, with a good measure of it, the statement assumes that presence correlates 
with all effects that a VE might have on a user. Indeed, these three arguments can be applied to any 
broad criticism of measuring presence by means of measuring variables other than presence itself. 
Conversely however, it is also incorrect to assume that the answer to measuring presence lies in 
reducing presence to another variable. 




2.5 Models of Presence 
Many reviews of presence research, such as the recent paper by Schuemie, van der Straaten, Krijn & 
van der Mast (2001) contain a section discussing causes of presence. In this dissertation, we opted to 
not include such a section, for several reasons. Firstly, we choose to avoid a review of causes as this 
dissertation concerns itself with presence modeling and presence prediction – it would be far more 
fruitful for our purposes to consider causes as elements of models rather than as free standing entities. 
Secondly, we feel that speaking about causes of presence gives the false impression that presence is a 
single, unified concept which is widely accepted and understood. The discussions in 2.3 and 2.4 above, 
we believe, suggest that this is not currently the case. The current state of presence measurement, in 
particular, makes it quite difficult to separate a finding from the method which was used to obtain it. 
For example, studies by Slater and colleages (e.g.,  Slater, Usoh, & Steed,1994 or Slater & Usoh, 1993) 
measure presence by means of introspective reports. However,  studies by IJsselsteijn and colleagues 
(e.g. IJsselsteijn, Freeman, de Ridder, Avons, & Pearson, 2000 or IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & 
Avons, 2000) measure presence by means of posture observation. These two measures have not been 
shown to be related (Schuemie & van der Mast, 1999), and therefore, we believe, findings on the 
causes of each should not presented in the same review.  
 
For the purposes of this section, we define a presence model as an explanatory structure whose purpose 
is to predict the occurrence or level of presence a VE user will experience under a particular set of 
circumstances. This prediction may occur quantitatively or qualitatively. This definition excludes 
conceptualizations or definitions of presence, unless these make specific reference to possible causes of 
presence. Hughes (1994) provides a set of four desiderata for positivist models. Briefly, these are: 
 
1. Models should be based (partly, at least) on empirical evidence. This is necessary to ensure 
that the model has a basis upon observation, rather than on conjecture. 
 
2. Models should not simply be post-hoc explanations of previous findings. Hughes (1994) notes 
that it is always possible to create a structure to explain a set of past occurrences, making such 
structures correct a priori. 
 
3. Models should be predictive, not postdictive, structures. Eysenk & Keane (1995) argue that 
the validity of a model exists not only in its ability to account for past observations alone, but 
equally so in its ability to predict future occurrences. 
 
4. The evidence provided for the existence of a model should include instances of the model’s 
ability to remain consistent to findings made before its inception, as well as instances of 
validated predictions made using the model. 
 
Note that the points raised by Hughes also act to create the distinction between a model and a 
definition. Although definitions are sometimes based on empirical findings, definitions have no 
predictive power. Definitions are structures whose purpose is to identify, rather than predict. 
2.5.1 Classes of presence model 
Based upon the criteria outlined in 2.5 above, we identify four classes of presence model.  Each class is 
defined in terms of its structure, its use of empirical findings, and whether it predicts the presence 
experience quantitatively or qualitatively. Note that this classification is based solely on a survey of the 
literature, and is not meant to provide a complete taxonomy of all possible models. The classification 
CHAPTER 2: PRESENCE: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, MODELS 35 
 
 
we propose contains four categories, listed below. Discussions and examples of each category are 
presented in 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4 and 2.5.5 below.  
 
1. Unstructured causal models: These models make use of a flat structure, with short causal 
chains. Typically, these models assume that all named causes work directly on presence, 
without mediation by other factors. These models tend to be strongly based on empirical 
findings, and they are usually capable of qualitative predictions only. These models often limit 
themselves to listing variables which have been empirically established as causes of presence. 
 
2. Structured causal models: These models represent an added level of structural complexity 
above that of the unstructured causal models. They do this by identifying a structure which 
establishes relationships between the identified causes. These models also tend to be 
qualitative in their predictions, although they are not as reliant on empirical findings for 
determining their structure, which is usually extracted from theory. 
 
3. Structured conceptual models: These models are usually the most complex, positing various 
levels of hidden structure (such as feedback loops) between the identified causes of presence, 
and presence itself. These models usually rely on empirical findings to identify input and 
output variables, but the structure connecting them is derived theoretically. These models tend 
to predict presence qualitatively. 
 
4. Regression models: These models aim to quantitatively predict presence by use of single or 
multiple regression, factor analyses, path analyses or some other statistical method. These 
models are usually strictly empirically driven, without a strong theoretical basis. 
2.5.2 Unstructured causal models 
These models explain presence by relating it to a set of cause variables. Typically, no structure is 
present, as each cause variable is thought to act directly on presence. No postulation of mediator or 
moderator variables typically exists in these models. These models are not generally referred to as 
models or theories in the literature, and are typically not expressed explicitly. This type of model has 
appeared in the literature under the names of “factors affecting presence” (Barfield & Hendrix, 1995a), 
“factors underlying presence” (Witmer & Singer, 1998) and “determinants of presence” (Loomis, 1992; 
IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & Avons, 2000). Although the discourse used by these authors seems 
to imply their desire to not have these structures regarded as models, the way in which they are used 
suggests that they are indeed models, because they are often used to make predictions or generate 
hypotheses about presence. These models are created, it seems, by an accumulation of published 
empirical findings. As each new finding is published, the model grows. 
  
IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & Avons’ Model 
 
An example of such a model is present in IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & Avons (2000). In a section 
entitled “determinants of presence” they provide a list of four classes of variable which they argue have 
an effect on presence. Their list is comprised of variables identified through “theoretical analyses” (p. 
396), which have not been tested in the laboratory, and variables identified by empirical procedures. 
Their classification includes: 
 
1. The extent and fidelity of sensory information. This is defined as the amount of useful and 
relevant information presented in a consistent way to the sensory modalities of the user. 
IJsselsteijn et al provide the examples of monocular and binocular cues of spatial layout, 
display resolution and spatial audio.  
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2. The match between sensors and the display. This is defined as the mapping between a 
subject’s action in the VE, and the consequences of those actions in the VE. The example 
provided is that of the link between head-tracking and camera movement. 
 
3. Content factors. This is defined as a broad category which encompasses the objects and 
physical structure of the VE. This includes the subject’s representation in the VE (the avatar), 
as well as the interactions which are possible between the subject and the VE. IJsselsteijn et al 
suggest that the task carried out in the environment, as well as the meaningfulness of its 
content also belong to this category. 
 
4. User characteristics. These factors include the subject’s various faculties, including 
perceptual, cognitive and motor ability. It also includes prior experience with VR, 
expectations, and “willingness to suspend disbelief” (p. 3961). Huang and Alessi (1999 in 
IJsselsteijn et al, 2000) also include states of psychological disorder, such as depression and 
phobia, into this category. 
 
5. Negative cues. This is not included as a category by IJsselsteijn et al, but we include it, as it is 
explained in some depth in their treatise. Unlike the other four categories above, negative cues 
do not contribute to presence, but rather detract from it. This includes all manner of variables, 
including a lack of user attention to the VE, eye strain, outside interruptions and system lag. 
 
Apart from creating these five categories, IJsselsteijn et al group categories 1 and 2 together as being 
media factors, which will contribute towards the illusion of non-mediation. These media factors are the 
factors in the model most grounded on empirical findings, while the others are based mostly on 
conjecture.  
 
We place IJsselsteijn et al’s model into the unstructured causal models category for several reasons. 
Firstly, the model is clearly an attempt not only at explanation, but also at prediction. The list of 
variables is created in an attempt to show the relative importance of some factors over others (an 
explanatory goal), while at the same time, they are used in an attempt to predict presence levels in 
particular situations. For example, considering the large number of media related variables listed, it is 
clear that presence is somehow connected to the fidelity of the stimuli presented to the user (this is an 
explanation). At the same time, by examining the negative cues, it is possible to predict that presence 
will be less if the VE experience occurs in a noisy room than if it occurred in a quiet one (this is a 
prediction). 
 
IJsselsteijn et al’s model predicts presence qualitatively. It provides a mechanism for predicting 
presence in a relative sense (for instance, condition set A will lead to more presence that condition set 
B), but provides no way of determining the quantity of presence which will be felt. Furthermore, all the 
factors of this model are weighted equally, as no concrete indication is given of which factors may be 
of more or less consequence. 
 
This model presents several strengths and weaknesses, most of which are common to all models in its 
class. The most significant weakness is its treatment of previous findings. This is a problem because 
the model is perceived by researchers not as a theoretical structure, but rather as a statement of proven 
facts (by virtue of their having been discovered in the laboratory). Because these statements are 
“known to be true” there is no perceived need to verify them. This is, however, not always the case. 
Even if the results used to build these models are statistically significant, they are often derived from 
modest samples (in the region of 40 subjects), and are not often replicated. This leaves no way of 
verifying that the relationship found was not a product of the particular circumstances in which it was 
discovered. 
 
A second weakness is the model’s lack of cognizance of the relative strengths of the factors which 
compose it. Although the studies upon which such models are based almost always report the statistics 
necessary to compute effect sizes, this is not often done. More importance seems to be given to the fact 
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that a particular variable has a statistically significant relationship to presence, than to the strength of 
that relationship. Although population effect sizes are difficult to compute accurately from small 
samples, it should be possible to create a table of “major factors” and “minor factors” from the 
information available in the literature. Creating such a list would be difficult, as it is rare to find effect 
sizes published in presence research. 
 
A third, important weakness of these models is their disregard for structure. As can be seen in 
IJsselsteijn et al’s model, all variables are considered as having a direct relationship with presence, and 
none are identified as mediators. This lack of structure may arise from the list-like nature of the 
models, which often aim to be understood simply as summaries of empirical findings. However, it is 
important to note that this lack of structure often simply reflects the research on which the models are 
based, as not many published studies exist whose aim was to identify mediators rather than main 
effects. It is entirely possible that when mediator variables begin to be identified, they will begin to be 
incorporated into these models. 
 
This class of model, however also presents a notable strength, namely its reliance on empirically 
derived information. Although some untested factors are sometimes built into these models (as is the 
case in IJsselsteijn et al’s model presented above), these variables are usually identified as such, and far 
more importance is granted to those derived in the laboratory. This is a highly desirable property in any 
model, as it ensures that the information used in the model’s construction truly exists.  
2.5.3 Structured causal models 
Structured causal models show more complexity than unstructured causal models. Like unstructured 
model, structured model still focus on basic causes of presence, but they go further by defining 
structures to relate the causes to one another. Unlike their unstructured counterparts, structured causal 
models are largely perceived as being theories in their own right. A well-known example of such a 
model is that presented by Steuer (1992). Steuer’s model is similar to that of IJsselsteijn et al, in that it 
clusters causal variables into categories; however, Steuer imposes a structure onto these variables, thus 




Steuer uses mainly variables which have been empirically tested, as well as variables which arise from 
theoretical analysis. Steuer’s model is only capable of predicting presence at a qualitative level, as it 
does not incorporate any scalars of either cause or effect. Steuer identifies two major dimensions of VR 
display technology which contribute to presence. These are: 
 
1. Vividness. This refers to the ability of the technology to present a rich set of stimuli to the 
user. According to Steuer, many factors contribute to the vividness of a display, but two are 
most significant. The first of these is breadth, which refers to the capacity of the system to 
stimulate a variety of sensory modalities. The second factor is depth, which refers to the 
amount of data which is carried to each of the stimulated modalities. When perceiving real 
environments, notes Steuer, the senses are almost always stimulated to maximum depth and 
breadth. However, virtual environments present information which is limited in both depth 
and breadth. 
 
2. Interactivity. This dimension is also noted as being a feature of the display system. Steuer 
defines it as the extent to which users of a VE can modify the form or content of that VE. 
Interactivity includes several aspects which have been identified by various other researchers 
as being important to presence. These include Sheridan’s notion of autonomy (Sheridan, 
1992), and Zeltzer’s notion of interactivity (Zeltzer, 1992). Steuer elaborates on the concept of 
interactivity by positing some of the factors from which it is composed. These include speed, 
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range and mapping. Speed refers to the rate at which the environment is able to update in 
response to user input. Range is the number of avenues of change which are open to the user 
at any time, and mapping refers to the ability of a system to respond to user input in a natural 
and predictable manner. Schuemie & van der Mast (1999) review the results of various studies 
investigating the importance of these interactivity components. They report evidence that 
suggests that presence is decreased noticeably if the speed of the system drops below a certain 
threshold value (which exists in the range of 15Hz to 20Hz). The evidence for range and 
mapping however, is far less clear. Schuemie & van der Mast conclude that the evidence does 
suggests neither a simple nor a monotonic relationship between presence and range. The data 








Figure 2-1: Steuer’s model of presence (from Steuer, 1992). The bottom layer represents the 
five basic determinants of presence. These are grouped into to major factors (‘vividness’ and 
‘interactivity’) of technological contributors to presence. 
 
Apart from these two dimensions which he describes in detail, Steuer also includes a vaguely specified 
and unnamed user psychology dimension (this is our term for it; Steuer does not include it as a separate 
entity). This dimension includes all aspects of the presence experience which are contributed by the 
user’s own internal state. A final dimension of Steuer’s model is the situational dimension. This is 
constituted of transient factors in the environment which modify the situation; for instance, a sudden 
loud noise which might affect the presence experience. 
 
Apart from these factors, Steuer also identifies the “willing suspension of disbelief” (p. 91) as an 
important ingredient of presence. Steuer believes that presence is not attainable unless the subject is 
willing to treat the mediated images as non-mediated to, at least to some extent. This process, 
according to Steuer, is mostly volitional, but there can be some unconscious forces (such as social 
context influences) at play as well. 
 
Steuer’s model does not stop at the careful classification of variables into dimensions. It also includes a 
structure to organize them. The structure, presented in Figure 2-1, shows a hierarchical arrangement of 
dimensions and components. The dotted horizontal line represents the interface between the generated 
display and the user’s psychology. If the vividness and interactivity of the display are to have an effect 
on the user (that is, make their influence felt as presence), the user must first suspend disbelief. Thus, 
the dotted line represents not only the interface, but also a portcullis which the user must raise before 
the possibility of presence can exist. 
 
Steuer’s model presents several notable strengths and weaknesses. Its major strengths are increased 
explicatory power over the simple unstructured models, provided by virtue of its structure. It is possible 
to predict, for instance, that there are more opportunities for a system designer to increase the 
interactivity of a system than to increase its vividness. Also, more specific explanations are possible 
thanks to the structure. For example, it is possible to explain why an increase in display rate increases 
presence (it is an increase in speed and thus interactivity). 
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However, the structure of the model may turn out to be only a fa?ade of complexity. Note that all 
dimensions in the model carry the same weight. For all its apparent complexity, the model is actually a 
flat causal model. Because breadth and depth affect vividness equally, the vividness node only acts to 
categorize the terms. If the vividness node were removed, the explicatory power of the model would be 
unaffected (this would not be the case however, if the vividness node applied some transformation to 
these inputs). Similarly, the interactivity node can be removed with no detrimental effect to the model. 
These two dimensions, it seems, act only as semantic categorizations, rather than functional 
dimensions. The model can thus be reduced to an unstructured causal model, with almost no negative 
impact on its powers of prediction. 
 
The major contribution of Steuer’s model is its inclusion of user psychology as an important 
determinant of presence. Although Steuer does not include it as a separate construct in his model, he 
makes a strong case for its importance by making it pervasive in most other parts of the model. 
However, Steuer presents no empirical evidence to support his claim. This is unfortunate, as the willing 
suspension of disbelief is an important feature of his model. Steuer himself admits that “[t]his process is 
of great interest in the context of all kinds of mediated experience” (p. 91). Its lack of empirical basis, 
however, raises the question of whether users of VEs engage in this type of behaviour at all. Sadly, the 
lack of an empirical basis is a weakness which can be applied generally to Steuer’s model. It relies 
substantially on the theoretical statements made by others, which are, in turn, not based on empirical 
data. This weakens the model, as predictions made with it will not be based upon observed patterns, but 
rather on expected patterns. While considering this weakness, as serious as it is, it is important to 
remember that this model was created in the earliest days of presence research, before much empirical 
research was available to build models from. 
2.5.4 Structured conceptual models 
This class includes those models which rely on higher level abstract concepts and complex structure to 
make predictions. They differ from structured causal models mostly in the specificity of the inputs to 
the model. Structured conceptual models use very high level concepts as inputs, whereas structured 
causal models have very specific inputs. For instance, Thie & van Wijk’s model (a structured 
conceptual model described below) has an input node signals which encodes all of that encoded by 
Steuer’s breadth, depth, speed, range and mapping nodes. Another difference exists in the complexity 
of the structure. Structured conceptual models typically have multiple layers of complexity, and often 
incorporate feedback loops. Structured causal models, on the other hand, are usually far simpler in 
structure. 
 
There are several models of this class in the literature, representing a great theoretical variety. We will 
discuss three models which we feel are most significant in theoretical terms. We present them in 
chronological order of publication. They are Slater & Usoh’s representation systems theory (1993), 
Thie & van Wijk’s general presence theory (1998) and Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix’s Immersion, 
Presence and Performance model (1999). 
 
Slater & Usoh’s representation systems theory  
 
Slater & Usoh build their model upon concepts derived from neurolinguistic programming therapy 
(NLP). This psychological basis provides only one half of their model; the other half is provided by 
empirical research into the causes of presence. The model posits a split between external factors and 
internal factors. External factors are those which are related to the display of the virtual environment. 
These factors include (Slater & Usoh, 1993): 
 
1. High fidelity information presented to the sensory modalities of the user in such a way as to 
suggest non-mediation to the user. This factor includes Steuer’s notion of “vividness” (see 
2.5.3 above). 




2. Presentation of the environment to the user in a way that is consistent across sensory 
modalities. 
 
3. The user should be able to interact with the environment, and the environment should respond 
to the user by, for example, containing agents which interact with the user. 
 
4. The self-representation of the user in the virtual environment should be similar to the user’s 
real body, and should respond in an accurate way. 
 
5. The effects of interacting with the environment should be simple enough for the user to learn 
over time. This is similar to IJsselsteijn et al’s notion of mapping (see 2.5.2 above). 
 
Slater & Usoh note that this list is not complete; other display properties also exist as external factors. 
It is worthwhile noting that the external factors component of this model is remarkably similar to 
Steuer’s technological layer, although Slater & Usoh’s conception is far more abstract, encoding many 
more concepts into each factor. For instance, the high fidelity category of Slater & Usoh’s model 
includes Steuer’s concept of vividness as well as its components (i.e. breadth and depth). By making 
use of this increased abstraction, Slater & Usoh are able to include more causes (both established and 
speculated on) into their model without overloading it. 
 
Any presence model can clearly benefit from the inclusion of psychological knowledge, as presence is 
rooted in personal experience. Making use of established research in psychology to aid in the 
construction of a presence model is thus a useful strategy. Slater & Usoh exploit this strategy by 
deriving a substantial portion of their model (the internal factors) from the NLP literature. These 
internal factors consist of three representation systems which act to process perceptual inputs, as well 
as other, more abstract thought structures. The three representation systems are: 
 
1. Visual representation system (V): This system encodes all visual information. Apart from this 
basic sensory function, this system also contains self-constructed visual images, and visual 
memories 
 
2. Auditory representation system (A): This system processes sound stimuli to produce auditory 
perceptions. This system is also used to produce the internal dialog (the silent conversations 
we have with ourselves) and holds auditory memories. 
 
3. Kinesthetic representation system (K): This system is responsible for producing perceptions of 
touch, bodily motion and pose. It encodes memories for these sensations, as well as emotions.  
 
These three systems are not all equally important in their contribution to experience. Each person has 
one system which will tend to be preferred over the others. This dominant system tends to contribute 
more when operating in an environment, although all three systems contribute to thought at every 
moment. 
 





Figure 2-2: Slater & Usoh’s representation system theory. The external factors stimulate the 
three internal representational systems, which lead to perceptions and presence (if the 1st 
perceptual position is dominant). In each individual, one of the three representational systems 
is dominant over the others; stimulation of this dominant system will lead to more intense 
sensations of presence. 
 
Apart from the three systems described above, NLP theory also contains the notion of three perceptual 
positions, closely related to the three voices of normal speech. The first of these is referred to as the 
first position, which involves recollection of events as if they were occurring to the subject. The second 
position recalls events from the perspective of another person, and in the third position, the events are 
remembered from a passive, non-personal perspective. The important difference between a perceptual 
position and a voice in speech is that unlike voices (which only apply to speech), perceptual positions 
apply to any of the three representation systems. For instance, recall of a scene could occur from the 
perspective which the subject experienced it (first position), or from the perspective of someone else in 
that scene (second position), or from a “floating camera” perspective, not attached to any person (third 
position). 
 
Slater & Usoh combine the internal and external factors in a structure reminiscent of Steuer’s (Figure 
2-2). In this model, equal weight is given to the external factors, but not to the internal; consistent with 
NLP theory, they posit that at any time, one of the representation systems will be more active than the 
others. An interesting feature of this model is that it has a distributed rather than explicit representation 
of presence. In this model, presence occurs when the subject is operating in the first perceptual position 
in one or more representation system. As one of these representations systems is more active than the 
others, presence will be experienced more strongly if the VE display equipment supports that modality 
well. For instance, a subject in a VE with compelling visuals who has a dominant visual representation 
system will experience more presence than one, in the same VE, who has a dominant auditory 
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Slater & Usoh published, together with their model, two sets of results aimed at verifying the model. 
They present some evidence to support the model; they found that the sense of presence correlated with 
the use of first position predicates in subject’s descriptions of their experiences. This supports the 
distributed expression of presence in the model. However, the samples used for these studies were 
unsuitably small – 20 subjects in the first experiment and six in the second. These samples seem even 
smaller when one considers that they were used to construct a multiple regression equation with four 
predictors; this technique usually requires larger samples to ensure adequate statistical power (Howell, 
2002). The findings should thus not be regarded as definitive or final. 
 
Apart from this lack of empirical evidence, there are some other criticisms which can be leveled at the 
model. Although the strategy of using previous research in a related field as a basis for a presence 
model is a commendable one, Slater & Usoh’s choice of NLP is less so. NLP is a controversial 
technique, which itself lacks adequate empirical verification. Slater & Usoh’s admit to this, stating “the 
evidence for the NLP approach is largely anecdotal, practitioners implicitly accepting its correctness by 
virtue of their success in clinical (and other) applications. In fact, NLP has had a critical response from 
the academic and counseling community” (p. 223). Their selection of NLP is thus quite puzzling, 
considering the vast range of psychological theories examining perception and its link to behaviour that 
exist (see Chapter three for a broad outline of some of these theories). Slater & Usoh defend their 
choice by saying, “[w]e are not taking a standpoint here on the validity of the NLP claims, but rather 
using the model as a basis for the formation of testable hypotheses of interest in our IVE research.” (p. 
224) However, this defense is not valid, because a model is a predictive structure; if any of its parts or 
structure is false, its predictive quality will suffer as a result. In building a model, each component must 
be carefully selected, because its addition might lead to a decrease in the validity or accuracy of the 
model. For instance, if it should emerge that NLP’s precepts are false, Slater & Usoh’s model will 
likely not survive the consequences, as the internal factors would evaporate, leaving it as a variation of 
IJsselsteijn et al’s model. 
 
Thie & van Wijk’s general presence theory  
 
Thie & van Wijk (1998) use a communications theory perspective for their model, and so it carries a 
distinct social flavour. Thie & van Wijk’s central stated goal is to create a model which can encompass 
task performance. The structure of this model is presented in Figure 2-3 below. A strong component of 
this theory is the idea by Loomis (1992) that operation on a VE leads to the creation of a mental model 
of it. The concept of a mental model, which can be traced back to Craik (1943), has received 
considerable attention, via Loomis, in the presence research world. The concept is simple. As a person 
operates in an environment, they learn a series of cause-effect links between their actions and the 
consequent changes in the environment; this is referred to as a mental model. As this mental model 
grows, it becomes possible for the subject to use it to create expectations about the consequences of 
action in the environment, and consequently, complex planned actions become possible. In VE 
research, the mental model which a user has of the VE has importance for this same reason – if a 
correct model of the virtual environment has been formed, complex behaviours (such as the completion 
of some task) become possible in that VE.  
 




















Figure 2-3: Thie and van Wijk’s model (after Thie and van Wijk, 1998). Presence occurs 
when the mental model of the virtual world (Self VE/ Non-Self VE) becomes highly 




Thie and van Wijk contend that any time a user is in a VE, two mental models are competing for 
activation: the model of the real world (RW), and that of the shared virtual world (SVE). When the 
subject is experiencing a high level of activation of the virtual mental model (labeled “non-self VE” in 
Figure 2-3), presence occurs. The activation of the SVE model rather than of the RW model, depends 
mostly on two factors: the willingness of the subject to become present, and the degree to which the 
subject feels there are others present in the VE. 
 
1. Willingness to become present: Thie and van Wijk argue that a user’s psychology contributes 
to their presence in two ways; one conscious, and the other unconscious. The conscious 
component they define as the user’s willingness to accept signals from the VE. The 
unconscious element seems to be linked to the focusing of attention, as it is defined as the 
ability to block out signals from the RW while accepting signals from the VE. According to 
Thie and van Wijk, increasing these two components should lead to an increase in presence. 
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2. Perception of others in the VE: This trait, which is referred to as social virtual presence by 
Thie and van Wijk, has also been called co-presence by others (see Blake, Casaneuva & 
Nunez, 2000, for a brief review of this concept). Social virtual presence is regarded by Thie 
and van Wijk as a measure of the quality of communication in a VE. Thie and van Wijk argue 
that if communication with others in the VE is effective, then this will lead to an increase in 
the user’s sensitivity to the social context, and a degree of de-individuation. This can lead to a 
change in the user’s model of themselves in the VE, and consequently to a change in the 
degree of presence felt. 
 
According to this model, presence occurs when the subject has a correct, developed mental model of 
both the virtual environment, and of themselves as occupants of that environment. Presence is further 
enhanced by the existence of other subjects in the environment, each of which is also present. Task 
performance is postulated to be important, due to its relationship to the mental model of the VE. As the 
mental model of the VE develops, argue Thie and van Wijk, task performance will improve due to the 
improvement in quality of information about the environment which a correct mental model brings. 
Thus, improved task performance can lead to an increase in presence. Also, when subjects are present, 
task performance will improve because the active mental model which is relevant (i.e. the mental 
model of the VE) will be relevant to the task. This will only occur, however, if the VE is well suited to 
supporting the task. It is also seems possible that the activation of a particular VE mental model could 
lessen performance on a task, if that environment is not developed for supporting that task, although 
Thie & van Wijk do not discuss this eventuality. 
 
Thie and van Wijk present a modest set of results to support their model. They report a significant but 
moderate relationship between measures of social virtual presence and presence, as predicted by the 
model. However, they fail to find a relationship between measures of susceptibility-for-presence 
(measuring the will/ability component of the model), and presence. They argue that the erratic pattern 
of findings point not to a flaw in the model, but rather to a deficit in the measures. They support this 
argument by quoting unacceptably low Cronbach’s alpha scores for the scales of both presence and 
susceptibility-for-presence. Sadly, because Thie and van Wijk did not make use of any other presence 
measures in their study, we are left with no clear evidence of their model’s validity. 
 
Thie and van Wijk’s work is interesting in that it attempts to include ecological elements into the 
model, in the form of task performance. This explicit attempt to account for the “usefulness” of 
presence (insofar as it could aid task performance) is in some respects an improvement over Slater & 
Usoh’s model, which remains cryptic as to the possible applications of presence.  Another 
improvement of this model over that of Slater & Usoh, is that this model acknowledges the role of 
learning and experience in presence, whereas Slater & Usoh model the user as a static entity. 
 
However, this model shows several serious flaws. Firstly, it expresses presence in a way that is too 
narrow to allow the application of the model to scenarios beyond those for which it was specifically 
developed. For instance, it is difficult to predict the effect presence might have on the emotions of the 
user (a prediction which is possible with Slater & Usoh’s model). Also, although a distinction is made 
between conscious and unconscious factors of the user’s willingness to experience presence, very little 
is explained as to how these operate as separate entities. This raises the question of whether this 
division adds any value to the model, or simply acts to violate Occam’s razor. Finally, Thie & van 
Wijk’s model suffers from a lack of empirical support. Not only were the findings of the studies which 
aimed at validating the model not convincing with regard to the model’s correctness, but they also did 
not address some of the model’s central contentions, such as the role played by the acquisition of the 
VE mental model, or the impact of task performance on this process. 




The immersion, presence and performance (IPP) model (Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix, 1999) 
 
Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix (1999) propose a model which also aims to clarify how task demands and 
task performance relate to presence and display technology. This model is itself an amalgam of 
previous models (mostly of the structured causal variety), and as such is built upon a solid foundation. 
The IPP model is a purely qualitative one, and according to its authors, exists more as a research tool 
than an engineering one (Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix, 1999).  
 
The model begins with two basic assumptions. The first of these is that presence can only occur as a 
consequence of immersion (an axiom proposed by Slater & Wilbur, 1995). The second assumption is 
that there exists a relationship between presence and performance (this axiom is proposed by the 

















Figure 2-4: The IPP model (after Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix, 1999) 
As was the case with the models of Steuer and of Slater and Usoh, the model begins with a basic split 
between display technology and user psychology. The IPP model posits a simple causal relationship 
between the display system and its effect on presence, similar to that proposed by Steuer (1992) and 
Slater and Usoh (1993); namely, high fidelity immersive displays will lead to presence (although there 
is no explicit requirement of fidelity expressed, so we assume that the IPP allows for lowers levels of 
presence can arise from the use of non-immersive displays). 
 
The first node in the user component of the model is the allocation of attention to process the 
information arising from the displays. Bystrom et al require that attention be allocated to the display 
before presence can occur. This requirement is quite similar to Thie and van Wijk’s requirement that 
the VE mental model be more active than the RW mental model. Once attention has been focused, 
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there must be some degree of suspension of disbelief before presence can occur. Unfortunately, 
Bystrom et al are vague as to whether this suspension must be done willingly by the subject, or whether 
it occurs automatically as a function of attentional resource allocation. This point is crucial, as 
according to the structure in Figure 2-4, presence can only come about as a function of this suspension 
of disbelief. 
 
An interesting feature of this model is how it explains the possible relationship between presence and 
task performance. Unlike Thie and van Wijk’s model, which proposes a rather crude direct link 
between presence and performance, the IPP theorizes that presence is affected by a bidirectional link to 
the allocation of attentional resources. As can be seen from Figure 2-4, performance can affect the 
allocation of attentional resources, which in turn can affect presence. However, presence itself can also 
affect task performance, and so it is possible for a positive feedback loop to be established to maximize 
both presence and task performance. However, the model does not suggest that task performance is a 
cause of presence or vice-versa; their intensities are both by-products of the allocation of attention. 
 
Bystrom et al do not present any empirical data to support their model. Instead they argue that the 
model’s primary purpose is not quantitative predictions, but rather the stimulation of research. It seems 
to us, however, that a model does not have to be able to make quantitative predictions for it to be a 
useful engineering or research tool. If this is to be done, however, then it is necessary to verify the IPP 
model by testing its essential features. 
 
The IPP model exhibits some problems beyond those of its lack of validation. The most significant is 
the vague definition and handling of the contribution of the user’s psychology to the presence 
experience. The allocation of attention is well explained, but the suspension of disbelief is not. This 
problem is shared with the model of Thie and van Wijk, which explains the unconscious contribution 
of the user (quite similar to the allocation of attentional resources concept used by Bystrom et al), but 
fails to satisfactorily define or explain the conscious element. The only detail Bystrom et al give is that 
“[i]f the participant allocates sufficient attentional resources to the virtual environment, and if there is a 
sufficient degree of sensory fidelity, the participant may ‘suspend disbelief’ and view the virtual 
environment as a real place” (p. 234, our emphasis). It would seem that if the suspension of disbelief is 
a prerequisite to presence in the IPP (as is implied by the structure in Figure 2-4), then more 
information about this phenomenon is required to completely understand this model. 
2.5.5 Regression models 
This final class of model differs from the other three in that it specifically aims to predict presence 
quantitatively. To do this, these models rely on various statistical techniques, notably regression and 
associated techniques. Due to this statistical basis, a successful regression model relies on a solid 
foundation of quantitative empirical data. Such models have been criticized for relying too much on 
data, and not enough on theory, a situation which can lead to models which are useful for predicting in 
a strict mathematical sense without allowing any theoretical insights to be reached (Howell, 2002). 
However, when combined with a judicious quantity of theoretical grounding, regression models can be 
powerful predictive tools, particularly in applied settings. 
 
Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht’s path-analysis model (1999) 
 
Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht present a path-analysis model of presence which is a good 
exemplar of its class. The path analysis technique is a method related to statistical regression which is 
used to find and test complex causal relationships amongst networks of observed (measured) and latent 
(unobserved) variables (Loehlin, 1998). Schubert et al’s model is extraordinary in its class, as it has an 
extremely strong conceptual basis. At the same time, its path model was derived from a large sample, 
giving it a significant capacity for making quantitative predictions.  
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Schubert et al base their model partly on a cognitive theory outlined by Glenberg (1997 in Schubert, 
Friedmann & Regelbrecht, 1999), which rejects the notion of direct perception. Schubert uses this 
theory to argue that interaction with an environment would be impossible if only the information 
present in the optic flow field were available (the basic tenet of the direct perception school). Instead, 
supplementary information must come from a representation of the environment held by the user (a 
similar concept to Craik’s mental model). This representation contains possible patterns of behaviour 
which are suitable to that environment. These actions are prioritized, based on survival needs and other 
relevant criteria, so that action in the environment always occurs in a meaningful and goal-directed 
manner. Schubert et al argue that this basic representation structure applies not only to operation in real 
environments, but also to virtual environments. However, virtual environments differ from real 
environments in that the operator in a real environment is not confronted with the problem of two 
information sources, as all information comes from the real environment. Users of virtual environments 
thus have to engage in two processes; the first is constructive (processing information from the virtual 
environment), and the other suppressive (suppressing contradictory signals from the real environment, 
such as tripping over cables, the low resolution of displays, etc). From these two processes, argue 
Schubert et al, arise a set of possible behaviours which make sense for the user to engage in.  
 
Based on these premises, Schubert et al factor-analyzed items drawn from seven presence measures, 
with the aim of determining if this conceptual basis fit into the contemporary body of empirical 
findings. They conducted two factor analyses, using large samples; 246 participants in the first study, 
and 296 in the second (details of these studies can be found in Schubert, Friedmann & Regelbrecht, 
2001).  From these analyses, Schubert et al identified eight independent factors which compose these 
measures. These factors were (Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbracht, 2001): 
 
 
1. Sense of being in a place (SP): This is the commonly referred to aspect of presence (“being 
there”), as referred to by Steuer and Slater & Usoh. 
 
2. Involvement/attention (INV): This includes items related to attention and concentration. 
Schubert et al take the appearance of this factor as evidence of the importance of suppression 
of real world stimuli to presence. 
 
3. Realness (REAL): This factor related to subjects’ opinions of the reality of the VE. Schubert et 
al argue that this factor occurs as a consequence of judgments made by the subjects, rather 
than due to features of the VE itself. They argue that it is probably not a part of the presence 
experience itself, but only a co-varying event. 
 
4. Quality of immersion (QI): This refers to the richness and vividness of the display. It is similar 
to Steuer’s notion of vividness. 
 
5. Perception of dramatic structures and content (DRA): This factor includes the user’s 
perception of a plot or other dramatic structure in the VE. It also refers to the user’s 
experience of dramatic moments such as unexpected events, excitement, etc. while immersed 
in the VE. 
 
6. Interface awareness (IA): This refers to the degree to which the interface interferes with the 
user’s experience. It also expresses the degree to which the users are familiar with the 
interface. 
 
7. Exploration (EXPL): The opportunity for users to freely explore the virtual environment. 
 
8. Predictability (PRED): The user’s ability to predict would happen next in the VE (similar to 
Steuer’s motion of mapping). 
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Having identified these basic factors, Schubert et al used the path-analysis technique to build a 
structure and associated path weights. To create the model, they begin with two basic assumptions, 
which are drawn from the literature. The first assumption is that the immersion factors (QI, DRA, IA, 
EXPL and PRED) will be causes of SP, INV and REAL (this is the classic “immersion affects 
presence” hypothesis which IJsselsteijn et al, Steuer and Slater & Usoh express in their models). The 
second assumption is that SP and INV will also affect REAL; that is, that highly present and involved 
subjects will regard the environment as being more realistic. 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht’s Path Model (from Schubert, Friedmann & 
Regenbrecht, 1999). Path weights are standardized. 
 
Based on these two assumptions, Schubert et al construct the path model illustrated in Figure 2-5. This 
model shows only the paths between factors which proved to be statistically significant. The model 
shows several interesting relationships. Firstly, all the predictors affect spatial presence (SP). However, 
only exploration (EXPL) affects the perception of reality (REAL). Also, both spatial presence and 
involvement affect the sense of reality (REAL). 
 
Schubert et al point to several aspects of the final model which validate their initial conceptual stance. 
Firstly, exploration and predictability are the two most significant contributors towards spatial presence 
(with regression weights of 0.2 and 0.3, respectively). This supports the notion that spatial presence 
arises not only from the information contained in the optic flow field, but also from the user’s 
experiences in the environment. Secondly, the perception of dramatic content also contributes 
significantly towards spatial presence (with a weight of 0.2); this is taken as evidence that the 
meaningfulness of a space contributes towards the degree of presence that is felt in it. 
 
The Schubert, Friedmann & Regelbrecht model is quite impressive for several reasons. Firstly, it has 
the potential to be used as a tool for the quantitative prediction of presence; this would be of 
inestimable value for both researchers and engineers. Secondly, the model exists with a sound 
theoretical basis, which has been empirically supported, and is thus suitable for expansion by further 
examination of the underlying theory. Finally, the model includes many aspects from previous presence 
models. It thus presents the opportunity for previous presence related findings to be reinterpreted in its 
terms. 




Unfortunately, the model has faults as well. Schubert et al criticize their own methodology on the basis 
of using the same set of data for the factor and path analyses. This error violates the fourth of Hughes’ 
(1994) guidelines for predictive models, which states that a model should be constructed and verified 
with independent datasets. A second problem of this study is the lack of validity analysis on the scales 
used to produce it. If a model is to be successfully created mostly from data, it is extremely important 
that it possess high levels of construct validity (Anastasi & Urbina, 1996). This is because statistical 
models find relationships between scores, not between variables. If a test does not have construct 
validity, then a score obtained on that test does not reflect the true level of that variable. A model based 
on unvalidated scales simply predicts test scores rather than true phenomena. Indeed one of the 
assumptions required by the path-analysis technique is that there be no measurement error (Loehlin, 
1998), which is highly unlikely in this case. Because this problem lies with the currently available 
measures of presence, this criticism does not only apply to Schubert et al’s model, but to all statistical 






Chapter 3  
An introduction to schemata, scripts 
and connectionist architectures 
This chapter introduces three of the central psychological ideas used in the construction of the 
connectionist model of presence, namely schemata, scripts and connectionist architectures. The 
understanding of these concepts has been developed by cognitive psychologists since the mid 1950s, 
and so there is a great deal of empirical evidence to support their existence and structure. This chapter 
briefly explains each concept, and reports some of the more seminal or compelling studies which 
provide empirical support for their existence. How these concepts can be applied to the problem of 
explaining presence will be descried in chapter 4. 
3.1 Schemata and scripts 
A person’s knowledge is often thought of as simply a collection of object concepts (such as computer, 
chair, coffee, etc.). While it is true that any individual’s knowledge contains thousands of these object 
concepts (Eysenk & Keane, 1995), an important part of knowledge exists in the form of relational 
concepts, which describe the relationships between object concepts (for instance, type, sit and drink). 
More recent theories of human knowledge, such as those of Collins & Loftus (1975) have concentrated 
on understanding the relationship between object concepts, relational objects and how they are encoded 
in the mind, by modeling them as networked architectures. In these models, called semantic networks, 
object concepts are expressed as nodes, with relational concepts expressed as connections between 
nodes. Thus, two connected nodes have a relationship between them (such as the relationship sit exists 
between writer and chair), and a lack of connection between two nodes means the two objects are not 
related (such as computer and coffee might not have a relationship connecting them directly). 
 
Research into these semantic networks uncovered some evidence to support them. Gentner (1981), for 
instance, gave her subjects three types of sentences to remember. The first type (which she called the 
general type), were vague, and thus each node included connections to many other nodes. In the second 
type (the poorly connected specific type) each node contained connections to only a few nodes, but of 
those, some were unrelated to the object of the sentence. The third sentence type (the well connected 
specific type) contained only a few connections between nodes, and most of them were directly related 
to the object of the sentence. Gentner found that the poorly connected specific type were the worst 
remembered type of sentence (because a large proportion of the existing connections led to irrelevant 
objects). The best remembered were the well-connected specific sentences (where a large proportion of 
the existing nodes were connected to relevant objects). The general sentences performed slightly better 
than the poorly-connected specific sentences. This may come as a surprise, as these types of sentences 
contained less information about the event depicted in the sentence than the poorly connected type. The 
effect occurs because as there are so many connections between the verb and other objects, a high 
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proportion of these were interpreted as being relevant to the object of the sentence. This study 
emphasized the idea that relational knowledge could not be modeled by a simple function of the 
amount of information available, but rather required more complex models such as semantic networks. 
 
Further research into the semantic network model revealed that the mental representation of 
relationships was more complex than was previously realized. Coleman and Kay (1981) showed that 
verbs can have different types of relationships, and also create implications about the properties of the 
subject and object they can take. They give the example of the verb to lie, which they argue, implies 
three distinct properties of its subject and object. Firstly, it implies that the statement made is false. 
Secondly, it implies that the subject believes the statement is false, and thirdly, it implies that the 
subject intended to deceive. This complexity cannot be easily expressed in a semantic network. 
 
This type of evidence combined, in the mid 1970s, with a realization by researchers that explaining 
knowledge about events and other complex concepts required more than information about the 
attributes of objects. Even positing a hierarchy of relationships, as Gentner did, was not enough to 
solve the problem. Impelled by the work being done in linguistics by theorists such as Chomsky (1965) 
on recursive models in language rule encoding, researchers such as Rumelhart (1975) and Thorndyke 
(1977) proposed “story grammars” which were though to underlie the encoding and comprehension of 
stories, as stories usually which contain a complex set of relationships between objects. The pinnacle of 
this line of inquiry was the creation of two closely related theoretical constructs – the schema and the 
script. 
3.1.1 Schemata (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) 
A schema is a recursive, organizing structure which encodes complex concepts by combining simple 
objects with the relationships that occur between them (Eysenck & Keane, 1995). Schemata contain a 
list of relations and variables on which these relations act. The relations can encode simple transitive 
verbs (such as sit or drink), or they can encode complex relations indicating causation and temporal 
relationships (such as cause or produce). The variables can contain either concepts (such as objects) or 
other schemata; however, before an object or schema can be assigned to a variable, it must satisfy some 
test condition. These tests prevent nonsense constructions such as eat the air. These variables contain 
default values, so that if enough information is not provided to assign a value to all the variables, a 
complete, workable schema is still available. For example, if a subject is given the sentence “Joe drank 
heavily”, which does not contain information about what Joe drank, the information is still available by 
virtue of the default value. In this example, most subjects would respond to the question “what did Joe 
drink” with alcohol, liquor and other related terms, as these pass the test to fit into the drinks heavily 
schema. It is unlikely that objects such as water or milk would fit that schema. 
 
Schemata encode generic knowledge, which can be applied to a range of situations, provided those 
situations do not violate the variable fitting test conditions. For example, the relation CARRY can 
apply to Joe carried the bottle as well as it does to The ship carries the passenger, but not to The 
passenger carries the ship, as this violates the necessary test condition (which might be SUBJECT must 
be larger than OBJECT). The ability of schemata to encode generic situations allows for greater 
efficiency in memory, as few schemata can be used to encode a wide variety of situations. Also, the 
existence of default values of variables allows for optimal processing to continue even under conditions 
of reduced information. However, the information provided by the default values might be incorrect, as 
it is based upon previous experiences in similar situations (Rumelhart & Norman, 1981). This can lead 
to errors in behaviour or cognition, as the information used for decision making does not fit the 
environmental situation the person is facing. 
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3.1.2 Scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) 
Schemata, as defined above, are capable only of encoding statements. They are clearly not suited to 
encode more complex, sequence dependent behaviours which are common in everyday living (such as 
posting a letter or having coffee). A hoary example of such a complex action is having a meal at a 
restaurant. Operating in this situation requires following a strict sequence of events: waiting to be 
seated, selecting from the menu, waiting for the meal, eating, waiting for the bill, paying and leaving. 
In order to successfully carry out a trip to a restaurant, it is necessary not only to have knowledge of 
each step, but also of what order they should be performed in. It is also necessary to be able to identify 
the signs that one step is completed and that the next has commenced. Clearly, a schema alone cannot 
encode all of this information. Schank and Abelson propose a script, which is a structure that encodes a 
stereotypical sequence of events. Scripts are said to exist for sequences of events which are experienced 
frequently; for instance, most pedestrians have a crossing the road at a traffic light script, but scripts 
can also encode the far more obscure – long time fans of Star Trek probably have a script for getting a 
starship underway. 
 
As the examples above show, scripts exist to co-ordinate knowledge and behaviour in order to achieve 
complex goals such as eating in a restaurant while not causing a scene. In order for a script to encode 
all this information, it is necessary for the script to encode not only the actions required, but also the 
relationship between behaviours (such as temporal order) and the required role-players (such as the 
waiter). Each script is represented by a series of variables referred to as role-slots (Schank & Abelson, 
1977). Role slots can be filled either by a role (such as waiter) or by a schema (such as entering the 
restaurant, or ordering the food). Based on the specific situation at hand, role-slots will be filled by the 
objects and information present in the environment. For instance, the waiter role-slot might be filled by 
the teenager behind the counter wearing the restaurant’s logo on his t-shirt, or it could also, in a 
different situation, be filled by a tall, elegantly dressed middle-aged man holding a pen and notebook. 
Not any object can fill a role-slot, however. Each role-slot has criteria which are applied to determine if 
a particular object is suitable for filling the role-slot (Schank & Abelson, 1977). These criteria are 
stored in long-term memory, and are acquired through personal experience and other forms of learning, 
such as observation. If a particular person has only been to five star restaurants, it is likely that for this 
person a youth behind a counter would not satisfy the criteria for waiter. These criteria ensure 
behaviours are kept appropriate to the environment, while ensuring storage efficiency by allowing 
adaptation of scripts to new but similar situations. 
 
It seems that the purpose of scripts is to allow for algorithms of cognition and behaviour to be applied 
to achieve particular goals in an environment. These algorithms are applied only to situations which fit 
a set of criteria for suitability, through a mechanism which involves the use of perception (to asses the 
resources currently available in the environment) as well as previous knowledge (to provide criteria to 
compare against, as well as to determine if the available resources are similar enough to those 
required). By means of this mechanism, behaviour in environments can be kept appropriate to the 
situation, which in turn ensures that the required goals will be met. The inclusion of learning to modify 
the scripts allows for behaviours to remain goal directed (as the basic structure of the script remains 
unchanged), but still relevant to environments which change (by adapting the criteria for accepting an 
object or schema as a role-slot filler). 
 
A satisfactory amount of evidence has been gathered to support the theory of scripts. The commonality 
of script content was demonstrated by Bower, Black & Turner (1979). They collected descriptions of 
restaurant eating experiences from a large, diverse group of subjects. Although there was a great deal of 
variation in terms of the participants, the types of restaurant they frequented and the restaurant 
experiences they had had, Bower et al discovered a common core of 15 ordered experiences which 
were common. While this study demonstrates the content of scripts, and the phenomenon of time order, 
Galambos & Rips (1982) demonstrated the effect of scripts on general mental processing. Firstly, they 
primed a script in their subjects by showing their subjects various photographs of restaurants. Then, 
they asked subjects to decide if particular actions were part of the experience of visiting a restaurant. 
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Galambos and Rips found that subjects took significantly longer to make the decisions when the action 
was not part of the script, than when it was. This demonstrated the effect of scripts not only on 
regulating behaviours, but also on making particular types of information more available. 
3.2 Connectionist architectures 
Psychologists began to use theoretical models of computing machines as an aid to explaining cognitive 
processing in the mid 1950s (Martindale, 1990). This movement (referred to as the information 
processing paradigm) applied theoretical computing machines (such as the Von Neuman machine) to 
attempt to replicate some of the effects seen in human cognition. The method achieved some notable 
successes, such as the attention model of Triesman (1964) and the measuring of short term memory 
capacity (Miller, 1956). However, some of the fundamental principles of the information processing 
paradigm were found to be lacking by some researchers. For example, many theories based on 
information processing required the existence of a central executive, a hypothetical processing unit 
which makes basic decisions. Critics of this approach, such as Paivio (1975), claim that postulating the 
necessity for such a device makes the very information processing approach moot as an explanatory 
tool. The claim is that rather than explaining a phenomenon, the information processing approach 
merely re-phrases it. The problem in question is simply transformed from a situation of having to infer 
what is happening in the mind, to one of having to infer what is happening in the central executive. The 
mystery and obscurity which the explanation was meant to dispel, is simply passed onto the central 
executive. An true explanation of a phenomenon, maintain these critics, must leave no “black boxes” 
which defy explanation, unaccounted for. 
3.2.1 Basic properties of connectionist architectures 
A connectionist architecture defines a computing machine without recourse to any “black boxes”. The 
components of the machine are simple and easily understood, and its computational capacity arises 
mostly from its structure rather than from any componential complexity. Various authors have written 
about connectionist architectures, and have called them various things, ranging from “unorganized 
machines” (Turing, 1948 in Teuscher, 2001) to “parallel distributed processes” (Rumelhart, Hinton & 
McClelland, 1986). Although the terminology changes, a few basic characteristics of connectionist 
architectures are largely agreed upon:  
 
1. A group of nodes (also referred to as “processing units”). The only functions a node can 
perform are to take on an activation level, and to release that activation at a particular time to 
the other nodes to which it is connected (Martindale, 1990). 
 
2. Activation state. Each node can take on a different level of activation. Activation of a node 
beyond a certain threshold leads to awareness of the concepts encoded by that node. Most 
authors allow only limited amount of activation to be spread throughout the network, thus 
limiting the maximum processing capacity of the network (Rumelhart et al, 1986). 
 
3. A set of connections between nodes. Each node is connected to at least one other node by a 
connection which can either be excitatory or inhibitory. Activation received through excitatory 
connections increase the activation level of a node, while inhibitory connections decrease the 
activation level. Each connection represents a long-term memory for an association between 
two concepts (Martindale, 1990).  
 
4. Unit functions for the nodes. Each node contains two functions which it applies to activation. 
The first (the input function), is used to scale the inputs received from particular connections. 
The input function also determines the rate at which activation in the node decays. The second 
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function (the output function) determines the activation level at which the node will 
commence transmitting activation to the nodes it is connected to (Rumelhart et al, 1986). The 
input and output functions of a node are always different; if they were not, the node would 
simply acts as a pass-through gate (Martindale, 1990). 
 
5. Learning rule. In a connectionist architecture, learning simply means modifying connection 
strength (i.e. the ease with which the connection transmits activation). Several rules have been 
proposed, but the most commonly used is that of Hebb (1949), which states that a 
connection’s strength will increase if both connected nodes are simultaneously activated. 
 
6. System Environment. Most cognitive researchers provide for a particular structure to the 
system. Fodor (1983) argues that nodes are clustered into analyzers each of which is 
specialized to perform a specific sub-task in the system. These analyzers are massively 
interconnected to allow communication between themselves. Inside each analyzer, further 
structure exists. Theorists such as Grossberg (1980) and Martindale (1981) propose that nodes 
inside analyzers are arranged into various layers. The connections between nodes inside each 
layer are generally inhibitory, while those between nodes of different layers are generally 
excitatory.  
3.2.2 The interactive activation and competition architecture 
From the basic architecture described in 3.2.1 above, a large number of system variations have 
been developed for various purposes. Caudill & Butler (1990) describe many of these variations 
such as crossbar networks, Kohonen networks and Local Linear models. Each of type of network 
is suited to a particular class of processing task (Caudill & Butler, 1990), and as such not all will 
be of relevance to this work. We will focus the discussion on one particular type of network, the 
interactive activation and competition architecture, which is the most used model in psychological 
modeling (McClelland & Rumelhart 1986). This model has been successfully applied and 
developed by many researchers (Martindale, 1990). The rest of the discussion on connectionism in 
this work will refer to this type of network. 
 
The interactive activation and competition architecture forms the basis of a cognitive analyzer. An 
analyzer (sometimes called a module) is a unit of processing which is takes as input a set of data 
(from other modules), and processes it to output more abstract data (Martindale, 1981). Many 
analyzers of human cognition have already been identified (Koronoski, 1967). An example of such 
an analyzer is the unit which recognizes faces. This analyzer takes as input simple features (lines, 
curves, regions of shade, etc) from other perceptual analyzers and outputs a single percept (a face). 
The identification of modules is generally done through a process of inference based on clinical 
data. For instance, it is known that face perception exists in a isolated module separate from other 
forms of perception, as damage to particular regions of the brain leads only to prosapagnosia (the 
inability to perceive faces), while brain damage leading to other forms of perception deficit will 
not affect face perception (Eysenk & Keane, 1995).  
3.2.3 Structure of the analyzers 
The microstructure of the various analyzers is different, but all share the same basic macrostructure 
(Martindale, 1981). This structure is illustrated in Figure 3-1. Four basic structural features exist in 
each analyzer: Stratification, vertical stimulation, lateral inhibition and similarity mapping.  






Each analyzer contains a large number of nodes, arranged into four or more layers (Martindale, 
1990). Each layer represents a particular level of abstraction. Lower layers represent more basic 
concepts (with the bottom-most layer receiving the information to be processed from other 
analyzers), with upper layers representing more abstract concepts (with the top layer outputting the 
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Figure 3-1: An example of analyzer structure. This is a semantic analyzer, with only a few 





Connections exist between nodes on a particular layer and nodes on adjacent layers. These vertical 
connections are always excitatory, and serve to encode mostly is a part of relationships 
(Martindale, 1990). For example, in Figure 3-1, Dog is a part of Mammal is a part of Animal. 






Bidirectional connections also exist between nodes belonging to the same layer. Unlike the vertical 
connections, these lateral connections are of the inhibitory type (Martindale, 1990). The existence 
of these connections is a point of some contention, although they are widely recognized as being 
necessary in these models. Theorists such as Grossberg (1980) argue that inhibitory connections of 
this type are essential, as a network with only excitatory connections, such as those proposed by 
Beurle (1956), will tend to either end with all nodes maximally activated, or, once the activation 
has decayed, with zero activation.  







A final property of these networks, proposed by Kohonen (1989), is similarity mapping. On each 
layer of the analyzer, the nodes are arranged so that nodes encoding similar concepts are situated 
close to each other. This arrangement allows for nodes encoding similar concepts to inhibit each 
other strongly. This prevents ambiguity, as the inhibition makes it unlikely that two nodes 
encoding similar concepts would become highly activated simultaneously. 
3.2.4 The spread of activation and resonance 
Because the connections in interactive activation and competition architectures are bidirectional, there 
is not a strong distinction between input and output. It is quite common for feedback to occur, and 
many of the unique features (such as learning) can only occur if activation spreads backwards from a 
top-level node to a lower node - a process known as backpropagation (McClelland & Rumelhart, 
1988). To more fully understand these feedback loops, it is necessary to distinguish between two 
classes of activation spread, namely top-down activation, and bottom-up activation (Eysenk & Keane, 
1995). 
 
In the case of bottom-up activation (also called data-driven processing), the network receives activation 
primarily from sensory or less processed sources (Martindale, 1990). However, often the senses do not 
always provide sufficient information to allow complete processing of the percept. Often, bottom-up 
activation leads to ambiguity as many nodes in a particular layer become activated, and due to their 
inhibition of each other, the situation that results is a continuous oscillation of activation between 
nodes, which provides no clear outcome to the process (Martindale, 1990). To resolve the deadlock and 
allow processing to continue, top-down activation is required. Top-down activation  (also referred to as 
conceptually-driven processing) originates as abstract thoughts or expectations, and is transmitted 
downwards by means of the bidirectional vertical connections. This extra activation can increase a 
node’s activation state to the point where it is able to overcome the inhibition by its neighbours, and 
break the deadlock. 
 
The situation described above, where top-down and bottom-up activation converge, leads to a state 
known as resonance. Resonance occurs when top-down and bottom-up activation meet at a particular 
node. In sensory terms, this occurs when what is being observed matches that which the observer was 
expecting to see. When such a match occurs, the activation continues to be transferred along the path 
joining the source of the activation, leading to further inhibition of neighbouring nodes. Resonance acts 
as a mechanism of signal amplification, by inhibiting “noise” nodes and increasing the activation in the 
resonance or “signal” path. 
3.2.5 Evidence for the importance of top-down activation in perception 
Top-down activation plays an important role in all cognitive processing, not least of all in perception. 
During the early 1960s, the direct perception school (whose efforts are exemplified by the work of J.J. 
Gibson) argued that perception can be accomplished only with the information that is available from 
the senses, and that no top-down activation was necessary for successful perception (Eysenk & Keane, 
1995). This idea received a great deal of research attention, and, as will be seen below, the evidence 
collected suggests that regardless of whether the senses provide enough information or not, top-down 
activation plays a significant role in perception. 
 
The first example of the importance of top-down processing can be found in the word-superiority 
effect, which is the phenomenon where letters are more easily processed if they are embedded in words 
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than if they stand alone. Reicher (1969) demonstrated this effect in a simple experiment. Reicher 
showed subjects either real or fabricated four letter words for an instant (for instance walk and wlka), 
and then presented them with a single letter. The subject’s task was to decide if the letter existed in the 
word they had just been shown. Reicher discovered that subjects viewing the real words made the 
decision far faster than those viewing fabricated words. This can be easily explained by top-down 
processing, as knowledge of the word would allow the subjects to more easily identify which letters it 
was composed of. 
 
A similar effect was found by Pollack and Pickett (1964), which has been dubbed the sentence 
superiority effect. Pollack and Pickett recorded natural conversations between people, and then cut 
single words out from the recordings. They played these single words to subjects and asked them to 
identify the words. Only 47% of the words were identified by the group of subjects. This implies that 
even if all of a piece of speech is heard clearly, many of the words are simply unintelligible and thus 
carry no meaning. However, sentences are usually understood completely (if not, clarification is 
normally requested by the listerner). These results show that some of the information for processing 
sentences must come from a source other than the senses. 
 
To demonstrate that top-down processing is not only useful in speech processing, Williams and 
Weisstein (1978) conducted an experiment which led to the coining of the general term object 
superiority effect. Williams & Weisstein briefly showed their subjects images of a line with a reference 
dot. The lines were chosen from only one of four possibilities, and the subject’s task was to identify 
which of the four possibilities they had seen. Williams & Weisstein found that subjects identified the 
lines far more accurately when the stimulus lines were shown as part of a meaningful image compared 
to when the stimulus lines were presented in isolation. They concluded that the context of the image 
made the processing and subsequent memorization of the line far easier. This demonstration proved to 
be most damaging to the direct perception claims, as the visual senses carry the most information of all 
the senses; yet Williams & Weisstein managed to show that if top-down information was available, it 




Chapter 4   
Cognitive presence 
The discussion of presence conceptualization in Section 2.3 in Chapter two shows that the presence 
field does not yet have a single, agreed upon definition of presence; indeed, in their recent review of the 
presence literature, Schuemie et al (2001) identify more than ten major conceptualizations of presence 
in use. Lombard & Ditton (1997) attempted to reduce this complexity by creating six categories of 
presence definition. In Section 2.3 of Chapter two, we attempted a similar feat by grouping definitions 
into three broad classes. Regardless of how one attempts to cluster definitions together, this does not 
overcome the problem of the variety of measurement methods which exist. This chapter considers the 
various conceptualizations of presence and presence measurement philosophies outlined in Chapter 
two, and attempts to derive a unified concept of presence by making use of psychological research into 
environmental processing (discussed in Chapter three). We also provide a measurement method for our 
conceptualization. Finally, we consider some of the strengths and weaknesses of our approach. 
4.1 The need to unify presence 
There are several reasons why it would be desirable to have a single conceptualization of presence. 
Lombard & Ditton (2000) identify two. The first is the lack of standard measuring instrument for 
presence. Several other researchers, such as Slater (1999), have expressed dissatisfaction not only at the 
quality of contemporary presence measuring tools, but also at the number available (see section 2.4 in 
Chapter two for a review of some of these measures). The second reason identified by Lombard & 
Ditton (2000), is that there exists no standard measurement methodology; some researchers, such as 
Witmer & Singer (1998) use a post-experience, introspection methodology, while others, such as 
Freeman et al (2000), perform naturalistic observations of the subjects during the VE experience. 
Although it is true that some of this variety arises simply from a desire to explore methodological 
alternatives, a great deal of it seems to come from differences in the basic ideas of what constitutes 
presence. 
 
To these two compelling reasons for unifying the concept of presence, we add a third. A single 
common conception of presence would allow for an integration of presence research findings. This 
would permit researchers to meaningfully compare findings from various studies, which would in turn 
allow for the creation of theories with wide scope. For example, Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht 
(1999) attempted to create a statistical model to predict presence by combining various presence 
questionnaires. Although they added into their model a commendable variety of presence concepts, 
they were not able to include them all. This is because the basic method used by Schubert et al (1999) 
requires quantified measurements; however, some presence approaches, such as those which observe 
reflexes or spontaneity of behaviour, are not amenable to quantification, and it was thus impossible to 
include them.
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4.1.1 Lombard & Ditton’s unified concept of presence 
Some work has already been done towards creating a single, unified concept of presence. The best 
known attempt at unifying the various conceptualizations of presence was made by Lombard & Ditton 
(1997). They identified six major movements in presence conceptualization (which they refer to as 
dimensions of presence). These were: 
 
1. Presence as social richness (the degree of interaction with other users in the VE, ease of 
communication, etc) 
2. Presence as realism (the fidelity of visual, auditory and other stimuli) 
3. Presence as transportation (the sense of “being in” another place) 
4. Presence as immersion (surrounding the user with stimuli from the VE while blocking stimuli 
from the real world) 
5. Presence as social actor within medium (the user’s sense that they belong socially in the world 
by means of storyline etc) 
6. Presence as medium as social actor (the user’s sense that the VE is able to sustain social 
intercourse) 
 
Lombard & Ditton argue that although these factores seem quite disparate, a common factor can be 
extracted from them. They propose that the six categories all include the idea of the illusion of non-
mediation to some degree (see 2.3.2 in Chapter 2 for a further discussion of this concept). They argue 
from that if one were to create for users the illusion that the VE medium were invisible, then each of 
the six properties would consequently increase, and conversely, that as each of the six dimensions 
increases, so too would the strength of the illusion. 
 
A notable problem with Lombard & Ditton’s argument is that it fails to establish convincingly that the 
illusion of non-mediation is the only common thread between all six presence dimensions. Lombard & 
Ditton do present a convincing reason as to why non-mediation is related to each of the six dimensions 
they define. However, in none of the six cases do they establish that non-mediation is the sole cause, or 
that non-mediation is itself not caused by a more general construct. 
 
The objection we present above is one which could in principle be applied to any definition of presence 
which aims to become a bridge between previous concepts. There is a danger that instead of 
simplifying the concept of presence, such a move would make it more complex. If it should transpire 
that the illusion of non-mediation is not the atomic mental operation which produces presence, then 
Lombard and Ditton’s ideas would have effectively transformed presence (a single term) into a 
hierarchical structure, a result which is in direct opposition to the central aim of replacing many 
concepts with a single one. There is not enough evidence at the moment to determine if Lombard and 
Ditton have created the most inclusive concept of presence; indeed it would be impossible to show that 
a definition of a non-trivial concept is all-inclusive. Our objection is not that Lombard and Ditton have 
not created the most inclusive concept possible, as this objection could only be supported by a great 
deal of empirical evidence, which we do not have. Rather, our objection is that they have created a 
conceptualization which allows the possibility of having a more abstract cause, and thus introducing 
more complexity. 
4.1.2 The psychology of behaviour regulation as a unifying principle 
Based on the arguments presented in 4.1.1 above, we suggest that presence cannot yet be regarded as a 
successfully unified concept. We therefore propose our own concept to unify presence, while 
remaining mindful to avoid the objection we raised to Lombard & Ditton. To do this, we will consider 
presence not as a special unique experience, but rather as a result of normal psychological processes.  




Slater & Usoh’s concept of presence (which is “the (suspension of dis-) belief that [the subjects] are in 
a world other than where their real bodies are located”, 1993, p.222) suggests that presence is a novel 
experience which is only possible when a person is viewing a virtual environment. Similarly, Zeltzer  
(1992), who suggests that presence is the state which arises when we are immersed in a high bandwidth 
stream of information together with interaction, provides a view of presence which we feel suggests 
presence is a unique experience which is only possible due to the existence of virtual environments. 
Indeed, even the more technical views of Sheridan (1992, 1996) contain this view. Sheridan seems to 
consider presence as a phenomenon which “pops up” when the correct causal circumstances have been 
arranged. We feel that considering presence as a unique psychological phenomenon in this way is 
incorrect, because the writings of Slater & Usoh, Zeltzer and Sheridan do not contain an analysis of 
how they arrived at the conclusion that presence is a unique experience; rather, it seems that they 
engage in conceptual reification; that is, they assume that presence is a unique phenomenon, without 
first considering the possibility that presence may simply be a special case or unfamiliar form of an 
already well-understood mental process. 
 
Our own conception of presence is far more similar to those views presented by Schloerb (1995), Thie 
and van Wijk (1998), Lombard &  Ditton (1997) and especially Zahoric & Jenison (1998). Like these 
theorists, we believe that the first step towards understanding presence lies in discovering if presence 
does not already exist in some other body of literature. Thie & van Wijk, for instance, make reference 
to the human factors literature by defining presence in terms of active mental models. Similarly, 
Zahoric & Jenison refer to environmental perception theory to explain presence. For each of these 
groups, presence is simply the application of existing mental processes to a virtual environment. This 
pragmatism has several advantages. Firstly, if presence is defined as new concept, then one must begin 
studying it from the ground up. However, if presence is defined as a special case of an existing field, 
then it is only necessary to determine how presence differs from the other phenomena in that field. A 
second reason, suggested by Schloerb’s subjective presence notion (1995), is that working with a new 
concept leads to imprecise measurements of it. Because a new concept has no theory behind it, it 
becomes difficult to determine the construct validity of its measures (Anastasi & Urbina, 1996). 
Finally, considering presence as a new phenomenon can lead to theoretical fragmentation and 
unnecessary complexity. As Lombard & Ditton (1997) show, considering the various strands of 
presence research as special cases of a larger structure can lead to a deeper understanding of it. 
 
We propose that presence can be understood as the consequence of psychologically processing any 
environment, including virtual environments. This point is in line with the views of Slater & Usoh 
(1993), Schloerb (1995), Lombard & Ditton (1997), and Sheridan (1999). We therefore propose that 
presence can be best understood by considering the underlying cognitive processing of the virtual 
environment. As demonstrated in Chapter three, cognitive psychology contains a thorough 
understanding of the relationship between environment, cognition and behaviour, and this 
understanding is based on empirical evidence collected over a period of more than forty years. We feel 
that this field can contribute a great deal, both in terms of theory and findings, towards the 
understanding of human behaviour and cognition in virtual environments. 
 
We are certainly not the first in the presence field to suggest that cognitive psychology can be applied 
to understanding user behaviour in virtual environment. Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix (1999), for 
instance, postulate that the direction of attention can have an impact on presence. Also, Mania & 
Chalmers (2001) use memory and recall performance to determine presence. Finally, Freeman, Avons, 
Meddis, Pearson, & IJsselsteijn (2000) propose a presence measurement strategy which expects users 
to apply familiar, real world behaviours and cognition strategies when they are present in the virtual 
environment. Judging from the successes of these researchers, we feel confident that cognitive 
psychology can be fruitfully applied to understanding presence. 
 
Our concept of presence relies on the notion of schemata (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) and scripts 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977). As stated in Chapter three, scripts and schemata are theoretical structures 
which encode complex behaviours which are initiated in response to particular conditions, some of 
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which are perceived, and some of which are remembered. The perceived conditions are similar to those 
used by the behavioural presence movement (e.g. Loomis, 1992). However, unlike the idea of “reflex 
actions” used by Usoh, Arthur, Whitton, Bastos, Steed, Slater, & Brooks (1999), which are triggered 
only by perceived stimuli, scripts and schemata require a complex set of conditions existing in the mind 
of the user. This is more akin to the spontaneous social behaviour which Sheridan (1996) suggests as a 
sign of presence. Our contention is that presence is the state when the scripts and schemata active in the 
user are those which apply to the virtual rather than the real environment. 
 
In this light, we can re-examine the findings of Usoh et al (1999), who report that when presented with 
a virtual hole, users react by refusing to step over it, even though they knew that no real consequences 
could arise from this act. Usoh et al (1999) argue that when presented with the virtual hole, subjects 
can respond in one of two ways. The first (non-present) way is to simply “disbelieve” the hole and step 
through it; the second (present) way is to treat the hole as real and refuse to step through it. We propose 
that each of these response behaviours (which are far more complex than simple reflexes) is in fact 
encoded by a script. The first response (which Usoh et al would call “non-present”) is encoded by a 
script which is appropriate in the real world, as there is no hole in the floor of the experimental venue. 
The second response (the “present” response) is encoded by a script which is appropriate to the virtual 
environment, where the hole actually does exist. Whether the subject is present or not, in our view, 
depends not on what they believe is true about the world (a volitional action), but rather on what script 
their mind executes (an automatic action).  
 
The script concept can also be applied to explain why subjects show social behaviours, such as 
greeting, to computer controlled agents, as reported by Cassell, Torres, & Prevost (1999). Again, there 
are at least two scripts which can be applied to the situation: the script appropriate to the real 
environment (not to greet the agent, as greeting only applies to real persons), or the script appropriate 
to the virtual environment (to greet the person in front of you). If presence simply means the selection 
script appropriate to the virtual environment, then we can expect that present subjects will greet the 
agents, while non-present subjects would not. 
 
We thus propose the use of script and schemata theory as a unifying concept for presence. We feel that 
using this field overcomes our objection of Lombard & Ditton’s illusion of non-mediaiton, because 
scripts and schemata are well researched, and are considered to be atomic structures of thought 
perception (Eysenk & Keane, 1995). Scripts and schemata have been used to explain a variety of 
complex behaviours, including social behaviours (such as restaurant attendance - Bower, Black & 
Turner, 1979), and should therefore apply to most situations which could occur in a VE. Also, our use 
of a well-researched field minimizes the risk of reification. Finally, because this field has a long 
research tradition, there exists an established research methodology, which in turn allows for more 
robust research to be conducted (Eysenk & Keane, 1995). 
4.2 Cognitive presence 
Based on the arguments presented in 4.1.2, we propose a novel conception of presence, which we call 
cognitive presence, which we believe can be used as a unified concept of presence. Cognitive presence 
is defined as the degree to which the virtual environment dominates over the real environment as the 
basis for thought (Nunez & Blake, 2001). This same basic notion has been recently echoed in Slater 
(2002b), in which the author states, “[t]he critical issue is how will the actor respond? To which set of 
signals will the actor respond?” (pp. 436). 
 
In our definition, we consider only the abstract part of the virtual environment for this purpose, and not 
the technology used to display it. By this we mean that we consider not the VE as it is rendered by the 
display, but rather the VE as it is stored in the VR system. This excludes any display artifacts which 
may occur during display as not being part of the virtual environment. We believe that display artifacts 
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are aspects of the real environment, and not of the virtual environment, and thus should not be 
considered to be contributing towards cognitive presence. We define a virtual environment as data 
displayed in such a way as to create in users the impression of objects existing in a space (Nunez & 
Blake, 2001). 
4.2.1 Immersiveness and cognitive presence 
In line with current research (which we describe in Chapter two), we consider the technology used to 
display an environment to be a determinant of how a subject mentally processes that environment (for 
some examples of this evidence, see Stark, 1996, Slater, Usoh, & Chrysanthou, 1995, and Barfield, 
Rosenberg, Han, & Furness, 1993). However, we decide not to explicitly include any notion of display 
technology or immersion in this definition. We agree that there is a strong theoretical basis supporting 
the importance of display technology for presence. For instance, the theories of Steuer (1992), Slater & 
Usoh (1993), Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht (1999) and of IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman & 
Avons (2000) emphasize the importance on display technology. However, the theories of Thie & van 
Wijk (1998), and the Immersion Presence & Performance model (Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix, 1999), 
while recognizing the importance of display factors, emphasize other aspects of presence. Indeed, even 
the theories of Steuer and Slater & Usoh mentioned above accept that display factors are only a part of 
the workings of presence. This lack of consensus on the importance of display factors is not the sole 
reason for our decision to exclude them from our definition, however. We feel that the emphasis on 
display variables in presence research is not due only to their actual importance, but also to the weight 
of research which has been directed at immersive displays. The lack of evidence on the importance of 
non-immersive technologies does not indicate that these technologies cannot produce presence, but 
rather that this issue has not been sufficiently researched (see Towell & Towell, 1997, for a notable 
exception). Due to this bias in the evidence, we decide to not include display variables explicitly in the 
definition, as this would preclude the investigation of cognitive presence in non-immersive displays.  
4.3 The Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI) - a 
measurement of cognitive presence 
To conduct quantitative research with cognitive presence as a variable, a measure is required. We 
created the Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI) as a measure of this construct. In Sections 
4.3.1 and 4.3.2 below we discuss the problem of measuring cognitive presence, and describe the 
measure. In Section 11.3 we present a psychometric evaluation of the COCI, and consider its 
effectiveness as a measure of presence. 
4.3.1 The problem of measuring cognitive presence 
Cognitive presence is defined in terms of the rules or basis which the mind uses to process information 
obtained from the senses. It is therefore not possible to infer the degree of cognitive presence simply by 
considering the environmental stimuli. What is required is a method of establishing which script the 
user is applying to process the environment. The solution to this problem lies in the fact that scripts 
affect not only the selection of behaviour, but all cognition in general. For instance, in Galambos & 
Rips’s study (1982), the activation of the attending a restaurant script led to an effect on an abstract 
word processing task, which is far removed from the behaviour required to successfully attend a 
restaurant.  
 
The generality of this effect can be exploited for the purpose of measurement. We propose a method 
where the subject is presented with a list of stimuli, and their task is to select one stimulus from the list. 
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If one of the stimuli in the list is related to the script which is active in the subject, then that stimulus 
should seem to stand out from the others. In Galambos & Rips’s study, for instance, words which were 
related to restaurants were identified much faster than those not related to restaurants. We thus infer 
that in a list of items, those items which are related to the script which is currently active in the subject 
will seem different from the others. If the item selected from the list is related to the script which would 
be appropriate in the VE, then, according to the definition presented in 4.2 above, the subject is present.  
 
A complication in applying scripts and schemata to measure cognitive presence lies in the fact that 
when a user is involved with a virtual environment, there are two possible sources of environmental 
information. Witmer & Singer (1998), Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix (1999), IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, 
Freeman & Avons (2000) and others have theorized that presence can only occur when the user’s 
attention is focused on the VE display. However, Triesman (1964) and others have shown that attention 
does not shift discretely, so that it is possible to experience divided attention. In this case, the 
environmental processing mechanisms of the mind will be receiving input from two sources 
simultaneously. However, the script literature suggests that only one script can be active at a time 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977). We suggest that under such conditions, the user might be sometimes more 
focused on the VE and at other times more focused on the real environment. To capture a single 
presence score under these conditions, we implement a strategy similar to that used in the Breaks in 
Presence method of Slater & Steed (2000). They solve a similar problem by asking subjects to report 
when they experience a break in presence (i.e., a time when they become aware that they are no longer 
focused on the VE, but rather on the real environment) at any time during the VE experience. At the 
end of the VE session, the subjects which have experienced fewer breaks in presence are deemed to 
have experienced more presence. To overcome the divided attention problem, we propose sampling the 
mental state of the subjects at various points over time during the VE session. This overcomes the 
potential problem of the subject not focusing attention at the precise moment of measurement, as other 
opportunities for measurement will exist during the time of the experience. 
 
This method also overcomes two difficulties experienced by the currently popular introspection 
methods discussed in section 2.4.1 of Chapter two. Firstly, measurement occurs during the VE session, 
and thus overcomes any memory distortions and other related difficulties. Secondly, the method does 
not require subjects to introspect in any way; their task is simply to select an item from a list. This 
prevents any of the negative introspection effects suggested by Nisbett & Wilson (1977). 
4.3.2 A first measure of cognitive presence - The Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI) 
We implemented the measurement philosophy discussed in 4.3.1 above. The measure we created, 
which we call the Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI), uses word lists as stimuli. The COCI 
is computerized, being administered by the machine displaying the VE during the VE session, with one 
item appearing approximately once every minute. The exact amount of time between COCI items is 
randomized slightly (by as much as 10 seconds) to prevent creating in the user an expectation of the 
appearance of the next item. When the item is displayed, the user is briefly shown (for less than half a 
second) a word fragment. The subjects are then shown a list of four words, and their task is to select 
from the list the word which they believe the word fragment represented. 
 
The word fragment task is designed to be completely ambiguous, as any of the words from the list 
could fit the fragment. The task is in fact a ruse, designed simply to create a pretense for the word 
selection. The word fragment task aims simply to provide a motivation for the subjects to process the 
words in the list so that the script-induced cognitive bias can take effect.  
 
The COCI score is derived by summing the number of times the user selects a word in the list which is 
related to the script which would be active if the VE were determining the activation of scripts. We 
designed the word lists so that in each item only one word would be suitable for selection. We did this 
by creating VEs with a particular theme (a hospital and a medieval monastery), and adding in each item 
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one word which was related to the VE setting (for instance, for the hospital items we added the words 
ambulance and antiseptic). Scoring the COCI is therefore trivial; because the themed words are already 
known, it is a simply case of scoring 1 for the item if that word was selected, or 0 if it was not. 
Technical details of how the COCI was implemented in each of our VR systems are in sections A.6 and 
B.5 of Appendices A and B respectively. The list of COCI items we used are in Appendix F. A 
discussion of the effectiveness of the COCI as a presence measure may be found in sections 11.3 and 
11.5.4 of Chapter eleven. 
4.4 Critique of the cognitive presence approach 
The cognitive presence approach conceptualizes presence as the effects of the virtual environment on 
basic thought processes. This level of abstraction permits one to try to explain current presence findings 
from a unified perspective. This is possible because we consider what we believe is a common cause. 
For instance, presence findings based on perception (e.g. Hendrix & Barfield, 1995 or Lessiter, 
Freeman, & Davidoff, 2001) are separate from those findings based on posture and movement (e.g. 
Freeman et al, 2000). This separation exists because there is no common theoretical ground joining the 
two approaches. However, if one considers the common basic cognitive processes underlying each of 
these phenomena, it might be possible to find a framework or theory which incorporates both of these 
classes of finding, and explains how they relate. This type of integration is the aim of the cognitive 
presence approach.  
 
To achieve integration in this way, the cognitive presence approach needs to be fairly general. This 
generality may lead to a degree of inclusiveness which some researchers might argue extends too far. 
For instance, under the definitions presented in this paper, a novel or other piece of text could produce 
cognitive presence. If the text defines a space with objects included in it, the reader might, using their 
imagination, become cognitively present in that space. This inclusiveness comes about mostly because, 
like Lombard & Ditton (1997), we do not explicitly define any display medium criteria for achieving 
presence. This position opposes the idea, expressed by Slater & Wilbur (1995), that presence requires 
immersion as a necessary condition. We do not consider this position a weakness of our definition. We 
do not believe that there is enough firm evidence to exclude non-immersive displays as potential 
inducers of presence. Indeed, Johns, Nunez, Daya, Sellars, Casaneuva & Blake (2000) showed that 
presence can be successfully elicited using non-immersive desktop diplays. More impressively, Towell 
& Towell (1997) showed that presence can be elicited using text-only displays. We therefore leave the 
relationship between immersiveness and presence as a matter of investigation, rather than one of 
definition. 
 
A second, more serious weakness of the cognitive presence approach is that it does not explicitly 
include the concept of user-environment interaction. Interaction is seen by many researchers as 
essential for presence. For instance, Zeltzer (1992) requires that some form of interaction with the 
environment occurs before a user becomes present. Similarly, Waller, Hunt & Knapp’s (1998) notion 
of simulation fidelity, requires that interaction takes place before a VE can be said to be having an 
effect on the user. However, the term “interaction” itself is not as straight-forward as one might think. 
Sheridan (1992) as well as Witmer & Singer (1998), for instance, consider simply moving in an 
environment to be a form of interaction with it. On the other hand, Zeltzer (1992) considers interaction 
to be a changing of the state of the VE. To further confuse matters, Regenbrecht & Schubert (2002) 
present empirical evidence of how the user’s belief that interaction with the VE is possible can be 
enough to increase the degree of presence. Due to this theoretical murkiness, we decided not to include 





Chapter 5  
The connectionist model of presence 
Chapter 2 outlined some of the current major trends in presence modeling. This chapter presents our 
own model. The model which we propose in this chapter is based on McClelland and Rumelhart’s 
(1986) interactive activation and competition architecture, and includes aspects of Schank & Abelson’s 
(1977) script theory. The model implements an environment processing architecture, the purpose of 
which is to use both perceptions of the environment as well as previous experience and abstract 
knowledge to select and maintain cognitive strategies and behaviours which are appropriate for 
operation in that environment. This model thus aims to explain presence in terms of the cognitive 
processing of virtual environments, and the resulting cognitions and behaviours therein. 
 
This model is most similar to Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht’s (1999) model, although it differs 
in many respects. While Schubert et al created the structure of their model via factor and path analyses, 
we modify an existing architecture (interactive activation and competition architecture), based on 
current presence research. This includes many of the causes included in Ijsselstein, de Ridder, Freeman 
& Avons’ model (2000), as well as in Steuer’s model (1992). Like Slater &Usoh (1993) we use a 
strong foundation in a previous field, but in our case it that foundation is found in experimental 
cognitive psychology. 
 
We propose a model with three layers of analyzers. The topmost of these layers (which we call the 
conceptual layer) represents abstract, higher-level conceptual processes, and the bottom layer (which 
we call the perceptual layer) represents data-driven perceptual processes. The middle layer, (which we 
call the action layer) represents an intermediate stage of environmental perception, where previous 
knowledge and expectations converge with current perceptions of the environment. It is in this middle 
layer that we propose the key to understanding presence lies. Each of these layers, as well as their 
interconnections, is explained below. The basic structural layout of the model is presented in Figure 5-1 
on the following page. 
 
The reader should note that the connectionist model currently exists as a qualitative tool only; it is not 
capable of predicting presence numerically (as is possible with Schubert & Regenbrecht’s model). 
Rather, the model exists to relate the effects of perceptual stimulation with those of the user’s mental 
state in order to show how these two forces combine to generate a sensation of presence in the user. It 
is possible to show how a particular set of circumstances would produce a strong or weak sense of 
presence, but not to predict the degree of presence in a quantitative sense. Section 12.6.5 and 12.6.6 in 
Chapter 12 contain a discussion of how this basic model can be expanded to provide quantitative 
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Figure 5-1: The basic structure of our connectionist network. The model consists of three 
horizontal layers: at the bottom, the perceptual layer (which consists of the perceptual 
analyzers and the O and R nodes), in the center the action layer (which consists of the action 
nodes), and at the top the conceptual layers (which are regarded as a single functional layer by 
the model). This figure only shows three analyzers per level for the sake clarity, but the model 
includes many more in each level. 
5.1 The perceptual layer 
The perceptual layer plays similar role to The external component of Slater & Usoh’s model (1993), 
and the bottommost layer of Steuer’s model (1992). We propose that this layer represents a series of 
perceptual analyzers, there being at least one per sensory modality. The need for separate analyzers per 
modality is derived in part from the ideas of Slater (1999), who suggests that presence is a function of 
many separate display system factors. Slater argues that many of these factors are independent of each 
other, and this independence allows VR systems engineers, who generally work with limited display 
resources, to trade factors off against each other to maximize presence in a particular system. In order 
to model this independence, it is necessary to have separate perceptual analyzers, so that the level of 
activation in any one analyzer can be held constant while the activation the others can be changed.
 
For example, Slater’s argument implies that a VE which includes both sound and graphics might 
produce different presence levels to one which only includes graphics, and some evidence to this effect 
is presented by Hendrix & Barfield (1995b).  
 
By modeling the perceptual analyzers of sound and vision as separate entities, it is possible to explain 
this phenomenon by arguing that in the graphics-only VE, only the vision analyzer is activated, while 
in the graphics and sound VE, the graphics analyzer remains activated, but the auditory analyzer 
becomes active as well. It is this increase in overall activation which leads to the increase in presence. 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE CONNECTIONIST MODEL OF PRESENCE 67 
 
 
The top level of each perceptual analyzer contains two nodes (labeled ‘O’ and ‘R’ in Figure 5-1) – one 
of these nodes (the ‘O node’) will become activated if the perception by that modality results in the 
percept being identified as an object, and the other (the ‘R node’) will becomes activated if the 
perception by that modality results in the percept as being identified as a rendition of an object. We 
define a rendition of an object as any symbol or reproduction which aims to represent or symbolize an 
object, regardless of how physically dissimilar the rendition is from the object. In the case of vision, 
renditions include photographs, video footage, geometric models, sketches and even a verbal 
description of a scene can all be regarded as renditions of a scene. The modeling of the O and R nodes 
is derived partly from the work of Lombard & Ditton (1997) who argue that presence is the illusion 
that the VE experience is not mediated by technology. In this model, mediation would be experienced 
when a the R (rendition) node is highly activated, leading to the perception of the objects not as real, 
but as representations of real objects. On the other hand, if the O node is highly active, this will lead to 
the perception of the virtual environment of consisting of real objects, and consequently, the sense of 
non-mediation. 
 
The O and R nodes are connected to the action layer by means of excitatory connections. Each O and R 
node is connected to many action nodes, with each connection encoding one of the possible responses 
which are appropriate for any particular percept. Activation of an O or R node will lead to a partial 
activation of all the nodes in the action layer to which it is connected. Usually, the activation provided 
by the perceptual layer is not sufficient to activate the action nodes to a level where a response occurs. 
In order for that to occur, a certain amount of activation is also required by from the conceptual layers. 
For example, a user who perceives an object as a door in a virtual environment may respond to that 
object in one of many possible ways, none of which is directly suggested by the percept itself, but 
rather by previous experiences as well as by abstract knowledge about doors (Norman, 1988). In a few 
cases, such as reflex or automatic actions, perceptual stimulation alone will provide sufficient 
activation of the action layer for a response to occur. 
5.1.1 Further motivation for modeling the O and R nodes 
Slater & Steed (2000) emphasize the difference between experiencing data originating from the “real 
world” (which they term being in an R state), and experiencing data emanating from a VE display 
(which they term being in a V state).  Specifically, they note that data from a VE display will contain 
glitches in image quality, sudden changes in frame rates etc. This type of display artifact clearly creates 
a distinction between VE data and “Real world” data, but we think the distinction is more subtle that 
“real world”/VE. Our decision to create a separate apparatus for detecting objects and renditions of 
objects is based largely upon the work of Gibson (1979). Gibson suggests that the rendition of an 
object is not simply a poor quality reproduction of an object, which contains less information than the 
object itself. Rather, Gibson points out, a rendition is often identified as such by the fact that the 
rendition contains information which the object itself does not. For example, we can appreciate the 
difference between an apple and the photograph of an apple not simply due to the failings of the 
photograph to capture all the information present in the apple (such as depth information, its hardness, 
smell, etc), but also due to the fact that a photograph of an apple will also contain features of the 
photograph such as glossy reflections, the grain of the film, and perhaps the smell of photographic 
chemicals, which the object does not contain. Gibson further points out that it is possible to fool the 
visual system into perceiving a rendition when it is in fact an object on display. As an example, Gibson 
presents a study in which researchers prepared a window of a house so that a majority of subjects 
reported it as being a framed photograph of a garden rather than a garden itself. Based on these results, 
we reject the notion that a continuum of quality or amount of information exists between an object and 
a rendition of that object, rather suggesting that each of these is perceived separately. We propose that 
the process of deciding if a percept is an object or a rendition occurs as one of the final steps of 
perception (due to its relatively high level of abstractness), and we thus place it at the top of the 
perceptual analyzer. Furthermore, we allow the ‘O nodes’ and ‘R nodes’ to connect to different action 
layer nodes, based on the notion that the response to an object will tend to be different to the response 
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to the rendition of that object. For instance, on perceiving an apple (object), my first reaction might be 
to smell it, but on perceiving a photograph of an apple (rendition of the object), my first reaction would 
probably not be to smell it, but rather a different response. 
 
This same idea is recently expressed by Slater (2002b) as the notion that presence occurs as a process 
of selecting between two competing hypotheses: that the percept is either representing a real scene, or a 
virtual scene. In Slater’s view, the scene presents evidence to the viewer which may or may not 
convince them that the scene they perceive is real. Our conceptual layer can be thought of as an 
explanation of the mechanism by which this happens. The O node represents the hypothesis that the 
scene (or a particular aspect of the scene) is real, and the R node represents the hypothesis that the 
scene is not real. The level of activation in each node represents the degree of confidence that the 
hypothesis is true, and the final determination of which of the two is true occurs as a process of the 
activation and mutual inhibition between the two nodes. 
 
As Slater (2002b) reminds us, it is usually not the case that a percept is identified simultaneously as 
both an object and a rendition, as this would lead to ambiguity and confusion. For example, a wax 
apple (rendition) might be mistaken for an apple (object), but once it has been identified as a wax 
apple, it is not likely be perceived as a real apple. This disambiguation feature of perception is 
important, and we model this by placing the O and R nodes on the same layer, and allowing inhibitory 
connections between them. These connections allow disambiguation by allowing the node which is 
more activated to inhibit and thus overpower the other, ensuring that at any moment, one of the two is 
dominant over the other. 
5.1.2 Implications of the perceptual layer model 
a) Using an interactive activation and competition model allows for perception to contribute to 
presence by degrees rather than in a dichotic “on/off” style. Evidence that perception affects 
presence in this way is contributed by Lessiter, Freeman and Davidoff (2001), who conducted 
a study into the effect of varying the quality of audio playback on presence. They created four 
levels of audio quality, and found that presence increased in each subsequent level of quality. 
This suggests that presence varies continuously as a function of the perceptions by a single 
modality. The variable activation connections between each perceptual analyzer and the action 
layer in this model allows for the replication of this effect. 
 
b) This model allows modeling of the benefits of multimodality to presence (as demonstrated, for 
example by Salln?s (1999), who found that presence in a multimodal environment was 
superior to that in a unimodal environment) by modeling each of the sensory input channels as 
a separate, independent, perceptual analyzer, each of which is independently capable of 
contributing activation to the action layer.  
 
c) This model also explains how a stimulus which is initially perceived as a rendition can, with 
increased exposure, be later perceived as an object. This effect is demonstrated by Nass, 
Steuer & Tauber (1994). They asked a group of subjects to engage in a text-based dialog with 
a computer agent, aware that the agent was only a program, and not another human user. After 
a period of interaction with the agent, Nass et al. found that subjects’ interaction style 
changed,  behaving towards the agent as if they were interacting with another person (for 
instance by using polite expressions, etc). This finding suggests that although the subjects 
began by perceiving the program as simply a rendition of a conversation with another person, 
exposure to the system changed the perception to that of an actual conversation with a person. 
This type of effect is modeled by postulating separation between the O node and the R node, 
each with its own connections to the action layer, and by postulating an inhibitory connection 
between the O and R nodes to allow disambiguation between of the two. 
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d) Each of the O and R nodes has its own connections to the action layer. This models the 
possibility of different reactions based on whether the stimulus is perceived as an object or a 
rendition. This effect can be seen, for example, in the difference in postural reactions which 
can be caused by changing from a simple projected display (which is more likely to be 
perceived as a rendition) to a stereoscopic projected display (which is more likely to be 
perceived as an object), reported by Freeman et al. (2000).  
5.2 The conceptual layers 
Like many theorists, we believe that the user’s psychology has an important role to play in the 
experience of presence. The conceptual layers represent the more abstract processes of cognition. The 
conceptual layer has the same purpose as Ijsselstein, de Ridder, Freeman & Avons’ (2000) user 
characteristics, as Steuer’s (1992) willing suspension of disbelief, as Thie & van Wijk’s (1998) 
willingness to become present, as Bystrom, Barfield & Hendrix’s (1999) suspension of disbelief and 
part of the attentional resource allocation, and as Schubert, Freidmann & Regenbrecht’s (1999) 
perception of dramatic structures and content.  
 
For the purposes of this model, it is not essential to describe their workings in detail. The conceptual 
layers are where mental models of interaction and of environments reside, memories of previous 
environmental interactions, as well as task-related knowledge and heuristics. The conceptual layers are 
connected to the action nodes below by means of excitatory connections. When any state of activation 
exists in the conceptual layers, activation spreads downwards to the action layers, partly priming 
certain nodes there. For example, a user who encounters a door in a virtual environment will begin 
thinking about the possible operations which can be performed on the door (Norman, 1988). These 
include, for instance, opening it, or knocking. In this model, the user’s previous experiences with doors 
will lead to a particular higher-level cognitive state, which in turn will contribute activation to a few 
related nodes on the action layer (for example, the nodes encoding opening, pulling, etc). In most cases 
the conceptual layer will contribute activation to many action nodes, is essence providing a range of 
choices which have been appropriate in similar situations in the past. The activation contributed by the 
conceptual layers is usually not sufficient to activate the action layer sufficiently for a response to 
occur. For that to occur, some contribution from the perceptual layer is usually required. This 
requirement for an external stimulus ensures that the selected behaviour matches the environment in 
which it is going to be expressed. 
5.2.1 Motivation for modeling the conceptual layers 
The conceptual layers are included in this model of presence due to a small but compelling body of 
work that illustrates the importance of complex, abstract cognition on presence. An example is the 
work of Sas & O’Hare (2001), which shows a relationship between navigation (a high level cognitive 
activity) and presence. Another example of this is the tendency, reported by Slater, Usoh and Steed 
(1995), for users who identified with their avatars in the virtual environment, to experience more 
presence. Apart from the evidence that is available, several influential researchers (such as Sheridan) 
have indirectly suggested that the user’s expectations of the virtual environment will have an impact on 
the level of presence they experience. Witmer and Singer, for instance, suggest that presence will come 
about if a user’s expectations of their interaction with the VE are met (Witmer & Singer, 1998). 
 
We do not model much detail in the conceptual layers, as there is very little research into the effects of 
higher-level cognitive processes on presence. Fencott (1999), for example, suggests that the content of 
a VE might affect presence, but provides no convincing empirical evidence to this effect. Similarly, 
Sheridan (1992) suggests that the content of a virtual environment might affect the degree of presence 
felt. Some empirical evidence is provided by Schubert, Friedman & Regenbrecht (1999). They 
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constructed a multiple regression model of various variables associated to presence, and find a 
significant relationship between Spatial Presence (the traditional notion of “being there in the VE”) and 
Drama (a measure of the dramatic content and structures in the VE). This suggests that abstract 
cognitive structures (such as knowledge of dramatic structure) are able to affect presence to a degree 
noticeable in the population. 
 
We model these layers as a single entity, with many unspecified connections to the action layer. For the 
time being, we suggest that the contribution of users’ previous experiences and their expectations cam 
be modeled by allowing the conceptual layer to activate nodes in the action layer, and the VE’s effect 
on the user’s thoughts and decisions (and other higher-level cognitive processes). 
5.2.2 Implications of the conceptual layer 
a) Having a conceptual layer which is indirectly (via the action layer) connected to the perceptual 
layers allows for modeling of Gestalt effects and other phenomena (such as illusions) where 
top-down activation can affect perception (Neiser, 1967).  
 
b) The indirect connection (via the action layer) between perceptual analyzers and the conceptual 
layer allows for modeling of environmentally appropriate reactions. An example of this 
phenomenon is the findings of Usoh et al (1999), who found that subjects react to a virtual 
hole in the VE as they would to a real hole in a real floor; that is by skirting around the edge 
rather than walking across the open space. In this case, the perception of a virtual hole alone 
cannot explain why users skirted around it, as there are many possible reactions to perceiving 
a virtual hole. Perception alone can also not explain why one particular response to the virtual 
hole was preferred by most subjects. The subjects’ behaviour can only be satisfactorily 
explained by considering the combined effects of previous experience and perception. 
 
c) Placing the conceptual layers on the opposite side of the action layer to the perceptual 
analyzers allows for the conceptual layers to contribute activation to the action layer 
independently of the perceptual analyzers. This allows the modeling of perceptual 
disambiguation by means of previous knowledge, which requires simultaneous activation 
from both the perceptual and conceptual layers. An example of such an occurrence is the 
perception of idioms or other contextually laden language constructions (Pinker, 1995). 
5.3 The action layer 
The action layer consists of a single layer of nodes placed between the perceptual analyzers and the 
conceptual layer. Each of these nodes contains multiple vertical excitatory connections to both the 
perceptual analyzers and the conceptual layer. The connections between the perceptual layer and the 
action layer are broader than those connecting to the conceptual layer, allowing the perceptual layers to 
exert more influence on the action layer than the conceptual layers. This results in perceptions having 
more influence than thoughts on behaviour selection, ensuring that behaviour remains appropriate to 
the environmental situation present. Each node of the action layer also has horizontal inhibitory 
connections to its nearer neighbours in the action layer.  
 
The nodes of this layer encode the possible relationships between a set of stimuli, and a thought pattern 
or decision-making process. In this sense, the action layer acts as a repository of schema (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977) with each schema being encoded by either one or several nodes, depending on its 
complexity. The nodes are arranged so that nodes encoding similar schemata are close to each other. 
This is necessary to ensure disambiguation of similar schemata by competition, as the activation of one 
will lead to the inhibition of its nearest (and thus most similar) neighbours. In this way, the perception 
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of a stimulus is guaranteed to activate only one schema, although the schema that is activated will 
depend not only on what is perceived (which is bottom-up activation from the perceptual analyzers), 
but also from the subject’s state of mind at the time (which is top-down activation from the conceptual 
layers).  
5.3.1 Motivation for modeling the action layer 
The action layer exists as an interface between perception and abstract cognitive processes. It acts as a 
matching mechanism between mental models or expectations about the environment, and the 
perceptions of the environment. The action layer allows for different reactions to be initiated in 
response to the same stimuli, based on the subject’s current cognitive state. If the perceptual analyzers 
were directly connected to the conceptual layers, then a specific stimulus would always bring about the 
same response, as occurs in a reflex-arc reaction (Martindale, 1991), such as the knee-jerk response. 
This type of predictable, fixed reaction generally only occurs in response to basic perceptions (such as 
pain) rather than to the complex perceptual processing which is required in perceiving a virtual 
environment. It is generally understood that a user’s reaction to a stimulus will vary according to that 
user’s goals and expectations (Brown, 1965). For instance, the sight of a raging rapid in a river might 
bring about an avoidant response in a person, but if that person is keen on a whitewater holiday and 
suitably equipped with a lifejacket, the response might be quite different. For this reason, we model the 
action layer as an intermediate step between perception and abstract cognitive functioning. We propose 
that this middle layer is at the heart of understanding presence, as it can be used to indicate the way in 
which a stimulus which has been perceived will be reacted to. By examining the pattern of activation in 
the action layer, it is possible to understand the relationship between a stimulus and the user’s higher-
level cognitive processes, and as such the action layer can act as an indicator of presence, by exposing 
the interface between the perception of virtual environments and the effect they have on the user’s 
thoughts and actions. 
5.3.2 Implications of the action layer 
a) The existence of inhibitory connections between action nodes implies that for any set of 
circumstances, only a single schema will be selected. This means that for any set of 
circumstances, a subject is unlikely to become confused as to the course of action to take 
(confusion being the state where more than one set of actions seems appropriate). According 
to Carver & Scheier (1998), the reduction of conflicts in the selection of goal-directed 
behaviour is an important feature of human behaviour self-regulation. 
 
b) The action layer allows the modeling of various appropriate reactions (schemata) to any set of 
stimuli. The selection of the schema will be based on the extent to which perceptual activation 
matches with the mental state of the user at the time of perception. This notion is supported by 
Witmer & Singer (1998), who note that presence will most likely vary as a function of the 
degree to which the environment responds to and fits with the expectations and mental models 
of the user. 
 
c) The O and R nodes of a perceptual analyzer are connected to many different action nodes, and 
so many different schemata can be triggered if a stimulus is perceived either as an object or as 
a rendition. This explains the phenomenon noted by Steuer (1992), that a realistic rendition of 
an object will lead to more presence than will a non-realistic rendition; simultaneously, it can 
also explain why users of non-realistically rendered virtual environments, such as text-based 
virtual environments, are able to experience presence (Towell & Towell, 1997). 
 
d) McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) state that the relative strength of connection in this type of 
network can change over time and with learning. If this principle is applied to the connections 
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between the O or R nodes and the action layer, it implies that a stimulus may begin by 
activating a schema appropriate to an object, but as time progresses, the same stimulus may 
activate the schema appropriate to a rendition (or vice versa). This will occur as a function of 
the reinforcement or reward a subject receives for activating a particular schema. Although 
our model allows for this possibility, the lack of any longitudinal research into presence leaves 
no evidence to support this idea. 
5.4 Amount of activation available for processing 
Following the suggestions by McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) as well as by Martindale (1991), we 
propose that there exists a limited amount of activation in the architecture for distributing between 
nodes. We propose that the conceptual layers share a single, large reserve of activation which can be 
used to activate the action layer. Also, each of the perceptual analyzers has its own reserve of  
activation available for spreading to the action layer. However, the sizes of each perceptual analyzer’s 
activation reserves are not equal; each has a different size, with the preferred modality having the 
largest reserve. By means of this large activation reserve, the preferred modality is able to exert more 
influence over cognition and processing than do the other modalities. 
5.5 The expression of presence in the model 
The connectionist model expresses presence in an implicit, distributed way, similar to that used in 
Slater & Usoh’s representation system theory (1993). In our model, presence is expressed as the 
activation of nodes in the action layer. This is reminiscent of Thie & van Wijk’s (1998) notion that 
presence is the activation of VE mental models rather than RW mental models. 
5.5.1 Defining the existence of presence in the model 
In the terms of this model, presence occurs when the set of activated nodes in the action layer is 
providing an appropriate response to the virtual environment provided as a stimulus to the subject 
rather than to the real environment in which the subject is physically located. This implies that 
presence is the state of mind in which the subjects' thought process is aligned towards the virtual 
environment. This idea is consistent with our definition of Cognitive Presence (Nunez & Blake, 2001). 
 
The use of the word appropriate in the above definition is somewhat problematic, as for all but trivial 
environments it is difficult to determine what an appropriate set of responses might be. However, it is 
possible to create a list of appropriate responses based on the requirements of the virtual environment 
in question. For instance, if a virtual environment has been created as part of a theme park, and its 
purpose is to scare the users (as in a virtual haunted house, perhaps), then appropriate responses to this 
environment should be fear, surprise, and so on, whereas laughter would not be an appropriate 
response. Defining the “appropriateness” of responses by means of examining the specification of the 
virtual environment in this way has the benefit that, to a limited extent, it defines presence in terms of 
what is useful in the environment. A virtual environment can then be said to be producing maximum 
presence when it is creating, in users, the desired responses. This definition also facilitates 
measurement, as the “appropriateness” criterion provides a baseline against which to compare a user’s 
responses. 
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5.5.2 The action layer and presence 
To understand the significance of the action nodes in presence, it is necessary to note that for each VE 
situation there is a finite set of actions and cognitions that are appropriate. For example, in a VE of a 
room with a deep pit in the center, the appropriate behaviours include walking around the hole, 
stepping carefully, and perhaps peering into the pit. Appropriate cognitions would include judging the 
depth of the pit, and perhaps fear, if the user has a phobia for heights (notice that these behaviours 
allow, by observing the subjects, to determine if they are virtually “there” in the room – those 
displaying these behaviours are present, those not displaying them are not present).  No single one of 
these behaviours is a clear sign of presence on its own, as they are appropriate in several settings. For 
instance, stepping carefully could also be appropriate in a setting where the user wishes to walk quietly. 
However, the related cluster of these behaviours is indicative of being in a room with a pit. In this 
model, this clustering of behaviours is expressed in the action layer – each node represents a cluster of 
behaviours (hence the similarity between action nodes and Schank and Abelson’s schemata). Any 
single behaviour may exist in a wide number of VE situations, but usually only one cluster of them 
(one action node) is appropriate in a single VE situation.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be derived that a particular action node (or sub-set of action nodes) 
can be designated as the “presence node” for a particular VE situation (note that the “presence node” 
will change from situation to situation, depending on what is appropriate at the time). The reason the 
activated action nodes can be referred to as the “presence node” is not simply a matter of definition, but 
is rather due to the effect which the activation of these nodes has on the system as a whole. It is 
important to remember that an action node is not simply a sink for activation to flow into. Once the 
action nodes have received enough activation, they begin to transmit that activation vertically to both 
the perceptual analyzers below and the conceptual layers above. As the activation spreads to these 
areas, it biases the system towards perceiving and thinking in terms related (that is, connected) to the 
activated action node. The action nodes thus help to set the “state” of the network as a whole. For 
instance, a particular action node may set the “behaviour for quiet places” state, while another might set 
the “exploring a dangerous place” state. However, no “state” as such exists, as the activation levels are 
continuous rather than discreet. The effect is more of a “bias towards”, and is thus better understood by 
looking at each action node as encoding something similar to a schema. 
 
Like schemata, action nodes do not simply control behaviour in the motor sense. Because they are 
connected to the perceptual layers, they also affect perception, leading to perceptions which occur in 
line with the mental state they impose (a phenomenon know as expectation-based processing after 
Posner & Snyder, 1975). They action nodes are also connected to the conceptual layers and are thus 
capable of affecting abstract thought. These effects include, for example, the selection of schema-
related coping strategies. It is through this mechanism of action node activation that strategies of 
thought and action are selected to allow coherent and appropriate operation in an environment. 
Interpreting presence in this framework is thus simple - if the mental state that is activated at the time 
of experiencing the virtual environment is more appropriate to the virtual environment rather than to 




Chapter 6  
Examples of the connectionist model 
of presence in use 
 
This chapter presents two examples of the model being used to predict presence levels. These examples 
show how the model described in chapter 5 can predict, given sufficient information about the 
perceptual and conceptual starting state, the level of presence that a subject will experience. Both 
examples are taken from published empirical studies. Using published empirical studies for examples 
has three major advantages; firstly, the method used has been peer-reviewed and their validity is thus 
not in question. Secondly, the results provided in published papers represent real results rather than 
speculation on possible outcomes; and thirdly, comparing the results of well-known studies with the 















Action node2 Action node3 
 
Figure 6-1: The model as used in the examples. In all examples, presence depends on the 
activation of action node 2.
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For these examples, a simplified version of the model presented in chapter 5 will be used. This is 
presented in Figure 6-1. Nodes which have no activation are drawn with a light line, and activated 
nodes are drawn with a heavier line. For the sake of simplicity, in each of the examples, we will assume 
that the degree of presence is largely tied to the activation of action node 2. As described in chapter 5, 
there is no single action node which can always be said to be the “presence node” – rather, presence 
will related to different action nodes in each VE situation, and the “presence node” will change from 
situation to situation. 
6.1 Example 1: Modeling the effect of geometric field of view on 
presence (after Hendrix & Barfield, 1995) 
This study investigated the effects of various display parameters, including geometric field of view 
(GFOV), on presence. Hendrix and Barfield placed subjects into one of three GFOV conditions – 10 
degrees GFOV, 50 degrees GFOV and 90 degrees GFOV. The results showed that the subjects in the 
50 and 90 degree GFOV conditions reported more presence than those in the 10 degree GFOV 
condition.  This study is typical of a series of studies which show that an improvement in the display 
capabilities of a VR system leads to an increase in presence (see also Barfield & Hendrix, 1995; 
Lessiter et al 2001 and Usoh et al, 1999 for further examples of this type of work). In these studies, 
generally speaking, no attention was paid to priming the subjects to incite a particular conceptual state, 
although the perceptual stimulus conditions were carefully controlled. 
 
The connectionist model is well suited to modeling this type of result. We will model two of the three 
GFOV conditions (10 degree and 90 degree) by varying the relative activation of the O and R nodes of 
the perceptual analyzer. The 10 degree GFOV condition would be represented by a high level of R 
activation with a low level of O activation and the 90 degree GFOV condition would be represented by 
a high level of O activation and a low level of R activation. This is done by assuming that the narrower 
the geometric field of view is, the more like a generated image the result will look, and the wider the 
field of view, the more natural and object-like the image will appear. Hendrix and Barfield did not 
prime their subjects for any particular conceptual state, and so we can assume that subjects entered the 
experiment with a random set of conceptual node activations. We will model this by assuming that all 
action nodes are receiving an equal amount of activation from the conceptual layers.  
 
This example will demonstrate how the model can predict the difference in presence comes about 
between the 10 degree GFOV condition and the 90 degree FOV condition, as reported by Hendrix and 
Barfield. We will first demonstrate the model predicting a low level of presence in the 10 degree 
GFOV condition, followed by it predicting a higher level of presence in the 90 degree GFOV 
condition. 
6.1.1 Predicting presence in the 10 degree GFOV condition 
Initial perceptual state: We will use perceptual analyzer 2 as the visual analyzer in this example. In this 
condition, the narrow GFOV would produce a strong frame around the image, which would strongly 
suggest that the image is generated, rather than natural. This implies that the O node will be receiving 
very little activation, while the R node would be receiving a lot of activation from the underlying 
perceptual layers.  
 
Initial conceptual state: Hendrix and Barfield made no attempt to prime their subjects, and so we 
assume that a random distribution of activation existed in the conceptual layers. We model this by 
allowing each action node to receive an equal amount of activation from the conceptual layers. These 
initial conditions are shown in Figure 6-2. 






































Figure 6-2: Initial state for the Hendrix & Barfield (1995) 10? GFOV example. Perceptual 
analyzer 2 is the vision analyzer, and action node 2 is the “appropriate action” node encoding 
presence for this example. Bolder lines indicate more activation. 
 
Once this initial state exists and the model is started, the O and R nodes of perceptual analyzer 2 begin 
to compete by means of the inhibitory connection between them. The R node is far more activated, and 
so this dominates and almost completely inhibits the O node, leaving only the R node to make a 
significant contribution to the action layer. The activation in the perceptual layers will spread along the 
vertical connections upwards to the action layer. Similarly, the activation from the conceptual layers 













Action node2 Action node3
 
Figure 6-3: Activation spreading in the model 
 
Once the activation reaches the action nodes, they begin to compete and inhibit their neighbours. At 
this stage, action node 3 is the most activated in the layer as illustrated in Figure 6-4. Although action 
node 2 is receiving activation from the conceptual layer and a small amount from the O node of 
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perceptual analyzer 2, it is also being inhibited by action node 3, and the net result is a very low 





































Figure 6-4: Action node 3 receives the most activation in the layer 
 
At this stage, we can see that action node 2 is not very activated, and thus we can deduce that only a 
small amount of presence will result, by virtue of our definition of action node 2 as the “presence node” 
for this particular situation.  
 
6.1.2 Predicting presence in the 90 degree GFOV condition 
Initial perceptual state: We again use perceptual analyzer 2 as the visual analyzer in this example. In 
this condition, the wide GFOV would present a more natural image, with less rendition features than 
the 10 degree GFOV condition. According to the model, the O node would thus be more activated than 
the R node. 
 
  
Initial conceptual state: As with the 10 degree GFOV condition, we assume that a random distribution 
of activation existed in the conceptual layers. We model this by allowing each action node to receive an 
equal amount of activation from the conceptual layers. The initial conditions for the 90 degree GFOV 
model is presented in Figure 6-5. 
 





































Figure 6-5: Initial state for the Hendrix & Barfield (1995) 90? GFOV example 
When the model is started, the O and R nodes of perceptual analyzer 2 begin to compete by means of 
the inhibitory connection between them. The O node has more activation, and so overwhelms the R 
node, and leaves itself as the only significant contributor of activation to the action layer. 
Simultaneously, the activation from the conceptual layers spreads downwards. Action node 2 is 
receiving a large amount of activation from the perceptual layer below, as well as a slight amount from 
the conceptual layers above. Because action nodes 1 and 3 are receiving activation only from the 
conceptual layers, they inhibit action node 2 only a slight amount, but action node 2, which is highly 
activated, inhibits them greatly. The model will settle with action node 2 containing a substantial 




































Figure 6-6: Final state of the model 
 
The activation state of the model indicates a high level of activation in the “presence node” (action 
node 2), and therefore a high state of presence. 
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6.1.3 Evaluating the model’s prediction of Hendrix & Barfield’s (1995) finding 
The model predicts a higher level of presence (that is, more action node 2 activation) for the 90 degree 
GFOV condition than for the 10 degree GFOV condition. This prediction matches the empirical finding 
by Hendrix & Barfield. This shows the model is capable of expressing differences in presence due to a 
difference in the quality of a single perceptual analyzer. At no stage of the process was there specific 
mention made of vision by the model, and the reader would be correct in extrapolating that a similar 
example could be applied to explain the difference in presence levels as a function of audio quality 
reported by Lessiter, Freeman, & Davidoff (2001). These examples illustrate that this model is able to 
explain and predict one of the most fundamental and most widely researched aspects of presence, 
namely that increasing the fidelity of a display variable will increase the amount of presence 
experienced by a viewer of that display.  
6.2 Example 2: Modeling the effect of multi-modality on presence 
(after Salln?s, 1999) 
Salln?s  (1999) reports a study comparing the levels of presence experienced by subjects using a VE 
stimulating a single modality (audio) with those of subjects using a VE that stimulated two modalities 
(audio and haptic). Two groups of users were asked to perform a collaborative task in one of the two 
conditions (audio only/audio and haptics), and were measured on various variables, including virtual 
presence using the Presence Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998). The results showed a statistically 
significant difference between the groups, with the group using two modalities experiencing more 
presence than the one using a single modality. Salln?s concluded from this that multimodal interfaces 
to VEs lead to more presence than unimodal interfaces. 
 
This result can also be easily modeled using the connectionist model. We will begin by modeling each 
modality (audio and haptics) as a separate perceptual analyzer. This example will use the same network 
used in example 1 (presented in Figure 6-1). We will use perceptual analyzer 2 as the audio analyzer, 
and perceptual analyzer 3 as the haptics analyzer. Again, the “presence node” for this example will be 
action node 2. As we are not given a measure of quality of the stimuli used by Salln?s, we will assume 
that the stimuli were of a moderate quality (this is a reasonable assumption, as she found presence 
levels even using a single modality, which would not have been the case if the stimuli had been of poor 
quality). We model this by assigning similar amounts of activation in the O and R nodes of each 
analyzer, with the O node receiving slightly more activation than the R node. Salln?s made no attempt 
to prime or prepare her subjects cognitively for the study, so we will again assume an even spread of 
activation from the conceptual layers to each of the action nodes. To model the difference between 
these two systems we will model each in turn, and compare the amount of activation in action node in 
each case. 
6.2.1 Predicting presence in the audio only condition 
Initial perceptual state: We will use perceptual analyzer 2 as the auditory analyzer, and perceptual 
analyzer 3 as the haptic analyzer for this example. In this condition, the haptic analyzer was not 
stimulated, and will thus not contribute any activation to the model. As argued in 6.2 above, we will 
assume similar activation levels in the O and R nodes, with slightly more activation in the O node. 
 
Initial conceptual state: Salln?s made no attempt to prime her subjects, and so we assume that a 
random distribution of activation existed in the conceptual layers. We model this by allowing each 
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 action node to receive an equal amount of activation from the conceptual layers. 













Action node2 Action node3
 
Figure 6-7: Initial state for the Salln?s (1999) audio only condition 
Once the model begins to run, the activation in the O and R nodes spreads via the inhibitory link 
between them, and they begin to compete. As the activation level in each of them is similar, one will 
not inhibit the other severely. However, the O node began slightly more activated, and thus will tend to 
slowly overpower the R node. 
 
The O and R nodes will both be contributing activation to the action layer. The O node is slightly more 
activated than the R node (this difference accentuated by the action of the inhibitory connection 
between them), and thus action node 2 will receive more activation than action node 3. This is 
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Figure 6-8: Activation spreading in the model 
The activation from the perceptual and conceptual layers will begin to spread towards the action layer. 
Action node 3 is receiving activation from the conceptual layers, as well as a small amount from the R 
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node of perceptual analyzer 2. Action node 2, on the other hand is receiving a moderate amount of 
activation from the O node of perceptual analyzer 2, as well as a small amount of activation from the 
conceptual layers. The net effect is a similar activation state in action nodes 2 and 3. However, as the 
action nodes become activated, they will begin to compete by means of the inhibitory connection 
between them. As action node 2 is more activated than action node 3, it will exert more inhibition, and 
will tend to a more active state. The model ends with action nodes 2 and 3 slightly activated, although 
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Figure 6-9: Final state of the model 
This configuration, as it only has a slight amount of action node 2 activation, represents a moderate 
presence level. 
 
6.2.2 Predicting presence in the audio with haptics condition 
Initial perceptual state: We will use perceptual analyzer 2 as the auditory analyzer, and perceptual 
analyzer 3 as the haptic analyzer for this example. In this condition, both the haptic and audio analyzers 
contribute activation, as they are both being stimulated. As argued in 6.2 above, we will assume similar 
activation levels in each perceptual analyzers’ O and R nodes, with slightly more activation in the O 
node of each. 
 
 
Initial conceptual state: Salln?s made no attempt to prime her subjects, and so we assume that a 
random distribution of activation existed in the conceptual layers. We model this by allowing each 
action node to receive an equal amount of activation from the conceptual layers. These initial 
conditions are shown in Figure 6-10. 
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Figure 6-10: Initial state for the Salln?s (1999) audio with haptics condition 
As the model begins, the O and R nodes of each analyzer begin to compete via the inhibitory 
connection between them. As the O node is slightly more activated than the R node (in each case), this 
will inhibit the other and gain a slight advantage. The activation then spreads upwards into the action 
nodes. Simultaneously, the conceptual layers contribute an equal amount of activation to each action 
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Figure 6-11: Activation spreading in the model 
The activation from the perceptual layers contributes activation to action nodes 2 and 3. The O nodes of 
each will contribute more activation due to their competition with the R nodes, although the R nodes 
still contribute a small amount. The consequence of this is that action node 2 receives activation from 
two highly activated O nodes, while action node 3 only receives a small amount of activation from the 
two slightly activated R nodes. As the action nodes become activated, they begin to compete, and 
because action node 2 is more activated than action node 3, it inhibits action node 3, and emerges as the 
most activated node of the action layer. This final state is shown in Figure 6-12. 
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Figure 6-12: Final state of the model 
The final state of the model suggest a high level of activation for action node 2 (as it is receiving 
activation from two moderately activated O nodes), and thus a high level of presence.  
6.2.3 Evaluating the model’s prediction of Salln?s’s (1999) finding 
The model predicts a higher level of presence (action node 2 activation level) for the audio with haptics 
condition than for the audio only condition. This is because in the audio only condition action node 2 
was receiving activation only from the O node of perceptual analyzer 2, while in the audio with haptics 
condition, action node 2 was receiving activation from the O nodes of perceptual analyzer 2 as well as 
perceptual analyzer 3. This prediction matches the empirical finding by Salln?s.  This example also 
illustrates that the model illustrates the general principle, suggested by Slater (1999), that subjects 
using multi-modal VR systems will likely experience more presence than subjects using VR systems 




Chapter 7   
A strategy for evaluating the 
connectionist model of presence 
Chapter 6 presented how the connectionist model of presence is capable of explaining the results found 
in two published studies, and arguments were presented as to how these explanations could be 
extended, by induction, to explain other similar phenomena (such as, for instance, the effects of sound 
quality manipulation on presence as reported by Lessiter, Freeman, & Davidoff, 2001). However, such 
post-hoc explanations are not evidence for the efficacy of the model, as these published results were 
taken into account during the construction of the model, and as such the model agrees with the 
published findings a priori. To show its effectiveness, the model needs to be able to predict a set of 
results that are beyond the scope of the material used in the model’s construction. If the model is 
capable of predicting the results arising from a novel situation, then the models can be said to be an 
explanation of the phenomenon it is modeling rather than just an obfuscated summary of previous 
findings. A perfect model would be able to accurately predict all instances of the phenomenon, past and 
future, under all conditions. 
 
This chapter presents an evaluation strategy for the connectionist model of presence based on these 
principles. The model’s performance in predicting the published studies presented in Chapter 6 can be 
taken as evidence that the model is coherent with the current empirical understanding of presence. To 
convincingly show its effectiveness, it is necessary to create a novel set of initial circumstances, and 
use the model to predict the outcome. Then, the same circumstances should be replicated in the 
laboratory, the presence experienced by subjects recorded, and the empirical findings compared with 
the model’s predictions. If the findings match the predictions, then this can be understood as further 
evidence of the model’s correctness. 
7.1 Creating novel conditions for evaluation 
The model includes two sites for providing input – the conceptual layers, and the perceptual analyzers. 
By varying the levels of input on each of these input sites, a set of initial activation states can be 
created. We propose creating four conditions to test, by setting two levels of activation in the 
conceptual layers, and two levels of activation in the perceptual analyzers. 
7.1.1 Manipulation of the conceptual layers 
The activation states of the conceptual layers can be manipulated by priming. Priming is a technique 
used in cognitive psychology to investigate how context affects mental performance, and usually 
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involves exposing the subject to a particular stimulus, not related to the experimental task, which will 
induce a particular mental state in the subject (Neely, 1977). For example, a subject about to begin a 
memory task might be shown a series of images before the task, to investigate the effect of the mental 
context created by those images, on recall. 
 
According to the connectionist model of presence proposed in this document, presence results when the 
schemata relevant to the virtual environment become maximally active (schemata being expressed in 
the model by the nodes of the action layer). Any manipulation of the conceptual layers must be made 
cognizant of the virtual environment in which the subject will be operating. For example, priming a 
subject with images of bookshelves and books might lead to activation of the schemas associated with 
operating in a library (including behaviours related to being quiet, browsing, reading, etc). This priming 
manipulation however, will have different effects on mental performance based on the environment in 
which the subject is asked to operate. If placed in a VE of a library, for instance, then the priming 
would contribute towards presence in that environment, as the appropriate “presence nodes” would be 
receiving top-down activation, and the subject would be more likely to display VE-appropriate (that is, 
library-appropriate) behaviours. However, if placed into a VE of a football stadium, this manipulation 
would have no beneficial effect on presence , as the action nodes receiving the top-down activation 
would not be the appropriate “presence nodes” for the situation. 
 
Based on these considerations, we propose two levels of conceptual layer activation – a VE relevant 
level, in which the subjects are primed with materials directly related to the VE in which they will be 
operating, and a VE irrelevant level, in which the subjects are primed with materials not related to the 
environment in which they will be operating (it is important to note that, according to Schank & 
Abelson, some schemata must always be active, so a “no action node active” control is not possible). 
These two states provide an opportunity to examine the two extremes of the contribution made by the 
conceptual layers to presence. 
7.1.2 Manipulation of the perceptual analyzers 
The connectionist model of presence, in its current state of development, describes the perceptual 
analyzers in far more detail than the conceptual layers, and as such affords many more options for its 
manipulation. For instance, the number of stimulated analyzers (modalities) could be varied, or the 
ratio of O to R node activation for a set of analyzers could be varied. We propose to take a broad-brush 
approach, and create two conditions which represent extremes of activation. In the first condition (High 
stimulus quality) a large number of analyzers are stimulated, with the quality of the stimulus being 
tailored to produce a high degree of O node activation in each analyzer. The second condition (Low 
stimulus quality), a small number of analyzers are stimulated in such a way as to produce mainly R 
node activation. 
 
7.1.3 The novel conditions for evaluating the model 
The manipulations described in 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 above create four conditions which can be used for 
evaluating the model. These are VE relevant priming/High stimulus quality, VE irrelevant 
priming/High stimulus quality, VE relevant priming/Low stimulus quality, and VE irrelevant 
priming/Low stimulus quality. These four conditions permit the investigation of the main effects of 
each of the manipulations (by keeping the level of one manipulation constant while varying the other), 
as well as of interactions between the manipulations (by looking at the effect of combining both 
manipulations at once).  
 
The four manipulations proposed fit into a 2 x 2 factorial design, with conceptual layer initial state as 
one independent variable and perceptual analyzer initial state as another independent variable and VE 
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appropriate action node activation (“presence node” activation) as the dependent variable. The four 
cells of the design each describe one of the four novel conditions which will be used to test the model. 
The factorial design is illustrated in Table 7.1 below. 
 
 
Conceptual Layer Manipulation 




VE relevant priming 

























Table 7.1 The four evaluation conditions created by manipulating two activation levels on 
each input layer of the model.  
7.2 Applying the model to predict relative presence levels in the four 
novel conditions 
This section will use the connectionist model to predict the relative presence levels for each of the four 
novel conditions defined in 7.1.3 above. It is important to note that the connectionist model is not yet 
sophisticated enough to predict presence quantitatively, but it is possible to predict, for a number of 
different initial model states, the relative presence levels between them. The examples below make use 
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Figure 7-1: The model used in the predictions 
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As with the previous examples, action node 2 will represent the “presence node” – that is, the action 
node which encodes the schema appropriate to the VE the subject is operating in. The level of 
activation of this node at the time the network settles will indicate the level of presence experienced by 
the subject. 
7.2.1 Expressing the conceptual layer manipulations in the model 
The VE relevant priming manipulation of the conceptual layers requires the conceptual layers to 
contribute activation to the “presence node” – action node 2. This will be modeled by adding top-down 
activation to action node 2 by way of the connection between itself and the conceptual layers. 
 
The VE irrelevant priming manipulation represents a state of priming where some action node not 
related to the VE appropriate schema is active. The action layer is organized with action nodes 
encoding similar schemas physically close together, so the action node activated in this condition will 
be physically far away from action node 2, and is not likely to exert any influence over action node 2. 
As this model shows only three action nodes, the activated action node is not indicated. This condition 
is thus modeled by not including any top-down activation. 
7.2.2 Expressing the perceptual analyzer manipulations in the model 
The High stimulus quality condition represents a condition with many perceptual analyzers stimulated, 
and the analyzers interpret the stimuli as being objects rather than renditions. This is modeled by 
activating the O nodes of all three perceptual analyzers included in the network, and allowing no 
activation in the R nodes. 
 
The Low stimulus quality condition represents a condition with a fewer analyzers activated, and the 
stimuli are such that they are interpreted as renditions rather than as objects. This is modeled by highly 
activating the R nodes of the perceptual analyzers. 
7.2.3 Modeling the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition 
In this condition, the O nodes of the perceptual analyzers are highly activated, with almost no 
activation in the R nodes. Due to the priming manipulation, the conceptual layers are contributing 
activation to action node 2. These initial conditions are presented in Figure 7-2. 
 
 














Action node2 Action node3
 
Figure 7-2: Initial model state for the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition 
Once the model begins processing, action nodes 1 and 2 begin to receive activation. Action node 1 
receives activation from the O node of perceptual analyzer 1, while action node 2 receives activation 
from the O nodes of perceptual analyzers 2 and 3, as well as from the conceptual layers due to the 
priming manipulation. As these action nodes become activated, they begin to compete and inhibit each 
other. Action node 2, receiving activation from three sources, will be able to successfully inhibit action 
node 1, although action node 1 will have inhibited it to some degree as well. The final state, illustrated 
in Figure 7-3, is that action node 2 receives activation from three sources, and is only inhibited by one, 
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Figure 7-3: Final state for the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition 
7.2.4 Modeling the High stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming condition 
In this condition, all of the perceptual analyzers’ O nodes are highly activated, with almost no 
activation in the R nodes. Due to the priming manipulation, the conceptual layers contribute no 
activation to action node 2. The initial conditions are presented in Figure 7-4 below. 
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Figure 7-4: Initial model state for the High stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming condition 
 
 
When the model is started, action nodes 1 and 2 receive bottom-up activation from the perceptual 
analyzers. Action node 1 receives activation from the O node of perceptual analyzer 1 and action node 
2 receives activation from the O nodes of perceptual analyzers 2 and 3. As the activation increases in 
the action nodes, they begin to compete through the inhibitory connection between them. Action node 2 
is more activated than action node 1 (it is receiving activation from two sources, while action node 1 
only receives activation from one source), and will tend to inhibit its neighbour more vigorously. When 
the model settles, action node 2 remains the most active node in the action layer, as it is receiving 
activation from two sources and inhibition from one. Action node 1 on the other hand, is receiving 
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Figure 7-5: Final state for the High stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming condition 
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7.2.5 Modeling the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition  
Unlike the previous two conditions described, this condition has low stimulus quality, and following 
the conventions outlined in 7.2.2 above, the R node of each perceptual analyzer will be highly 
activated, while the O nodes will begin with no activation. Due to the conceptual layer manipulation, 
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Figure 7-6: Initial model state for the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition 
When the model is run, the activation from the R nodes beings to spread upwards, activating action 
nodes 1, 2 and 3. Action node 3 receives activation from the R nodes of perceptual analyzers 2 and 3, 
and thus becomes significantly more activated than either action node 1 or 2, which share the activation 
of the R node of perceptual analyzer 1. Simultaneously, action node 2 receives top-down activation 
from the conceptual layers as a consequence of the priming manipulation. As the action nodes become 
activated, they begin to compete via the inhibitory connections. Action node 2 (the “presence node” in 
this example) which is receiving input from two sources (the conceptual layer and the R node of 
perceptual analyzer 1) will inhibit its neighbours strongly. Thus action node 1 (which receives only 
activation from the R node of perceptual analyzer 1) will be overwhelmed by the inhibitory activation 
from action node 2. Action node 3 also receives activation from two sources (the R nodes of perceptual 
analyzers 2 and 3), so it will resist the inhibition of action node 2. The final, stable state of the model 













Action node2 Action node3
 
Figure 7-7: Final state for the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition 




7.2.6 Modeling the Low stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming condition 
Similar to the condition described in 7.2.5 above, this condition has low stimulus quality, and thus the 
R node of each perceptual analyzer will be highly activated, while the O nodes will begin with almost 
no activation. As a consequence of the manipulation of the conceptual layers, the action nodes 
receiving top-down activation will be far from the action node 2 and will thus have a negligible effect 
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Figure 7-8: Initial model state for the Low stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming condition 
As the activation spreads, action nodes 1 and 2 receive activation from the R node of perceptual 
analyzer 1, and begin to compete. As each receives the same amount of bottom-up activation, the 
competition between them leads to a stalemate. Action node 3, however, receives activation from 2 
sources – the R nodes of perceptual analyzer 2 and 3. This allows it to effectively inhibit action node 2. 
The resulting state contains action node 3 as the most activated of the model, with action node 2 having 
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Figure 7-9: Final model state for the Low stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming condition 
CHAPTER 7: A STRATEGY FOR EVALUATING THE CONNECTIONIST MODEL OF PRESENCE 92 
 
 
7.3 The predicted relative level of presence in each of the four novel 
conditions 
As can be seen from the application of the model to each of the four novel conditions in 7.2 above, the 
interaction of conceptual layer manipulation and stimulus quality is predicted to have a great impact on 
the level of presence experienced by a subject. In the case of the High stimulus quality conditions, the 
model predicts that the convergence of top-down (conceptual layer) activation and bottom-up 
(perceptual analyzer) activation will lead to a significant increase in presence, but in the case of the 
Low stimulus quality conditions, the contribution of top-down activation seems negligible, as both 
priming conditions conclude with a low level of action in the “presence node” (action node 2). These 
predictions are summarized in 
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Table 7.2: Relative presence levels predicted by the model for each of the four novel 
conditions created by manipulating two activation levels on each input layer of the model 
7.3.1 Specific results expected 
When empirically testing these results, the following patterns should be evident in the data, according 
to the predictions made by the model: 
 
 
1. An overall difference in presence between the High stimulus quality and the Low stimulus 
quality conditions, with the High stimulus quality condition producing higher presence scores. 
This is can be better appreciated in Table 7.1; note that the High Stimulus Quality column 
contains higher predicted presence values that those in the Low Stimulus Quality column. 
 
2. A difference between the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming and the High stimulus 
quality/VE irrelevant priming, with the relevant priming leading to higher presence scores. In  
3. Table 7.2, this difference exists between the two values in the High Stimulus Quality column. 
 
 
4. Little or no difference between the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming and the Low 
stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming conditions. Again,  
5. Table 7.2 shows this; note the Low Stimulus Quality column. Both predictions are for the a 
low presence level. 


























Figure 7-10: Predicted means of relative presence experienced by subjects in each of the four 
test conditions 
7.4 Testing the independence of O/R node activation and presence 
Examination of our model proposed here reveals that a state of presence in any one environment can be 
arrived at by several ways. For example, in the models used in these predictions (as in Figure 7-1), one 
way for the perceptual layers to activate action node 2 (the node we use to represent presence in our 
examples) is by means of the O nodes of perceptual analyzers 2 and 3. In practical terms, this implies 
that to increase presence, one must increase the quality (and by implication, the realism) of the display. 
However, the description of the model’s architecture allows for R nodes to activate action nodes as 
well (for example, in the case of the R node connection between perceptual analyzer 1 and action node 
2). Because a path exists between the perceptual analyzer and the action layer which does not include 
an O node, this implies that presence can be independent of O node activation, and that it is possible for 
presence to occur as a consequence of R node activation only (even if this means a low level of display 
realism).  
 
To evaluate this idea, it is necessary to create a display of a virtual environment that consists mostly of 
renditions of objects rather than objects themselves. Possible ways of doing this include using still 
images, or text descriptions of rooms, as used in Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs – see Towell & Towell, 
1997, for an investigation into presence in virtual environments displayed using text only).  Once this 
display has been created, a comparison can be made of the presence levels experienced by subjects 
viewing it with the presence levels experienced by subjects viewing other display types.  
 
If it is possible to create using presence using the activation of R nodes only, then it is a 
methodological requirement that the “R node only” display produce presence levels comparable to 
those produced by a display which activates a combination of O and R nodes. This is necessary because 
there exists no absolute method for measuring the activation level of a particular set of action nodes. 
Thus, the presence level produced by the “R node only” display might in fact be an effective “zero 
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presence” level. However, if the presence level is comparable to a display which stimulates both O and 
R nodes, then it is easier to sustain the argument that “R node only” displays can produce presence 
levels similar to those of displays with higher image fidelity. 
 
To test this idea empirically, we propose comparing three displays of a virtual environment. The first 
makes use of high quality stimuli, presented to several modalities, which increases the probability that 
a number of O nodes will be activated. The second display uses lower quality presented to several 
modalities, increasing the probability of activating a combination of O and R nodes. The final system 
uses text descriptions of the VE, ensuring that only R nodes are activated. This effectively creates three 
conditions – one where mostly O nodes are activated, one where a combination or O and R nodes are 
activated, and one where mostly R nodes are activated. 
7.4.1 Specific results expected  
Based on the arguments presented above, if presence is indeed independent of O node activation, the 
following results are expected. These are presented graphically in Figure 7-11 below. 
 
1. Subjects viewing the text only display will experience less presence than those viewing the 
high stimulus quality display 
 
2. Subjects viewing the text only display will experience the same level of presence than those 
























Figure 7-11: Predicted means of relative presence experienced by subjects viewing the a VE 




Chapter 8  
Experiment 1 
8.1 Priming and Stimulus quality: Hypotheses 
This experiment sets out to falsify the main tenets of the presence model set out in Chapter five 
directly. These are: 
 
(a) The quality of the VR stimuli have an effect on presence 
(b) Priming participants before they enter a virtual environment can have an effect on 
presence 
(c) Presence levels will depend on the interaction of priming and stimulus quality. 
 
The first hypothesis follows directly from the mounting body of evidence which suggests that virtual 
environments which are of higher realism and which appeal to a greater number of modalities will lead 
to greater levels of presence. To test this idea, we have implemented two virtual environments each in 
two levels of quality, and each participant is placed into one of these two conditions.  In the low 
stimulus  quality condition, the environment is not textured, Lambertian lighting is used, and no sound 
is present. In the high stimulus quality condition, the same geometry is used as in the low quality 
condition, but in this condition, texturing is used, as is radiosity. There is also directional and 
environmental sound. The two conditions vary not only in realism, but also in the number of modalities 
they appeal to. The hypothesis then is that the high stimulus quality condition will lead to higher 
presence levels than will the low stimulus quality condition 
 
The second hypothesis is based on the constructive perception thesis, which states that perceptions of 
ambiguous stimuli are more accurately processed by a participant which has been primed for that task. 
We believe that higher presence levels will result if the participant has been primed before exploring 
the virtual environment, because the priming will help to resolve ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
environment, leading to a more coherent experience, and thus higher presence. To test this idea, we 
place participants into one of two conditions. In the relevant priming condition, participants were asked 
to read a booklet which was related in theme to the virtual environment (for example, participants who 
were to enter a hospital virtual environment were asked to read a booklet about emergency room 
procedures). In the irrelevant priming condition, subjects were asked to read a booklet which was not 
related in theme to the virtual environment. The hypothesis then is that the priming relevant condition 
will lead to higher presence levels than will the priming not relevant condition. 
 
The third hypothesis is based on the proposed effects of lateral inhibition in the action layer of the 
environmental perception connectionist network presented in this document. The effect of these later 
connections is that if nodes in the action layer are highly stimulated, they will vigorously inhibit their 
neighbours in the same layer, and that a node which has been thus inhibited is less likely to contribute 
to the sense of presence for that environment. We expect that the level of presence will vary for a given
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stimulus quality level if the priming is altered. To test this idea we will examine the interaction effects 
of priming and stimulus quality on presence. The hypothesis is thus that presence levels will vary as a 
function of the interaction between priming and stimulus quality. 
8.2 Variables 
The main variables in this experiment are presence, stimulus quality and priming. Secondary variables 
used are immersive tendencies and fun experienced in the virtual environment. 
8.2.1 Definition of variables 
x Presence: this is a complex concept, and is discussed in depth in Chapter two. Presence is 
used as a dependent variable in this experiment. 
 
x Stimulus quality: this is the quality with which the virtual environment is rendered. It depends 
on how closely the virtual rendering matches the virtual environment. This can be understood 
in several ways. One way of understanding this concept is as photo-realism. The higher the 
stimulus quality, the more photo realistic the rendering, although stimulus quality also 
includes the notion of multi modality (“photo-realism” for sound, etc as well as for images). 
Another way of understanding stimulus quality is through the notion of information load. A 
rendering of an environment which carries more environmentally relevant information has 
higher stimulus quality that one which carries less environmentally relevant information.  
 
x Priming: this is the notion of providing the participant with information which is relevant to 
the virtual environment before they experience the environment. The idea of priming has 
existed in cognitive psychology in the constructive perception school as a way of influencing 
identification of ambiguous stimuli for many years, and is quite well understood. 
 
x Immersive tendencies : this variable is defined by Witmer and Singer (1990). This is the 
capacity of a person to become immersed, be it in VR, cinema or any other immersive 
medium. Being a property of a person rather than a system, it is independent of any particular 
display device or medium, but some studies show that it is a predictor of presence. Its 
measurement is based on the subject’s previous experiences with immersive media.  
 
x Fun experienced in the virtual environment: this is the enjoyment experienced by the 
participant during the time of their immersion in the virtual environment. It is based on the 
subject’s memory of their experience in the virtual environment.  
 
8.2.2 Operationalization of variables. 
 
x Presence: three measures of presence were used, namely the Presence Questionnaire of 
Witmer & Singer, the questionnaire of Slater, Usoh & Steed and the Contents of 
Consciousness Inventory introduced in this document. Presence is used as a dependent 
variable. 
 
The Presence Questionnaire (PQ) consists of 32 semantic differential items, each giving a 
score in the range from 1 to 7. In 28 of the items, a score of 1 indicates a response consistent 
CHAPTER 8: EXPERIMENT 1 97 
 
 
with low presence, while a score of 7 indicates a score consistent with high presence. The 
remaining four PQ items (items 19, 22, 23 and 26) are reversed, with a score of 1 consistent 
with high presence, and a score of 7 being consistent with low presence. For the sake of 
simplicity, after administering the PQ, we reversed the response of these four items so that a 
higher total PQ score can always be understood as indicating more presence. A subject’s 
presence score on the PQ is simply the sum of their responses on the 32 items. A completed 
PQ yields a score from 32 to 224. The PQ appears in section G.2 of Appendix G. 
 
The Slater, Usoh & Steed questionnaire (SUS) consists of 6 semantic differential items, each 
giving a score in the range from 1 to 7. For each item, a score of 1 indicates a response 
consistent with low presence, while a score of 7 indicates a response consistent with high 
presence. A subject’s presence score on the SUS is simply the sum of their responses on the 6 
items. A complete SUS produces a score of  6 to 42. The SUS appears in section G.1 of 
Appendix G. 
 
The Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI) consists of 10 forced choice items, each 
giving a score of 1 or 0. A score of 1 indicates that the participant has selected the option 
which matches the theme of the virtual environment, and 0 indicates that the subject has not 
selected the option that matches the theme of the virtual environment. The COCI score is 
simply the sum of all COCI items. A complete COCI gives a score ranging from 0 to 10. The 
COCI implementation is described in section A.6 of Appendix A. The COCI items used are 
listed in Appendix F. 
 
x Stimulus Quality: In this experiment, stimulus quality is an independent variable, manipulated 
into two levels: ‘l’ or low stimulus quality and ‘h’ high stimulus quality. In both levels, the 
same virtual environment and geometry is presented. In the low stimulus quality level (the ‘l’ 
level), the environment is not textured, Lambertian lighting is used, and no sound is present. 
In the high stimulus (the ‘h’ level), radiosity is used and the geometry is textured. There is 
also sound, both environmental (sounds which emanate from no particular place and serve as 
an aural backdrop, such as the sound of thunder) and positional sound (sounds originating 
from a particular place, such as the sound of ringing from a telephone). Appendices C and D 
contain images illustrating the visual differences between the two levels of stimulus quality. 
 
x Priming: priming is an independent variable in this experiment and is therefore manipulated 
rather than measured. Two levels of priming exist: a relevant priming condition (abbreviated 
‘p’) and an irrelevant priming condition (abbreviated ‘n’). In the priming relevant condition 
(‘p’ level), the participant is allowed to examine, prior to the VR experience, a booklet which 
is related in theme to the virtual environment they are about to experience. In the irrelevant 
priming condition (‘n’ level), the same manipulation occurs, but the booklet is not related to 
the virtual environment they are about to experience. Details of the contents of the booklets 
are stated in section 8.4.6. The booklets themselves are reproduced in Appendix H. 
 
x Immersive tendencies: this variable is measured by means of the Immersive Tendencies 
Questionnaire (ITQ) compiled by Witmer & Singer (1990). The ITQ consists of 32 semantic 
differential items, each giving a score in the range 1 to 7, with a response of 1 being consistent 
with low immersive tendencies, and a score of 7 being consistent with an individual who tends 
to be highly immersive. A participant’s ITQ score is simply the sum of all their responses. A 
complete ITQ provides a score which ranges between 32 and 224. The ITQ is reproduced in 
section G.3 of Appendix G. 
 
x Fun experienced in the environment: this variable is measured with a single Likert-type item, 
in the range 1 to 10. A score of 1 is consistent with having felt no fun, while a score of 10 is 
consistent with having had a lot of fun. A participant’s score is simply their response to this 
item, in the range 1 to 10. This item is reproduced in sections G.4 and G.5 of Appendix G. 




This experiment makes use of a 2x2x2 (stimulus quality x priming x virtual environment) factorial 
design, the final factor being a within-subjects factor. This creates 8 cells in the design, and each 
participant contributes data to two of the cells. This type of design demands a large number of 
participants, but provides the opportunity to investigate interactions between factors. 
8.4 Materials 
8.4.1 Venue 
The experiment was conducted in a dedicated room in which the lighting and extraneous noise could be 
controlled by means of the door and window blinds. Inside this room, three computers were placed so 
that up to three participants could be run simultaneously. Partitions were placed between each 
computer so that participants could not see each other or their displays (although they entered the room 
together and were aware that others were in the room with them). The experimenter could stand behind 
a partition on one end of the room and observe the participants without them being distracted by his 
observation. 
8.4.2 Computers 
3 computers were used for this experiment, to allow 3 participants to be run simultaneously. All 
computers were equipped with the same hardware and software, namely 
 
x AMD Athlon 700 MHz processor 
x 128 MB RAM 
x GeForce 2 MX 32MB graphics card 
x 17” monitor displaying a 640x480x16 graphical stream at an average of 15Hz 
x Windows 2000 
x Sound Blaster sound card 
x Stereo headphones 
x Keyboard and mouse 
x DAVE v1.0 (cf. Appendix A for a description) 
 
The computers were not connected to a network during the experiment. 
8.4.3 VR display system 
This experiment used our DAVE v1.0 tool to display the virtual environments. This tool is in more 
detail in Appendix A. This system makes use of a desktop VR system, which render via means of a 
CRT monitor and stereo headphones only. Input was by means of keyboard and mouse. 
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8.4.4 Participants’ task 
The participants were given a simple task to perform during their exposure in the VE. Inside the VEs, a 
series of small boxes, called tokens, were placed by the experimenter. Only one of the tokens was 
visible at any one time. The participant’s task was to search for these tokens and collect them by 
colliding with the token. When a token had been found, it disappeared, and the next token in the series 
would appear in another location. To help the participants find the tokens, a “token scanner” was 
shown on the bottom-right hand corner of their display. This scanner showed a participant their 
position relative to the current token. A circle of 8 lights showed the relative angle to the token, while a 
set of two lights, one above the other, showed if the token was above or below the present position. The 
participants could also query the scanner for the distance to the token by clicking the left mouse button. 
When clicked, the scanner would produce a sound whose pitch indicated distance to the token – a high 
pitch sound if the token was nearby, and a low pitch sound if the token was further away. Two versions 
of the scanner were created, to better fit into the themes of the VEs. These differed only in their 
appearance, as shown in Figure 8-1. The “modern scanner” was intended for use in the hospital VE, 





Figure 8-1: The token scanners. On the left is the “modern” version used in the hospital VEs, 
and on the right is the “old” version used in the monastery VEs. Both show the token to the 
left of and above the participant. 
 
The purpose of this task was simply to keep the participant’s attention focused on the VE, and to ensure 
that the participants did not stay in a small area of the VE. By placing a token in each major area of the 
VE, the experimenter could ensure that most participants visited most areas of the VE, without fear of 
them becoming lost or wandering in circles. No measurements were taken with regard to the task.  
8.4.5 Virtual environments 
6 DAVE virtual environments were used during the experiment: 
 
x train.cfg – This environment is abstract, and does not represent any particular theme. It is a 
brick building with 12 sparsely furnished rooms in three levels, and is used to train the 
participants in the use of the DAVE tool. It features detailed textures, radiosity as well as 
positional and environmental sounds. A set of 13 tokens is present, with the “modern 
scanner”. No COCI items are defined. Images from this VE can be seen in Appendix E. 
 
x train_coc.cfg – This environment is used to teach the participants about the COCI. It is the 
same as train.cfg except that the token scanner is the “old scanner” and a set of 6 COCI items 
is defined. Images from this VE can be seen in Appendix E, and the COCI items used are 
listed in section F.3 of Appendix F. 




x mon_hi.cfg – The monastery, high stimulus quality. This environment represents a medieval 
monastery and chapel in the countryside. The environment features 3 levels, with 18 furnished 
rooms. There are detailed textures, radiosity, as well as positional and environmental sound. 
10 COCI items are defined. There are 32 tokens, with the “old scanner”. Images from this VE 
can be seen in Appendix D. The COCI items used are listed in section F.2 of Appendix F. 
 
x mon_lo.cfg – The monastery, low stimulus quality. This environment is the same as the 
mon_hi.cfg environment, except that there is no sound, the textures are flat colours, and there 
is no radiosity. Images from this VE can be seen in Appendix D. The COCI items used are 
listed in section F.2 of Appendix F. 
 
x hosp_hi.cfg – The hospital, high stimulus quality. This environment represents a 
contemporary hospital in a city. This environment features 3 levels with 21 furnished rooms. 
There are detailed textures, radiosity, as well as positional and environmental sound. 10 COCI 
items are defined. There are 36 tokens, with the “modern scanner”. Images from this VE can 
be seen in Appendix C. The COCI items used are listed in section F.1 of Appendix F. 
 
x hosp_lo.cfg – The hospital, low stimulus quality. This environment is the same as the 
hosp_hi.cfg environment, except that there is no sound, the textures are flat colours, and there 
is no radiosity. Images from this VE can be seen in Appendix C. The COCI items used are 
listed in section F.1 of Appendix F. 
8.4.6 Priming materials 
Three priming booklets were created; two related in theme to the monastery and hospital virtual 
environments, and a neutral booklet with a theme unrelated to either virtual environment. Each booklet 
contained a piece of text, approximately 1000 words long, as well as approximately 4 pictures. In the 
case of the monastery and hospital themed booklets, the pictures were printed in colour (the neutral 
booklet’s pictures were not printed in colour as a cost saving measure). The booklets have been 
reproduced as an appendix to this document. 
 
x Monastery booklet - This booklet contained a brief history of the monastic movement in 
medieval times, and a brief synopsis of everyday life in a monastery. The text was assembled 
from several web pages on the subject, and consisted of 963 words, and five pictures. Two of 
the pictures were of monasteries in England and France, and the other three were scans of 
illuminated religious scripts from the medieval period. This is reproduced in section H.1 of 
Appendix H. 
 
x Hospital booklet – This booklet contained an explanation of a hospital emergency room and 
how a patient is treated upon entering the emergency room, and was assembled from several 
web pages on the subject. The booklet consisted of 1022 words and 4 pictures. The pictures 
were all photographs showing medical equipment, people being treated, and a surgeon 
performing an operation. This is reproduced in section H.2 of Appendix H. 
 
x Neutral booklet – This booklet contained a description of driving a steam train. It explains the 
procedures of starting the train, as well as some personal anecdotes by train drivers, and was 
assembled from several web pages on the subject. The booklet consisted of 1051 words and 3 
pictures. The pictures showed steam trains, as well as the controls of a locomotive. This is 
reproduced in section H.3 of Appendix H. 
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8.4.7 Measurement instruments 
Four separate sets of scales were administered to each participant. These included 2 separate COCI sets 
(one themed to the monastery, the other to the hospital), which were administered electronically during 
the exploration stage. After each of each of the exploration stages, a set of questionnaires printed on 
paper were administered. The questionnaire booklets, as presented to the participants, have been 
reproduced as an appendix to this document. 
 
The first questionnaire series included the following scales, in this order: 
 
x Slater, Usoh & Steed (2000) scale 
x Presence Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998) 
x Form 100 (developed for this experiment) 
 
The second questionnaire series included the following scales, in this order: 
 
x Slater, Usoh & Steed (2000) scale 
x Presence Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998) 
x Form 200 (developed for this experiment) 
x Immersive Tendencies Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998) 
8.4.8 Experimental schedule 
In order to prevent repetition and associated learning effects on any of the 3 factors, each participant 
explored 2 virtual environments. In this way, there was no need to repeat environment, priming 
condition or stimulus quality. For instance, if a participant explored the monastery in high stimulus 
quality with priming in the first exploration stage, then the second exploration stage would see that 
participant exploring the hospital in low stimulus quality with no priming. This means that each 
participant contributes data to two of the eight cells of the design. 
8.5 Participants 
Posters advertising the experiment were placed around the Computer Science building at the University 
of Cape Town. This building is used not only by computer science students, but also by undergraduates 
of the Science faculty, the Commerce faculty and the Health Sciences faculty. The posters asked for 
participation in a virtual reality experiment for a payment of 20 Rand. The posters did not express 
preference for any particular group. Volunteers were asked to write their name and contact telephone 
number on a sign-up sheet outside the experimental venue. The sign-up sheets contained details of the 
times available for participation. 
 
Demographic details of the participants were not recorded; however, all were volunteers. Although 
details were not recorded, the group included both men and women (with a much higher proportion of 
men) of various ethnic groups. Almost all participants were in their early twenties. The level of 
familiarity with computers seemed to vary greatly, from one participant who stated he knew nothing 
about computers, to another who after the experiment engaged the experimenter in a discussion of the 
technical details of the DAVE tool. 
 
A total of  60 volunteers wrote down their name and contact telephone number on the sign up sheet. Of 
those, 55 actually arrived at the agreed time to participate in the experiment. The others did not appear 
at the experimental venue. This constitutes a 91.7% response rate. 





8.6.1 Instruction and Training stage 
The experiment was run in a dedicated room so that lighting and noise could be controlled to reduce 
distractions. The room contained three computers with partitions between each. The participants were 
asked to sit down at a computer of their choice. Their selection of computer placed them in an 
experimental condition, as a random schedule based on computer had been worked out previously. The 
basic purpose of the experiment was explained to them. They were told that the experiment wanted to 
look at a person’s thought process while visiting a virtual environment differed to their thought process 
while visiting a real place. They were then given a basic instruction of their task; namely that they were 
to be tourists in the virtual environment, and that their main task should be to take in the sights and 
sounds of the virtual environment. The DAVE tool was then started with the train.cfg virtual 
environment (which included tokens but not the COCI items), and the basic movement interface was 
explained to them. They were allowed to practice moving under the supervision of the experimenter, 
who helped those participants who were having problems. The participants were allowed to practice 
until the experimenter was satisfied that all the participants understood the principles of the movement 
interface. This usually took no longer than 3 minutes.  
 
At this point, the participants were introduced to the idea of the tokens and the scanner. They were told 
that in order to help them explore the virtual environment more thoroughly, a series of tokens were 
scattered in the virtual environment, and that if one went about collecting them, this would lead one to 
all the interesting places of the environment. They were shown the workings of the scanner, and 
allowed to practice finding tokens in the training environment under the supervision of the 
experimenter. Once the experiment was satisfied that all the participants understood the process (this 
usually took no longer than 3 minutes), he reminded the participants that collecting tokens was only a 
secondary task, and that their main task should be to explore the environment (this was done to avoid 
the participants from focusing on the token collecting task at the expense of taking in the virtual 
environment). The DAVE tool was shut down, and the participants were explained the procedure of the 
COCI. They were told that the purpose of the COCI was to assess their thought process, and that it 
would occur periodically at intervals of about 1 minute. They were shown what an item looked like, 
and were shown the controls used to respond. Once the explanation was complete, the DAVE tool was 
started using the train_coc.cfg virtual environment (which includes tokens as well as a set of COCI 
items). The participants were asked to begin exploring until the first item appeared. Once the item 
appeared, the experimenter explained the process again, emphasizing the point that none of the four 
options were “correct” but that the participants should choose the one they thought fit the word 
fragment best. The participants were then allowed to practice under the supervision of the 
experimenter, who ensured that all the participants understood all the interface aspects correctly, and 
offered correction where necessary. This practice session was allowed to run for 5 to 6 minutes. The 
DAVE tool was then shut down. 
8.6.2 Priming stage 
The participants were then told that the training was over and that the experiment was about to begin. 
The basic procedure was explained to them, namely that they would be given a booklet to read, 
followed by exploring a virtual environment, followed by filling out of questionnaires. Before they 
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were given the priming materials, the participants were given instructions on how to read it. They were 
told that the booklet was long, but that only 5 minutes would be given to read it. It was emphasized that 
it was not important to finish the entire booklet in the time given, but rather that they should read 
slowly, carefully examine the pictures, and think about the things written in the text. The door of the 
room was closed, and the participants were then given the priming material as dictated by the schedule.  
While the participants read, each computer was prepared with the virtual environment as per the 
schedule. After 5 minutes, the priming materials were taken away. 
8.6.3 Exploration stage 
The room’s lights turned off, and the DAVE tool started. The subjects were instructed to begin 
exploring the virtual environment. The experimenter remained in the room, but observed the 
participants from a covert position so that the participants were not distracted. Once all of the 
participants had completed the entire set of COCI items (which took between 11 and 15 minutes), the 
exploration stage was concluded. 
8.6.4 Questionnaire stage 
The room’s lights were turned on, the DAVE tool shut down, and the participants were handed the first 
series of questionnaires to complete. The participants were then given time to complete the entire set of 
questions, which usually took between 10 and 15 minutes. 
8.6.5 Second iteration 
Once the questionnaires were complete, the participants were told that they were to explore one more 
virtual environment. The same basic procedure as above was repeated, from the priming stage till the 
questionnaire stage. At the beginning of this second priming stage, the participants were again 
reminded of the importance of not rushing through the booklet, but rather reading carefully. During the 
second questionnaire stage, the second series of questionnaires were administered. This slightly longer 
set of questionnaires took between 15 and 20 minutes to complete. 
8.6.6 Completion and preparation stage 
Once the participants had completed the questionnaires, they were asked to sign a receipt, and were 
paid 20 Rand for participating. When the participants had left, the experimenter checked the data 
output file in each computer for completeness, and prepared each computer for the next set of 
participants. The paper questionnaires were then coded and stored. 
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8.7 Analysis of results 
In this section we present an analysis of the data collected in this experiment. We first present 
descriptive statistics for each of the variables, followed by an inferential analysis. The analyses 
presented were conducted using Microsoft Excel 2000 and StatSoft Statistica 5.5. 
 
8.7.1 Categorization of participants into conditions 
Most of the 55 subjects contributed 2 sets of observations (some did not due to time restraints, 
equipment failures and other such unfortunate occurrences). Table 8.1 shows the frequency of 
observations in each of the four cells of the design (the virtual environment condition was collapsed). 
 
 Priming    
Stimulus Quality Relevant priming (‘p’) Irrelevant priming (‘n’) Row totals   
Low quality (‘l’) 24 28 52 
High Quality (‘h’) 27 24 51 
Column totals 51 52 103 (Grand Total) 
Table 8.1: Number of observations in each of the conditions 
8.7.2 Descriptive statistics for COCI, SUS, FUN, PQ and ITQ 
Each of the 103 observations was made on Witmer and Singer’s Presence Questionnaire (PQ), Slater, 
Usoh & Steed’s questionnaire (SUS) and the Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI). 
Furthermore, in the Form 100 and Form 200 questionnaires, participants were asked to rate their sense 
of fun on a scale of 1-10 (FUN). 44 of the 55 participants also completed Witmer and Singer’s 
Immersive Tendencies Questionnaire (ITQ). The descriptive statistics for these variables are presented 
in Table 8.2. 
 
Variable Valid N   Mean    -95% CI +95% CI Min Max Std.Dev. 
COCI 103 5.0777 4.5458 5.6095 0 10 2.72134 
SUS 103 25.0291 23.4853 26.5730 0 39 7.89944 
FUN 102 6.2157 5.7388 6.6925 1 10 2.42768 
PQ 103 151.6019 146.2269 156.9770 95 252 27.50235 
ITQ 44 155.1136 149.1902 161.0370 104 190 19.48311 
Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics for COCI, SUS, FUN, PQ and ITQ 
8.7.3 Correlations between COCI, SUS, FUN and PQ 
To test if the various presence measurements are valid, we conducted a series of correlations to test the 
concurrent validity of these measures. Also, we looked for correlations between FUN and the various 
presence measures.  A correlation matrix (n=43) was computed from the variables FUN, PQ, ITQ, 
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COCI and SUS. Table 8.3 presents a summary of the results, with significant correlations (p < 0.05) 
being in bold. 
 
                                             
 COCI     SUS      FUN      PQ  ITQ  
COCI 1.0 .01 0.33 .24 .05 
SUS .01 1.0 .57 .76 -.02 
FUN .33 .57 1.0 .74 .04 
PQ .24 .76 .74 1.0 .08 
ITQ .05 -.02 .04 .08 1.0 
Table 8.3: Correlations between COCI, SUS, FUN, PQ and ITQ. Significant correlations  (p < 
0.05) in bold 
8.7.4 Factorial ANOVA with Stimulus Quality and Priming as independent variables and 
SUS, PQ and COCI as dependent variables 
To test the effect of  stimulus quality and priming on the measures of presence, 2x2 factorial ANOVAs 
were conducted. The data used were the combination from the monastery and hospital environments. 
This same analysis was conducted using SUS, PQ and COCI as dependent variables.  
 
COCI as the dependent variable – all effects: An investigation of the effects shows that there is no 
significant interaction between stimulus quality and priming  (F(1,99) = 0.26 p > 0.611). There is also 
no significant main effect for stimulus quality (F(1,99) = 1.89 p > 0.17). However, there does exist a 
significant main effect for priming (F(1,99) = 8.46 p < 0.005). A summary of these statistics is 
presented in Table 8.4. A protected t-test of the significant effect (priming) reveals a t value of 3.011 
(df = 101, p < 0.004). A means plot for this effect is presented in Figure 8-2. 
 
 
  df Effect   MS Effect   df Error    MS Error      F     p-level  
Stim Qual 1 13.01460 99 6.850896 1.899693 .171220 
Priming 1 57.99200 99 6.850896 8.464877 .004471 
Interaction 1 1.78013 99 6.850896 .259840 .611365 
Table 8.4: Summary table of effects for a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with COCI as the D.V. 
Significant effects (p < 0.05) marked in bold. 
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Figure 8-2: Means plot of the main effect of priming on COCI 
 
SUS as the dependent variable – all effects: This variable presents a significant interaction between 
stimulus quality and priming (F(1, 99) = 10.18 p < 0.003). The means plot of this effect is shown in 
Figure 8-4. There is also a significant main effect on stimulus quality (F(1,99) = 9.64 p < 0.002). The 
means plot of this effect is shown in Figure 8-3. There is, however, no significant main effect in 
priming (F(1,99) = 0.17 p > 0.65). This effect information is summarized in Table 8.5.  
 
 
  df Effect   MS Effect   df Error   MS Error      F     p-level  
Stim Qual 1 516.8157 99 53.61860 9.63874 .002485 
Priming 1 8.9994 99 53.61860 .16784 .682923 
Interaction 1 545.9874 99 53.61860 10.18280 .001900 
Table 8.5: Summary table of effects for a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with SUS as the D.V. 
Significant effects (p < 0.05) marked in bold. 
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Figure 8-4: Means plot of the interaction between stimulus quality and priming on SUS 
PQ as the dependent variable – all effects: This variable behaves in a similar way to SUS, which 
comes as little surprise as they are highly correlated. The interaction between stimulus quality and 
priming (shown in Figure 8-5) is significant (F(1,99) = 4.23 p < 0.05), as is the main effect of stimulus 
quality on PQ shown on Figure 8-6 (F(1,99) = 5.99 p < 0.02). The main effect of priming on PQ is not 
significant (F(1,99) = 0.23 p > 0.63). Table 8.6 presents a summary of the effects.  
 
  






 df Effect  MS Effect  Df Error   MS Error      F     p-level  
Stim Qual 1 4221.079 99 704.3596 5.992791 .016125 
Priming 1 160.254 99 704.3596 .227518 .634422 
Interaction 1 2981.610 99 704.3596 4.233080 .042272 
Table 8.6: Summary table of effects for a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with PQ as the D.V. 



























Figure 8-5: Means plot of the interaction between stimulus quality and priming on PQ 
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Figure 8-6 Means plot of the main effect of stimulus quality on PQ 
8.7.5 Post-hoc analyses of the interaction between Stimulus Quality and Priming as 
independent variables and SUS and PQ as dependent variables 
The interaction results reported in 8.7.4 above prompted a series of interesting post-hoc investigations. 
These included a focused look at the actual differences in means for each of the dependent variables at 
each of the priming and quality levels. Of the three dependent variables presented, COCI is the least 
interesting, having shown no interaction. However, PQ and SUS, apart from showing a remarkable 
similarity in their pattern of effects, each show an interaction effect between stimulus quality and 
priming. It is on these interactions on which this section focuses. 
 
Interaction effect between Stimulus Quality and Priming on SUS: A series of protected t-tests was run 
to determine which means differences were statistically significant at each of the independent variable 
levels. The difference between Priming at the ‘n’ level (VE-irrelevant priming) and at the ‘p’ level 
(VE-relevant priming) shows significance for both the ‘h’ level of Stimulus Quality (high quality 
environment) and at the ‘l’ level (low quality environment). At the ‘h’ level, the t value is 2.18 (df = 49 
p < 0.04) while at the ‘l’ level the t value is -2.34 (df = 50 p < 0.03). Furthermore, the difference 
between Stimulus Quality at the ‘h’ level (high quality environment) and at the ‘l’ level (low quality 
environment) shows a significant difference at the ‘p’ level of Priming (VE-relevant priming) with an 
exceptionally high t-value of 3.995 (df = 49, p < 0.0003); however, the difference between Stimulus 
Quality at the ‘h’ level and at the ‘l’ level is not significant at the ‘n’ level of priming (t = 0.07, df = 50, 
p > 0.9).  Details of these analyses are presented in Table 8.7.  




t-test conditions Means tested t value df p 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ Priming ‘n’ vs. Priming ‘p’ 2.1832 49 0.0338 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ Priming ‘n’ vs. Priming ‘p’ -2.3425 50 0.02318 
Priming = ‘n’ Stim Qual ‘l’ vs. Stim Qual ‘h’ 0.0698 50 0.9446 
Priming = ‘p’ Stim Qual ‘h’ vs. Stim Qual ‘l’ 3.9954 49 0.000217 
Table 8.7: post-hoc t-tests on SUS means at various independent variable levels. Significant 
tests (p < 0.05) in bold 
 
Interaction effect between Stimulus Quality and Priming on PQ: As with the SUS analyses, protected t-
tests were run to investigate the significance of means differences at each of the independent variable 
levels. In the case of the SUS, only 2 of the 4 tests are significant. At the ‘h’ level of Stimulus Quality 
(high quality environment), the difference between the PQ means at the ‘n’ level of Priming (VE-
irrelevant priming) and at the ‘p’ level of priming (VE-relevant priming) is significant with t = 2.19 (df 
= 49, p < 0.04). The other significant difference is found at the ‘p’ level of Priming (VE-relevant 
priming) between the mean PQ scores at the ‘h’ level of Stimulus Quality (high quality environment) 
and the ‘l’ level of Stimulus Quality (low quality environment) having t value of 3.42 (df = 49, p < 
0.01). The other two differences are not significant. The difference between the ‘n’ level of Priming 
and the ‘p’ level of priming at the ‘l’ level of Stimulus Quality was not significant (t = 0.97, df = 50, p 
> 0.3). The difference between the ‘l’ level of Stimulus Quality and the ‘h’ level of Stimulus Quality at 
the ‘n’ level of Priming is also not significant (t = 0.26, df = 50, p > 0.75). This information is 
summarized in Table 8.8. 
 
 
t-test conditions Means tested t value df p 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ Priming = ‘n’ vs. Priming = ‘p’ 2.1915 49 0.0332 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ Priming = ‘n’ vs. Priming = ‘p’ 0.973 50 0.335 
Priming = ‘n’ Stim Qual = ‘l’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘h’ 0.26 50 0.79 
Priming = ‘p’ Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘l’ 3.42112 49 0.0013 
Table 8.8: post-hoc t-tests on PQ means at various independent variable levels. Significant 
tests (p < 0.05) in bold 
8.7.6 Reliability analyses of scales used 
To determine the internal consistency of the scales used, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient as well as item-
total correlations were calculated for each of the scales. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is a measure of 
the extent to which the items on a scale correlate with each other (Cronbach, 1960), and in the special 
case of a scale which measures only one construct, can be interpreted as estimating the degree to which 
the items agree on their estimate of the value of that variable (Anastasi, 1982). Thus, a high alpha value 
indicates a scale which is less prone to measuring noise. Item-total correlations represent the 
correlation between a particular item and the scale’s total excluding that item. Item-total correlations 
show the degree to which a particular item agrees with the scale as a whole. An item with a low item-
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total correlation suggests the measurement noise rather than of the construct that is being measured by 
the rest of the scale as a whole. 
 
Reliability of the PQ: With 101 observations, the PQ shows an acceptably high Cronbach’s alpha value 
of 0.9033 (standardized alpha value of 0.904). The item-total correlations are shown in Table 8.9. It 









PQ1 .494616 PQ12 .590483 PQ23 .364163 
PQ2 .543138 PQ13 .328263 PQ24 .480119 
PQ3 .620415 PQ14 .620148 PQ25 .644177 
PQ4 .539336 PQ15 .559128 PQ26 .270850 
PQ5 .670877 PQ16 .411539 PQ27 .223408 
PQ6 .552051 PQ17 .198751 PQ28 .473694 
PQ7 .567582 PQ18 .636567 PQ29 .302706 
PQ8 .622474 PQ19 .202746 PQ30 .439059 
PQ9 .436855 PQ20 .170757 PQ31 .239283 
PQ10 .590865 PQ21 .422689 PQ32 .503193 
PQ11 .563394 PQ22 .256610   
Table 8.9: Item-total correlations for PQ (n=101) 
Reliability of the SUS: The SUS has only 6 items, so we can expect lower internal consistency 
(Anastasi, 1982). This is confirmed by a low Cronbach’s alpha value (v = 0.7695, std v = 0.77, 











Table 8.10: Item-total correlations for SUS (n=101) 
 
Reliability of the COCI: The COCI has few items, and in line with measurement theory, it shows low 
internal consistency (Anastasi, 1982). It is not appropriate to calculate Cronbach’s alpha for the COCI, 
as it is not a continuous scale, but rather a dichotomous one (selected themed word/did not select 
themed word). We thus calculate the Kuder-Richardson 20 (KR20) value, which is equivalent to the 
Cronbach’s alpha for dichotomous data. The KR20 value is 0.74 (n=128). The average inter-item 
correlation is 0.224. Table 8.11 shows the item-total correlations. 
















Table 8.11: Item-total correlations for COCI (n=128) 
Reliability of the ITQ: According to its authors (Witmer & Singer, 1990), the ITQ has more than one 
factor, so it should not show a high Cronbach alpha value. However, the Cronbach alpha value is 0.8 
(std v = 0.801, n=44), which is higher than one would expect from a multi-factorial scale. The average 









ITQ1 .323684 ITQ13 .335411 ITQ25 .289553 
ITQ2 .501146 ITQ14 .252606 ITQ26 .213596 
ITQ3 .086090 ITQ15 .458851 ITQ27 .274783 
ITQ4 .536089 ITQ16 .550660 ITQ28 .149905 
ITQ5 .189501 ITQ17 .209872 ITQ29 .456395 
ITQ6 .482474 ITQ18 .096614 ITQ30 .369215 
ITQ8 .430204 ITQ19 .418629 ITQ31 .448047 
ITQ9 .496124 ITQ21 .340194 ITQ32 .576710 
ITQ10 .241416 ITQ22 .211616 ITQ33 .213210 
ITQ11 .159359 ITQ23 .280761 ITQ34 .019286 
ITQ12 -.049047 ITQ24 .049369   
Table 8.12: Item-total correlations for ITQ (n=44) 
8.8 Discussion of results 
The data collected in this experiment provide a large amount of information, which relates not only to 
the hypotheses outlined in 8.1, but also about the psychometric properties of the PQ, ITQ and SUS. It 
also provides some validation information with regard to the COCI. This section will briefly discuss 
the results outlined in 8.7, and relate them to the hypotheses outlined in 8.1. 
8.8.1 Evidence for hypothesis 1: stimulus quality affects presence 
The results show evidence is support of this hypothesis. Both the PQ and SUS show a significance 
increase in the high stimulus quality condition compared to the low stimulus quality condition. This 
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effect is only evident in the priming relevant condition, so a certain amount of reserve is required when 
concluding.  The COCI shows no effect with regard to stimulus quality, which might suggest a certain 
amount of doubt to any conclusion, but this is tempered by the fact that the PQ and SUS, both 
established measures of presence, are in agreement while it is the COCI, which is an unvalidated 
measure, that is in dissent. The parsimonious conclusion is therefore to disregard the COCI finding and 
conclude that presence is affected by stimulus quality. It seems that the hypothesis that stimulus quality 
affects presence is only true under certain conditions, one of which is the user’s state of mind at the 
time of VR exposure. This point is dealt with in more detail in 8.8.3 below. 
8.8.2 Evidence for hypothesis 2: priming affects presence 
There seems to be little evidence for this hypothesis. The PQ and SUS are not affected by priming 
directly. The COCI, however, reacts strongly to the priming manipulation. COCI scores are 
significantly higher in the priming relevant condition as compared to the priming irrelevant condition. 
As with the effect described in 8.8.1 above, it would not be correct to conclude that presence is affected 
by priming, as the two established presence measures do not provide evidence to this effect. The fact 
that COCI is affected by priming should not be given too much credence, as this scale as yet 
unvalidated. Priming does have an effect on presence, but that effect is subtle, as discussed in 8.8.3 
below. 
8.8.3 Evidence for hypothesis 3: the interaction of priming and stimulus quality affects 
presence 
The PQ and SUS measures provide important support for this hypothesis, although the COCI does not 
(the statements made above in 8.8.1 and 8.8.2 about the validity of the COCI apply here also). The PQ 
and SUS show a strong interaction, with presence scores at both levels of stimulus quality at the 
‘relevant priming’ level differing significantly from each other, but those at the ‘irrelevant priming’ 
level not differing from each other. Furthermore, priming seems to have a beneficial effect in the high 
stimulus quality condition, and a detrimental effect in the low stimulus quality condition. This occurs in 
the SUS, although in the PQ the effect is slightly different – the presence mean in the high stimulus 
quality is improved by priming, but priming has no effect in the low stimulus quality condition. This 
complex behaviour suggests that presence is not simply a product of the sum of all the information 
available about the environment. Priming seems to act as a mediator variable rather than a predictor 
itself; it does not change presence scores directly (as shown in Section 8.8.2), but rather acts as a 
catalyst for other variables such as stimulus quality. 
8.8.4 Evidence for the validity of the Contents of Consciousness Inventory 
The strategy for validating a new scale is based on two broad strategies (Gregory, 1991): 
 
(a) comparing the behaviour of a new scale to the behaviour of a scale of the same construct 
which is known to be valid 
 
The COCI does not behave in a way that is consistent with the SUS and PQ, which 
represent the currently accepted practice of presence measurement. This is evidenced by 
the extremely low correlations between COCI and either SUS or PQ. In contrast, the PQ 
and SUS correlate extremely well with each other, suggesting that they are measuring 
comparable constructs. 




(b) determining if the new scale behaves in a way consistent with the theory of the construct 
 
According to our current understanding of presence, better display systems should lead to 
higher presence scores. The PQ and SUS both show main effects on stimulus quality, 
confirming this idea. The COCI however, does not show a main or interaction effect on 
stimulus quality. A second line of evidence that can be investigated in this regard, is the 
relationship between immersive tendencies and presence, proposed by Witmer & Singer 
(1998). The COCI shows no convincing relationship with the ITQ, which further reduces 
its validity. However, neither the PQ nor the SUS show any relationship with the ITQ 
either, leading to some doubt as to the utility of the ITQ/presence relationship as a method 
for validating presence measures. 
 
From the evidence presented above, it seems clear that the COCI is not a valid measure of presence. 
The COCI detects the priming manipulation quite well, and is not affected by stimulus quality 
manipulations, so it would be more appropriate to refer to the COCI as a measure of priming rather 
than a measure of presence. 
8.8.5 Reliability of the presence measures 
There is no pre-scribed way to interpret a Cronbach’s alpha value (Gregory, 1991), apart from “higher 
is better”. Various authors suggest minimum acceptable thresholds, although the values they suggest 
are always quite high; for instance, Gregory (1991) suggests a minimum alpha of 0.9, and Anastasi 
suggests 0.8. Similar constraints apply to the interpretation of the Kuder-Richardson 20 formula. Based 
on these criteria, only the PQ performs as expected. The SUS and COCI fall short of the 0.8 mark, 
while the ITQ gives a borderline performance. Having a low level of internal consistency does not 
render a test completely useless. Rather, it implies that the test is more prone to measuring noise. The 
values derived from a test with low internal consistency will be less accurate, and the confidence of the 
statistical inferences will be reduced. With the results provided by these analyses, it seems that the PQ 
provides the most accurate presence readings. The measurements taken using the SUS, COCI and ITQ 




Chapter 9  
Experiment 2 
9.1 VE presentation method and priming: Hypotheses 
The purpose of this experiment is to test the idea that presence comes about not as a consequence of 
perception, but rather due to higher level mental processes. This will be done by comparing presence 
scores from participants immersed in graphics-based VEs to those immersed in text-based VEs. The 
specific hypotheses which are going to be tested are: 
 
(a) Text-based VEs can produce presence as effectively as graphics-based VEs 
(b) The effect of (a) above will be magnified under conditions of VE-relevant priming 
 
The first hypothesis is derived from the notion that text-based VEs can be regarded as another level of 
stimulus quality (as defined in experiment 1). Provided that the text descriptions provide enough detail, 
a text based display could be considered as lying between the ‘h’ and ‘l’ graphics based levels. 
Graphics-based VEs represent “raw data” with regard to perception (the scene represented is simply 
what a virtual observer would see standing in a particular spot in the VE), while text-based VEs, which 
consist of written descriptions of a space, represent “pre-processed” data, which does not include all the 
raw information about the environment available in a graphics-based VE, but rather only those aspects 
which the author of the text descriptions thought relevant or important. If both of these cases produce 
comparable levels of presence, then this finding will support the notion that presence is not the result of 
direct perception only. The second hypothesis is derived from the results of experiment 1, which 
suggest that differences in presence between various conditions is magnified under conditions of VE-
relevant priming. If text-based VEs also display this relationship to priming, then it will reinforce the 
idea that presence comes about as a product of cognitive processes which function at a level more 
abstract than perception, as the method of VE presentation would only have a small effect on the 
subsequent experience by the user. 
 
In this experiment, the graphics-based VEs were the two monastery VEs used in experiment 1. The 
text-based VE is a implementation of the same VE used in the graphics-based system, but implemented 
in the TIVE text VE display system (cf. Appendix B for a description of this system). The descriptions 
of the rooms in the text VE version were built by an expert user after exploring the graphics version of 
the monastery VE. When a still image of a room was used in the text-based display system, this image 
was created by reducing the quality of a screenshot of the graphics based system. The text based system 
also allowed the user to perform the same number of actions as the graphics based system, with the 
exception of looking around in a room (for obvious reasons). By creating this correspondence between 
the text-based VE and the graphics-based VE, it becomes possible to make direct comparisons in 
presence levels between the text-based system and graphics-based system, as these can be regarded as 
different levels of the same variable, namely stimulus quality. 
 
 




The same variables as used in experiment 1 (described in Chapter 8) were used. The main variables in 
this experiment are presence, stimulus quality and priming. Secondary variables used are immersive 
tendencies and fun experienced in the virtual environment. 
9.2.1 Definition of variables 
The variables used have the same definitions as those used in Chapter 8. These are: 
 
x Presence: this is a complex concept, and is discussed in depth in Chapter two. Presence is 
used as a dependent variable in this experiment. 
 
x Stimulus quality: this is the quality with which the virtual environment is rendered. It implies 
how closely the virtual rendering matches the virtual environment. This can be understood in 
several ways. One way of understanding this concept is as photo-realism. The higher the 
stimulus quality, the more photo realistic the rendering, although stimulus quality also 
includes the notion of multi modality (“photo-realism” for sound, etc as well as for images). 
Another way of understanding stimulus quality is through the notion of information load. A 
rendering of an environment which carries more environmentally relevant information has 
higher stimulus quality that one which carries less environmentally relevant information.  
 
x Priming: this is the notion of providing the participant with information which is relevant to 
the virtual environment before they experience the environment. The idea of priming has 
existed in cognitive psychology in the constructive perception school as a way of influencing 
identification of ambiguous stimuli for many years, and is quite well understood. 
 
x Immersive tendencies : this variable is defined by Witmer and Singer (1990). This is the 
capacity of a person to become immersed, be it in VR, cinema or any other immersive 
medium. Being a property of a person rather than a system, it is independent of any particular 
display device or medium, but some studies show that it is a predictor of presence. Its 
measurement is based on the participant’s previous experiences with immersive media.  
 
x Fun experienced in the virtual environment: this is the enjoyment experienced by the 
participant during the time of their immersion in the virtual environment. It is based on the 
participant’s memory of their experience in the virtual environment.  
9.2.2 Operationalization of variables. 
 
x Presence: three measures of presence were used, namely the Presence Questionnaire of 
Witmer & Singer, the questionnaire of Slater, Usoh & Steed and the Contents of 
Consciousness Inventory introduced in this document. Presence is used as a dependent 
variable. 
 
The Presence Questionnaire (PQ) consists of 32 semantic differential items, each giving a 
score in the range from 1 to 7. In 28 of the items, a score of 1 indicates a response consistent 
with low presence, while a score of 7 indicates a score consistent with high presence. The 
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remaining four PQ items (items 19, 22, 23 and 26) are reversed, with a score of 1 consistent 
with high presence, and a score of 7 being consistent with low presence. For the sake of 
simplicity, after administering the PQ, we reversed the response of these four items so that a 
higher total PQ score can always be understood as indicating more presence. A participant’s 
presence score on the PQ is simply the sum of their responses on the 32 items. A completed 
PQ yields a score from 32 to 224. The PQ is reproduced in section G.2 of Appendix G. 
 
The Slater, Usoh & Steed questionnaire (SUS) consists of 6 semantic differential items, each 
giving a score in the range from 1 to 7. For each item, a score of 1 indicates a response 
consistent with low presence, while a score of 7 indicates a response consistent with high 
presence. A participant’s presence score on the SUS is simply the sum of their responses on 
the 6 items. A complete SUS produces a score of  6 to 42. The SUS is reproduced in section 
G.1 of Appendix G. 
 
The Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI) consists of 10 forced choice items, each 
giving a score of 1 or 0. A score of 1 indicates that the participant has selected the option 
which matches the theme of the virtual environment, and 0 indicates that the participant has 
not selected the option that matches the theme of the virtual environment. The COCI score is 
simply the sum of all COCI items. A complete COCI gives a score ranging from 0 to 10. The 
COCI items used are listed in sections F.2 and F.3 of Appendix F. 
 
x Stimulus Quality: In this experiment, stimulus quality is an independent variable, manipulated 
into three levels: ‘l’ or low stimulus quality, ‘h’ or high stimulus quality and ‘t’ or text 
implementation. In all the levels, the same virtual environment and geometry is presented. In 
the low stimulus quality level (the ‘l’ level), the environment is not textured, Lambertian 
lighting is used, and no sound is present. In the high stimulus (the ‘h’ level), radiosity is used 
and the geometry is textured. There is also sound, both environmental (sounds which emanate 
from no particular place and serve as an aural backdrop, such as the sound of thunder) and 
positional sound (sounds originating from a particular place, such as the sound of ringing from 
a telephone). In the text implementation, the system displayed the rooms as text descriptions 
of about 150 words, with some rooms (70% of them) including a still image of the room. 
These still images were 200x180 pixels in size, and displayed in 8 bit colour. The text 
implementation included no sound. 
 
x Priming: priming is an independent variable in this experiment and is therefore manipulated 
rather than measured. Two levels of priming exist: a VE relevant priming condition 
(abbreviated ‘p’) and a VE irrelevant priming condition (abbreviated ‘n’). In the VE relevant 
condition (‘p’ level), the participant is allowed to examine, prior to the VR experience, a 
booklet which is related in theme to the virtual environment they are about to experience. In 
the VE irrelevant priming condition (‘n’ level), the same manipulation occurs, but the booklet 
is not related to the virtual environment they are about to experience. Details of the contents of 
the booklets are stated in section 9.4.6. The booklets are reproduced in sections H.1 and H.3 of 
Appendix H. 
 
x Immersive tendencies: this variable is measured by means of the Immersive Tendencies 
Questionnaire (ITQ) compiled by Witmer & Singer (1990). The ITQ consists of 32 semantic 
differential items, each giving a score in the range 1 to 7, with a response of 1 being consistent 
with low immersive tendencies, and a score of 7 being consistent with an individual who tends 
to be highly immersive. A participant’s ITQ score is simply the sum of all their responses. A 
complete ITQ provides a score which ranges between 32 and 224. The ITQ is reproduced in 
section G.3 of Appendix G. 
 
x Fun experienced in the environment: this variable is measured with a single Likert-type item, 
in the range 1 to 10. A score of 1 is consistent with having felt no fun, while a score of 10 is 
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consistent with having had a lot of fun. A participant’s score is simply their response to this 
item, in the range 1 to 10.  
9.3 Design 
This study made use of a simple one-way design, with 2 cells (primed and not-primed). The design did 
not make use of repeated measures.  
9.4 Materials 
9.4.1 Venue 
The experiment was conducted in a dedicated room in which lighting and extraneous noise could be 
controlled by means of the door and window blinds. Inside this room, three computers were placed so 
that up to three participants could be run simultaneously. Partitions were placed between each 
computer so that participants could not see each other or their displays (although they entered the room 
together and were aware that others were in the room with them). The experimenter could stand behind 
a partition on one end of the room and observe the participants without them being distracted by his 
observation. 
9.4.2 Computers 
3 computers were used for this experiment, to allow 3 participants to be run simultaneously. All 
computers were equipped with the same hardware and software, namely 
 
x AMD Athlon 700 MHz processor 
x 128 MB RAM 
x GeForce 2 MX 32MB graphics card 
x 17” monitor displaying a 320x240x8 image (with user-event triggered refresh) 
x Windows 2000 
x Sound Blaster sound card 
x Stereo headphones 
x Keyboard and mouse 
x For the graphical TIVE v1.0 (cf. Appendix B for a description) 
9.4.3 VR display system 
This experiment used our TIVE v1.0 tool to display the virtual environments. This tool is described in 
more detail in Appendix B.  
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9.4.4 Participants’ task 
The participants were given a simple task to perform during their exposure in the VE. Inside the VEs, a 
series of small boxes, called tokens, were placed by the experimenter in various locations. Only one of 
the tokens was visible at any one time. The participant’s task was to search for these tokens and collect 
them by stepping into the room containing the token. When a token had been found, it disappeared, and 
the next token in the series would appear in another location. To help the participants find the tokens, a 
“token scanner” was available. This scanner showed a participant their position relative to the current 
token. By pressing the ‘T’ key, participants would bring up a text window which would give the 
bearing and relative height to the token in terms of the compass directions. There was no indication of 
distance to the token. 
 
The purpose of this task was simply to keep the participant’s attention focused on the VE, and to ensure 
that the participants did not stay in a small area of the VE. By placing a token in each major area of the 
VE, the experimenter could ensure that most participants visited most areas of the VE, without fear of 
them becoming lost or wandering in circles. No measurements were taken with regard to the task.  
9.4.5 Virtual environments 
Three TIVE virtual environments were used in this experiment: 
 
x train.tve - This environment is abstract, and does not represent any particular theme. It is a text 
implementation of the train.cfg environment used in experiment one. It is a brick building with 
12 sparsely furnished rooms on three levels, and is used to train the participants in the use of 
the TIVE tool. No tokens are defined. No COCI items are defined. 
 
x traincoc.tve - This environment is used to teach the participants about the COCI and the token 
scanner. It is the same as train.tve except that 13 tokens and a set of 6 COCI items is defined. 
 
x monastery.tve – The monastery. This environment represents a medieval monastery and 
chapel in the countryside. The environment features  27 locations on three levels, most of 
which (70%) are accompanied by a still image. 10 COCI items are defined. There are also 28 
tokens defined. 
 
The monastery.tve environment is a text implementation of the mon_hi.cfg environment used 
in experiment one. This was done so that data collected in this experiment could be directly 
compared with data collected in the monastery environment in experiment one. 
9.4.6 Priming materials 
Two priming booklets were used, which were identical to those used in experiment 1 (described in 
Chapter 8); one related in theme to the monastery virtual environment, and a neutral booklet with a 
theme unrelated to the monastery virtual environment. Each booklet contained a piece of text, 
approximately 1000 words long, as well as approximately 4 pictures. In the case of the monastery 
themed booklet, the pictures were printed in colour (the neutral booklet’s pictures were not printed in 
colour as a cost saving measure). The booklets have been reproduced as an appendix to this document. 
 
x Monastery booklet - This booklet contained a brief history of the monastic movement in 
medieval times, and a brief synopsis of everyday life in a monastery. The text was assembled 
from several web pages on the subject, and consisted of 963 words, and five pictures. Two of 
the pictures were of monasteries in England and France, and the other three were scans of 
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illuminated religious scripts from the medieval period. See section H.1 of Appendix H for a 
re-print of this booklet. 
 
x Neutral/non-priming booklet – This booklet contained a description of a driving steam trains. 
It explains the procedures of starting the train, as well as some personal anecdotes by the 
authors, and was assembled from several web pages on the subject. The booklet consisted of 
1051 words and 3 pictures. The pictures showed steam trains, as well as the controls of a 
locomotive. The booklet is included in section H.3 of Appendix H. 
9.4.7 Scales & Questionnaires 
Four separate sets of scales were administered to each participant. These included a COCI set (themed 
to the monastery), which was administered electronically during the exploration stage. After the 
exploration stage, a set of questionnaires printed on paper was administered. The questionnaire booklet, 
as presented to the participants, has been reproduced as an appendix to this document. 
 
The questionnaire set included the following scales, in this order: 
 
x Slater, Usoh & Steed (2000) scale 
x Presence Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998) 
x Form 100 (developed for this experiment) 
9.4.8 Experimental schedule 
Due to the simple design of this study, the schedule simply assigned participants randomly into the 
priming condition of the non-priming condition. The schedule was designed to assign the same number 
of observations in each condition. 
9.5 Participants 
Posters advertising the experiment were placed around the Computer Science building at the University 
of Cape Town. This building is used not only by computer science students, but also by undergraduates 
of the Science faculty, the Commerce faculty and the Health Sciences faculty. The posters asked for 
participation in a virtual reality experiment for a payment of 20 Rand. The posters did not express 
preference for any particular group. Volunteers were asked to write their name and contact telephone 
number on a sign-up sheet outside the experimental venue. The sign-up sheets contained details of the 
times available for participation. 
 
Demographic details of the participants were not recorded; however, all were volunteers. Although 
details were not recorded, the group included both men and women (with a much higher proportion of 
men) of various ethnic groups. Almost all participants were in their early twenties.  
 
A total of  48 volunteers wrote down name and contact telephone number on the sign up sheet. Of 
those, 25 actually arrived at the agreed time and participated in the experiment. The others did not 
appear at the experimental venue. This represents a 54.2% response rate. 





The procedure of this experiment is quite similar to that of experiment one, the main difference being 
that the participants explored only one virtual environment. This similarity was created so that data 
collected in this experiment could be directly compared with the data collected in experiment one. 
9.6.1 Introduction stage 
The participants were taken into the experimental venue, and told that they would be taking part in a 
study to evaluate a possible solution of displaying virtual environments in impoverished displays such 
as PDAs and cellphones. The experimenter explained that the system was text based only, as well as 
being non-realtime. The participants were told that their role in the evaluation of the system was to 
explore a virtual environment, taking in the sights along the way. 
9.6.2 Training stage 
The TIVE tool was started displaying the train.tve environment. The movement interface (excluding 
details on the tokens and the COCI) was explained, and the participants were allowed to practice this 
until the experimenter was satisfied that all of the participants understood the system (this usually took 
no longer than three minutes). The TIVE tool was shut down, and the participants were told of the 
tokens and token scanner. They were told that the tokens existed to help them explore the environment 
more thoroughly, and that collecting the tokens was not their main task; the main task is to carefully 
explore the environment. The COCI was then explained to the participants. The TIVE tool was then 
started with the traincoc.tve environment, which includes both tokens and COCI items. The 
participants were allowed to explore freely until the first COCI item appeared, at which point the 
experimenter again explained how to respond to the items. The participants were then allowed to 
practice exploring the environment and responding to COCI items under the supervision of the 
experimenter. When the experimenter was satisfied that all the participants understood the interface and 
COCI, the TIVE tool was shut down (this usually took no longer then 5 minutes). 
9.6.3 Priming stage 
The participants were told that the training was complete and that the experiment was about to begin. 
They were informed of the procedure, namely that they would be given a booklet to read, followed by 
exploring a virtual environment, followed by filling out a questionnaire. They were reminded that their 
primary task in the virtual environment was exploration, and not collecting of the tokens. They were 
then told that they would only have 5 minutes to study the booklet they were about to be given, but that 
they should not rush through it. They were told that reading slowly and carefully was more important 
than finishing the booklet. They were then given the booklet as dictated by the experimental schedule, 
and allowed to read for five minutes. 
9.6.4 Exploration stage 
The TIVE tool was started with the monastery.tve environment, and the participants were instructed to 
begin exploring. The experimenter remained in the room, but observed the participants from a hidden 
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position so that the participants were not distracted. Once all of the participants had completed the 
entire set of COCI items (which took between 11 and 15 minutes), the exploration stage was 
concluded. 
9.6.5 Questionnaire stage 
The TIVE tool shut down, and the participants were handed the questionnaire set. The participants 
were then given time to complete the entire set of questions, which usually took between 10 and 15 
minutes. 
 
9.6.6 Completion and preparation stage 
Once the participants had completed the questionnaires, they were asked to sign a receipt, and were 
paid 20 Rand for participating. When the participants had left, the experimenter checked the data 
output file in each computer for completeness, and prepared each computer for the next set of 
participants. The paper questionnaires were then coded and stored. 
9.7 Analysis of results 
In this section we present an analysis of the data collected in this experiment. We first present 
descriptive statistics for each of the variables, followed by an inferential analysis. In the section 
pertaining to inferential statistics, we have combined the data collected in experiment 2 (text-based VE 
data), with data from the monastery VE condition collected in experiment 1. Only the monastery VE 
data was used as the text-based VE only displayed the monastery text environment. As the conditions 
under which the data was collected in the two experiments were very similar, it is permissible to 
combine the data in this way. When the data are combined, the ‘text’ condition is regarded as another 
level of the stimulus quality variable. The analyses presented were conducted using Microsoft Excel 
2000 and StatSoft Statistica 5.5. 
9.7.1 Categorization of participants into conditions 
This section includes the data collected in the monastery VE in experiment 1 as well as the data 
collected in experiment 2 (text condition). Each of the 78 participants contributed an observation to one 
of the cells. Table 9-1 shows the frequency of observations in each of the four cells of the design. 
 
 Priming    
Stimulus Quality Relevant priming (‘p’) Irrelevant priming (‘n’) Row totals 
Low quality (‘l’) 13 13 26 
High Quality (‘h’) 14 13 27 
Text (‘t’) 14 11 25 
Column totals 41 37 78 (Grand Total) 
Table 9-1: Number of observations in each of the conditions 
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9.7.2 Descriptive statistics for COCI, SUS, FUN, PQ and ITQ 
This section includes only the data collected in experiment 2 (the text condition). Each of the 25 
observations was made on Witmer and Singer’s Presence Questionnaire (PQ), Slater, Usoh & Steed’s 
questionnaire (SUS) and the Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI). Furthermore, in the Form 
100 questionnaire, participants were asked to rate their sense of fun on a scale of 1-10 (FUN). All of 
the 25 participants also completed Witmer and Singer’s Immersive Tendencies Questionnaire (ITQ). 
The descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 9-2. 
 
 
Variable Valid N   Mean    -95% CI +95% CI Min Max Std.Dev. 
COCI 25 6.52 5.7559 7.2841 3 10 1.85113 
SUS 25 22.96 21.0930 24.8270 14 32 4.5229 
FUN 25 5.68 4.5962 6.7638 1 10 2.62552 
PQ 25 119.28 107.8970 130.6630 64 181 27.57644 
ITQ 25 157.16 148.8319 165.4881 129 195 20.17565 
Table 9-2: Descriptive statistics for COCI, SUS, FUN, PQ and ITQ 
9.7.3 Correlations between COCI, SUS, FUN and PQ 
This section is based only on data collected in experiment 2 (text condition). To test if the various 
presence measurements are valid, we conducted a series of correlations to test the concurrent validity of 
these measures. Also, we looked for correlations between FUN and the various presence measures.  A 
correlation matrix (n=25) was created from the variables FUN, PQ, ITQ, COCI and SUS. Table 9-3 
presents a summary of the results, with significant correlations (p < 0.05) being in bold. 
                                              
 COCI     SUS      FUN            PQ ITQ   
COCI 1.0 -.12 -.03 .20 .19 
SUS -.12 1.0 .42 .56 .24 
FUN -.03 .42 1.0 .68 .33 
PQ .20 .56 .68 1.0 .58 
ITQ .19 .24 .33 .58 1.0 
Table 9-3: Correlations between COCI, SUS, FUN, PQ and ITQ.  
Significant correlations  (p < 0.05) in bold 
9.7.4 Factorial ANOVA with Stimulus Quality and Priming as independent variables and 
SUS, PQ and COCI as dependent variables 
This section includes the data collected in the monastery VE in experiment 1, as well as the data 
collected in experiment 2 (text condition). To test the effect of stimulus quality and priming on the 
measures of presence, a 2x2 factorial ANOVA was conducted for each of the three dependent variables 
(SUS, PQ and COCI).  
 
COCI as the dependent variable – all effects: An investigation of the effects shows that there is no 
significant interaction between stimulus quality and priming  (F(2,72) = 0.33 p > 0.716). Both main 
effects are significant; the main effect for stimulus quality (F(2,72) = 7.71 p < 0.001), as well as the 
main effect for priming (F(1,72) = 4.511 p < 0.04). A summary of these statistics is presented in Table 
9-4. Means plots of the significant main effects are presented in Figure 9-1 and Figure 9-2. 








  df Effect   MS Effect   Df Error    MS Error      F     p-level  
Stim Qual 2 43.25228 72 5.607968 7.712646 .000923 
Priming 1 25.29770 72 5.607968 4.511027 .037113 
Interaction 2 1.87543 72 5.607968 .334423 .716857 
Table 9-4: Summary table of effects for a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with COCI as the D.V. 


























Figure 9-1: Means plot of the main effect of stimulus quality on COCI 
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Figure 9-2: Means plot of the main effect of priming on COCI 
 
 
SUS as the dependent variable – all effects: This variable presents a significant interaction between 
stimulus quality and priming (F(2, 72) = 5.87 p < 0.005). The means plot of this effect is shown in 
Figure 9-4. There is also a significant main effect on stimulus quality (F(2,72) = 4.58 p < 0.02). The 
means plot of this effect is shown in Figure 9-3. There is, however, no significant main effect in 




  Df Effect   MS Effect   df Error   MS Error      F     p-level  
Stim Qual 2 212.5133 72 46.31329 4.588603 .013315 
Priming 1 127.3449 72 46.31329 2.749641 .101627 
Interaction 2 272.2772 72 46.31329 5.879030 .004315 
Table 9-5: Summary table of effects for a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with SUS as the D.V. 
Significant effects (p < 0.05) marked in bold. 
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Figure 9-4: Means plot of the interaction between stimulus quality and priming on SUS 
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PQ as the dependent variable – all effects: This variable shows very few significant effects. The 
interaction between stimulus quality and priming is not significant (F(2,72) = 0.813 p > 0.44), neither is 
the main effect of priming (F(1,72) = 0.536 p > 0.46). The main effect of stimulus quality on PQ, 
however,  is significant (F(2,72) = 10.467 p < 0.001). A means plot for this effect is presented in Figure 
9-5. Table 9-6 presents a summary of the effects.  
 
 
 df Effect MS Effect Df Error MS Error F p-level 
Stim Qual 2 8141.906 72 777.8716 10.46690 .000102 
Priming 1 417.183 72 777.8716 .53631 .466342 
Interaction 2 632.846 72 777.8716 .81356 .447310 
 
Table 9-6: Summary table of effects for a 2x2 factorial ANOVA with PQ as the D.V. 
Significant effects (p < 0.05) marked in bold. 
 
 






















Figure 9-5: Means plot of the main effect of stimulus quality on PQ 
9.7.5 Post-hoc analyses of the main effects if stimulus quality 
In order to address the hypotheses proposes in 9.1, it is necessary to examine the difference in presence 
between the various levels of the stimulus quality factor. The ANOVAs show that the stimulus quality 
main effect is significant for all three presence scales, namely COCI, SUS and PQ. These post-hoc 
analyses were conducted by means of a series of protected t-tests. 
 
Stimulus Quality main effect on SUS: These tests show that the ‘h’ level of stimulus quality is different 
from both ‘l’ (t = 2.4501, df = 51, p < 0.02) and ‘t’ (t = 2.2658, df = 50, p < 0.03). However, the ‘l’ and 
‘t’ conditions are not significantly different (t = 0.8956, df = 49, p > 0.37). These results are 
summarized in Table 9-7, and can be appreciated graphically in Figure 9-5. 
 





Means tested t df p 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ 2.4501 51 0.0177 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘t’ 2.2658 50 0.0278 
Stim Qual = ‘t’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ 0.8956 49 0.3748 
Table 9-7: Post-hoc tests of stimulus quality conditions on SUS. 
Significant results (p < 0.05) in bold 
 
Stimulus Quality main effect on COCI: The pattern in the COCI is quite different from that in the SUS, 
as can be seen in Figure 9-1. Here, the ‘t’ level gives the highest mean score, being significantly 
different from both the ‘h’ level (t = 2.8587, df = 50, p < 0.01) and the ‘l’ level (t = 3.9935, df = 50, 
p < 0.001). The ‘h’ and ‘l’ level, however, produce equivalent scores (t = 1.13427, df = 51. p > 0.25). 
Table 9-8 shows these results. 
 
 
Means tested t value df p 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ 1.13427 51 0.2619 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘t’ 2.8587 50 0.00618 
Stim Qual = ‘t’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ 3.9935 49 0.000218 
Table 9-8: Post-hoc tests of stimulus quality conditions on COCI. 
Significant results (p < 0.05) in bold 
 
Stimulus Quality main effect on PQ: The PQ shows a distinct progression in presence scores, as seen in 
Figure 9-5, starting with the ‘h’ level, and moving down to ‘l’ and then ‘t’. The ‘h’ level is significantly 
different from both the ‘l’ level (t = 1.0175, df = 51, p < 0.05) and the ‘t’ level (t = 5.2002, df = 50, p < 
0.0001). The ‘l’ level is also significantly different from the ‘t’ level (t = 2.4396, df = 49, p < 0.02). 
These results are summarized in Table 9-9. 
 
 
Means tested t value df p 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ 2.0175 51 0.0489 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ 
vs.Stim Qual = ‘t’ 5.2002 50 0.000004 
Stim Qual = ‘t’ vs. 




Table 9-9: Post-hoc tests of stimulus quality conditions on PQ. 
Significant results (p < 0.05) in bold 
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9.7.6 Post-hoc analyses of the interaction between Stimulus Quality and Priming as 
independent variables and SUS as the dependent variable 
The results from this experiment show interaction only on SUS, unlike the results presented in 
experiment 1, which showed interactions on SUS as well as PQ. This section presents a series of 
protected t-tests which was done to investigate the specific effect of the interaction.  
 
Interaction effect between Stimulus Quality and Priming on SUS: A series of protected t-tests was run 
to determine which means differences were statistically significant at each of the independent variable 
levels.  Only 3 of the 9 tests are significant. The difference between the ‘n’ and ‘p’ levels of priming at 
the ‘l’ level of stimulus quality is significant (t = 3.1033, df  = 24, p < 0.004). The difference between 
the ‘h’ and ‘l’ levels of stimulus quality at the ‘p’ level of priming is also significant (t = 3.5242, df = 
25, p < 0.0017) as is the difference between the ‘l’ and ‘t’ levels of stimulus quality at the ‘p’ level of 
priming (t = 2.4208, df = 25, p < 0.025). The details of these tests and the remaining, non-significant 
tests are presented in Table 9-10. These tests suggest a pattern similar to the interaction effect produced 
by SUS in experiment 1. In that case, the ‘l’ level of stimulus quality showed moderate scores at the ‘n’ 
level of priming, and lower scores at the ‘p’ level of priming, while the ‘h’ level of stimulus quality 
showed the opposite effect (moderate scores on ‘n’ and high scores on ‘p’). In this experiment, the ‘h’ 
and ‘t’ levels of stimulus quality show the same scores across priming conditions, while the ‘l’ level 
shows the same pattern as in experiment 1 – moderate scores at the ‘n’ level of priming and low scores 
at the ‘p’ level of priming. 
 
  
t-test conditions Means tested t value df P 
Stim Qual = ‘h’ Priming = ‘n’ vs. Priming = ‘p’ 0.6417 25 0.5268 
Stim Qual = ‘l’ Priming = ‘n’ vs. Priming = ‘p’ 3.1033 24 0.004 
Stim Qual = ‘t’ Priming = ‘n’ vs. Priming = ‘p’ 0.3111 23 0.7585 
Priming = ‘n’ Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘l’ 0.1172 24 0.90767 
Priming = ‘n’ Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘t’ 1.3548 22 0.1892 
Priming = ‘n’ Stim Qual = ‘l’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘t’ 1.5528 22 0.1347 
Priming = ‘p’ Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘l’ 3.5242 25 0.00166 
Priming = ‘p’ Stim Qual = ‘h’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘t’ 1.8158 26 0.0809 
Priming = ‘p’ Stim Qual = ‘l’ vs. Stim Qual = ‘t’ 2.4208 25 0.023 
Table 9-10: post-hoc t-tests on SUS means at various independent variable levels. Significant 
tests (p < 0.05) in bold 
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9.8 Discussion of results 
This section briefly discusses the results presented in 9.7, and relates these to the hypotheses laid out in 
9.1. The data collected in this experiment presents a complex picture, with each of the presence scales 
performing differently. This makes the results collected here less clear than hoped, as having no 
agreement between scales raises the possibility that the finding is not an effect of presence itself but 
rather of the scale used to measure it. 
 
No attempt was made to analyze the data from this study to assess the reliability or validity of scales, as 
the sample size was not large enough for this purpose. 
9.8.1 Evidence for hypothesis 1: Text-based VEs produce the same levels of presence as 
graphics-based VEs 
The results show some support for this hypothesis, although each of the presence scales shows a 
different picture. If one ignores priming as a factor, the SUS shows that the text condition produces as 
much presence as the low quality graphics condition, while the COCI shows that the text condition 
produces the highest levels of presence. Finally, the PQ opposes the hypothesis by suggesting that the 
text condition produces the lowest of all the conditions. Faced with these results, it would not seem 
incorrect to conclude that very little support exists for this hypothesis. 
 
However, if priming is brought into the analysis, then the findings become more promising. Unlike 
experiment 1, where both the PQ and SUS showed a priming/stimulus quality interaction, the results 
from this experiment show an interaction only for SUS, which makes the argument somewhat weaker. 
Nonetheless, when VE-relevant priming has occurred, participants in the text condition report presence 
levels which are not significantly different from the high quality graphics condition, and significantly 
better than the low quality graphics condition. This implies that under conditions of priming, the text 
condition is as effective as the high quality graphics condition. When the priming was VE-irrelevant, 
the three conditions (text, high quality graphics and low quality graphics) perform equally, in a pattern 
similar to that found in experiment 1. 
 
The odd results produced by the COCI, which place text-based VEs significantly higher than graphics-
based VEs in terms of presence production, might be due to an artifact of the scale itself. The COCI, as 
used in this experiment, was based on written language; the participants selected the word they thought 
stood out from a list of 4 words. The text-based VE is also based on written language, and this may 
lead to a confound with memory effects, as some of the words from the COCI item lists had appeared 
previously in the descriptions of the rooms. For example, the words “candle” and “wood” existed in 
room descriptions, and so may have been selected on this basis rather than due to any effect of 
presence. Sadly, there is not enough data to explore this possibility further without further 
experimentation. 
 
One can summarize the discussion above by concluding that the hypothesis that text based VEs 
produce the same levels of presence as graphics based VEs does have sufficient support. With the SUS, 
text based VEs perform similarly to high-quality VEs, and the COCI text based VEs outperform 
graphics-based VEs in terms of presence production. A slight doubt as to the veridity of this hypothesis 
is raised by the PQ, which ranks the text based VEs lowest in terms of presence production. 
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9.8.2 Evidence for hypothesis 2: Priming magnifies the effect of presence in text-based VEs 
This hypothesis aimed to show that text-based VEs would behave as the graphics-based VEs did in 
experiment 1, where priming was found to affect the presence scores by way of an interaction with 
stimulus quality. This experiment does provide much evidence to support this notion. In the COCI, the 
presence scores are affected directly by priming; that is, all three conditions benefited from priming, 
replicating the pattern observed in experiment 1. The text-based VE condition SUS scores show a true 
interaction, although there is no significant difference in SUS scores between VE-relevant and VE-
irrelevant priming. However, this pattern is also exhibited by the high quality graphics condition, which 
shows no significant increase from the VE-irrelevant condition to the VE-relevant condition. The text 
condition thus shows the same behaviour across priming conditions as the high quality graphics 
condition. This behaviour itself quite different from that shown by the low quality graphics condition, 
which shows a significant drop from the VE irrelevant condition to the VE relevant condition. 
 
This analysis seems to suggest that with respect to priming, text-based VEs behave in a way similar to 
high-quality graphics VEs, but quite differently to low quality graphics VEs. This finding does not 
satisfy the hypothesis exactly, as there is no significant improvement in the VE-relevant condition over 
the VE-irrelevant condition. However, this finding does suggest that text-based VEs behave in a way 
which is not significantly dissimilar from some graphics-based VEs, which in itself suggests that the 
mental processing of these two different modes of presenting VEs leads to similar products. 
9.8.3 Caveat – Suitability of the PQ for text-based VEs 
From the data collected in this study, it seems that the PQ might not be the most appropriate scale for 
use with text-based systems. The stimulus quality main effect on PQ showed the text condition to be 
significantly lower than both graphical conditions, but this result was not corroborated by either of the 
other two presence scales used. This behaviour can be attributed to the nature of the content of the 
items in the PQ. An investigation into the items reveals that most items ask directly about properties of 
the display system, for example, items 10 and 12, reproduced below: 
 
10. How completely were you able to actively survey or search the environment using vision? 
 
12. How well could you localize sounds? 
 
This type of item refers less to the participant’s experience than it does to the specifications of the 
display system. In a text based system, where there are almost no visuals and no sound, all subjects are 
compelled to respond negatively to those items, even if the text based VE was having a profound 
impact on them. This type of item, which asks about the purported causes of presence rather than about 
the sense of presence experienced is not useful when investigating other immersive media which are 
not similar to those expected by Witmer & Singer, who implicitly impose a requirement that a medium 
be multimodal, interactive and realtime in order to produce presence. This same line of argument is 
taken by Slater (1999), who argues that Witmer & Singer’s scale to strictly measures the 
operationalization of presence rather than the variable itself, In cases such as text based VEs, the SUS, 
which asks directly about the experience rather than about the display system, may be more appropriate 




Chapter 10  
Evaluating the evidence for the 
connectionist model of presence 
Chapter 7 outlined a strategy for evaluating the correctness of the connectionist model of presence, and 
this strategy was implemented by the empirical studies described in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. This 
chapter reconsiders the evidence presented in these experiments, and evaluates the model in terms of 
the specific predictions made by the model in Chapter 7. This evaluation is then used as the basis for a 
critical evaluation and discussion of the model. 
10.1 Empirical evidence for the interaction between conceptual layer 
activation and perceptual analyzer activation 
Section 7.3.1 in chapter 7 outlined the specific results predicted by the model for the four novel 
conditions created by manipulating two levels of conceptual layer activation and two levels of 
perceptual analyzer activation. These four conditions were implemented in experiment 1 (described in 
chapter 8). 
10.1.1 Prediction 1 – A difference between the High stimulus quality and Low stimulus quality 
conditions 
The evidence for this prediction can be found in section 8.7.4 in Chapter 8. The analysis of the data 
showed a significant difference in this regard with the SUS and PQ scales, but not the experimental 
COCI. In the case of the SUS (Table 8.5) and PQ (Table 8.6), subjects in the High stimulus quality 
condition experienced more presence than in the Low stimulus quality condition. As two of the three 
scales used to measure presence in this experiment produced the predicted results, this prediction can 
be regarded as having being satisfied by the data. This difference, however, only occurred in presence 
of VE relevant priming. This may indicate either that VE experiences are optimal under certain 
conditions of user priming, or that the presence measures used produce more distinct results under 
certain conditions of user priming. 
10.1.2 Prediction 2 – A difference between the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming and 
the High stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming conditions 
The evidence for this prediction is in Chapter 8, section 8.7.5, and summarized on Table 8.7. The post-
hoc analyses of the High stimulus quality condition reveals that as measured by the SUS, subjects in 
the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming group experienced significantly more presence than 
those in the High stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming group. This finding is repeated in the PQ, but
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not on the experimental COCI. This prediction can also be regarded as having being satisfied, as it 
holds for two of the three measures used. 
10.1.3 Prediction 3 – No difference between the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming and 
the Low stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming conditions 
The evidence for this statement is far more obscure. The details are presented in Chapter 8, section 
8.7.5 (summary on Table 8.7). The COCI results do not follow the prediction, as the Low stimulus 
quality/VE relevant priming and the Low stimulus quality/VE irrelevant priming conditions show a 
significant difference, with the VE relevant priming imparting an advantage to the subjects in that 
condition. In the case of the SUS, this pattern is reversed; the significant difference exists, but the VE 
relevant priming detracts from the presence experienced in the low quality condition. Finally, the PQ 
shows the predicted pattern – no significant difference between these conditions. With only one of the 
three measures showing the predicted pattern, it cannot be said, while claiming deference to scientific 
parsimony, that the prediction has been satisfied by the data. 
 
An item of interest arising from this data, is the SUS result. While there is a difference (which violates 
the prediction) it is important to note that adding VE relevant priming decreased the level of presence 
experienced by subjects in that condition. This implies that the contribution of conceptual layer 
activation to presence is not a simple summation or subtraction from the experience of presence (as is 
the case with the contribution of the perceptual analyzers, which on their own could be modeled by a 
simple sum). The conceptual layers act in a far more complex way, their effect apparently being to 
mediate the perceptual context in which the virtual environment is processed. 
10.1.4 Considering the evidence graphically 
The comparison of the predicted patterns of presence to the empirical findings is better understood by 
considering the data graphically. Figure 8-10 in chapter 8 presented the predicted presence experiences 
of the four novel conditions graphically, while Figures 8-4 and 8-5 of chapter 8 represent the means 
profiles for the measurements made using the SUS and PQ respectively. The COCI results are not used 
in this analysis, as the COCI failed to match the results of either of the two established scales used. By 
overlaying these graphs, it is possible to better understand the relationship between these three sets of 
data more easily.  
10.1.5 Displaying the PQ, SUS and predicted scores on one graph 
Before this comparison can take place, it is important to note that the sets of data in question use three 
different scales. The PQ scores have a maximum score of 224; the SUS a maximum of 42, and the 
predicted scores were not predicted numerically, but rather in a relative way (see section 7.3 in chapter 
7 for details). To plot these three data sets onto one graph, it is necessary to transform these scores onto 
a common scale. We propose the simple method of converting each mean into a proportion of the total 
possible score on the scale in question for the PQ and SUS scores (these transformations are shown in 
Table 10-1). Inserting the predicted scores into the graph is more difficult, as only relative scores exist. 
As no quantities exist for these values, it would be incorrect to compare these directly with the 
empirically obtained values. Rather, as the purpose of the comparison is to compare the pattern of data 
distribution rather than the magnitude of the scores, the predicted values are simply superimposed over 
the center of the empirically obtained values to allow the comparison of the data patterns more easily. 
The resulting graph is presented in Figure 10-1. 












PQ High VE relevant 164 224 0.73 
PQ High VE irrelevant 151 224 0.67 
PQ Low VE relevant 141 224 0.63 
PQ Low VE irrelevant 149 224 0.67 
SUS High VE relevant 29 42 0.69 
SUS High VE irrelevant 25 42 0.59 
SUS Low VE relevant 20 42 0.47 
SUS Low VE irrelevant 25 42 0.60 












































Figure 10-1: The predicted results for the four novel conditions compared to the empirical 
findings. The blue lines are measurements taken by the PQ, the orange lines measurements 
made by the SUS, and the green lines the results predicted by the model. For each data set, the 
upper line shows the high stimulus quality condition, and the lower line shows the low 
stimulus quality condition 
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10.1.6 Examining the data patterns in the graph 
With the three datasets superimposed, it is possible to notice that each dataset displays the same basic 
pattern. Examining the High stimulus quality condition for each of the three datasets (the upper line in 
each case), it is clear that both the PQ (square data points in Figure 10-1) and SUS (circular data points 
in Figure 10-1) show the pattern predicted by the model – The subjects experiencing VE relevant 
priming reported more presence than those who experienced VE irrelevant priming.  When examining 
the low stimulus quality conditions (lower line in each data set) however, it is obvious that the model’s 
predictions were not realized. The model predicts the same level of presence regardless of priming 
conditions, and this is indeed the case for the PQ (the slight slope visible is not statistically significant, 
and can thus be disregarded). The SUS, on the other hand, shows a distinct and significant positive 
slope, which implies that relevant priming proved detrimental to the presence experience for those in 
the low stimulus quality condition only. As the measurements do not agree in this regard, the evidence 
must be regarded as contradictory, and for the low stimulus quality condition no positive conclusions 
can be drawn. However, it is possible to conclude a weaker form of the prediction, namely that for the 
low stimulus quality condition, VE relevant priming will not increase the presence experienced by 
subjects. 
 
Another pattern is also discernable in the graph, although it does not form part of the set of predictions 
made in chapter 7. In the case of both measures, the difference between the high stimulus quality and 
low stimulus quality (distance between the two lines in each data set), is marked and statistically 
significant in the case of VE relevant level of priming but insignificant (both in the statistical and literal 
senses) at the VE irrelevant level of priming. The difference between these two priming conditions 
underscores the role of priming as a mediator rather than as a direct causal agent. This pattern also 
underscores the importance of priming as a possible source of error variance in experimentation. Figure 
10-1 suggests that by controlling the priming state of the subjects, it is possible to exclude mental 
context as a third variable, and effectively accentuate the difference in presence scores between high 
and low stimulus quality display conditions.  
10.2 Empirical evidence for the independence of O node activation 
and presence 
Section 7.4 in Chapter 7 argued that presence is independent of the perception of objects, and can thus 
also be achieved through the perception of renditions. To test this notion, a set of expected results was 
defined in 7.4.1 (shown graphically in Figure 7-11). Experiment 2, described in chapter 9, was 
performed to test this hypothesis empirically. 
10.2.1 Displaying the PQ, SUS and predicted scores on one graph 
To better compare the results from the PQ, SUS and the prediction, the three datasets have been 
displayed together on Figure 10-2. The transformations used to generate a compatible set of scores is 
described in 10.1.5 above. Table 10-2 presents the raw and transformed scores used to generate the 
graph (which is displayed in Figure 10-2). 













PQ Low 140 224 0.63 
PQ Text 120 224 0.54 
PQ High 155 224 0.69 
SUS Low 21 42 0.50 
SUS Text 23 42 0.55 
SUS High 26.8 42 0.64 







































Figure 10-2: The predicted results for the three display types compared to the empirical 
findings. The blue lines are measurements taken by the PQ, the orange lines measurements 
made by the SUS, and the green lines the results predicted by the model.  
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10.2.2 Examining the data patterns in the graph 
From Figure 10-2, it is fairly clear that the PQ scores (represented by square data points on the graph) 
do not fit the predicted pattern (represented by diamonds on the graph). The text display condition 
scores are lower than the low stimulus quality condition, although its score (0.54 of the total PQ score) 
while being the lowest, is high enough that it could be argued that the subjects were indeed 
experiencing some form of presence, albeit slight. The pattern displayed by the SUS (represented by 
circular data points in Figure 10-1) resembles the predicted pattern, although Figure 10-2 shows a 
difference between the text display and low stimulus quality display conditions. However, that 
difference is not statistically significant, (see Table 9-10 in chapter 9) and thus would not be expected 
to appear in the general case. This means that the SUS follows the pattern predicted by the model. 
 
Sadly, the conclusions which can be drawn about the independence of O node activation and presence 
are murky. While the SUS shows the predicted pattern, the PQ does not, showing that the perception of 
objects always lead to increased levels of presence when compared to the perception of renditions. This 
implies that it is not the virtual environment itself that induces presence, but rather the means used to 
display it. This effect may be due to the nature of the PQ’s items, which weigh the importance of 
display quality heavily and thus effectively preclude its use in non-graphical displays (this follows the 
argument presented by Slater, 1999). The PQ might thus not be an appropriate presence measure for 
use in text-based displays (for a more detailed account of our argument, see section 9.8.3 in Chapter 9). 
Due to the disagreement between scales, the question of whether rendition biased displays are capable 
of producing presence remains largely unanswered, although some descriptive results by Towell & 
Towell (1997) support our prediction that such displays can lead to experiences of presence. Clearly 
more research is needed to resolve this controversy. 
10.3 A critical evaluation of the connectionist model of presence 
It is clear from the evidence above that the model presented in Chapter 6 is by no means perfect. The 
empirical investigations revealed two central deficits. Firstly, the model was unable to predict the 
negative effect of relevant priming on a low quality display. This is a severe weakness, as this effect 
was found for users of both the monastery and hospital VEs, which implies that the effect is not an 
example of an isolated case, but rather a more general phenomenon. If it is the case that this is indeed a 
phenomenon rather than an experimental artifact, then it is important for the model to be able to 
recreate this effect. Secondly, the model clearly implies that it is possible for a user report the same 
degree of presence independently of whether the VE display leads to perceptions of objects or of 
renditions. The empirical data collected does not reflect this with clarity; a confused mass of results 
which seem to depend more on the scale with which they were measured than on the conditions under 
which they were collected, resulted from the experiment created to test the hypothesis. 
 
Although these seem like minor difficulties, these weaknesses are serious because they have the 
capacity for discrediting the basic structures of the connectionist network. The first problem (i.e. not 
being able to represent the negative effect of relevant priming on low quality displays) is most serious 
because it raises the question: within the constraints defined in the definition of the model, does there 
exist a set of connections which could represent this effect while maintaining the other properties of the 
model? The model used in the empirical tests was not able to show this effect, although it did show a 
difference in the effect of priming based on the quality level of the stimulus, which is encouraging, as it 
shows that the model is capable of implementing independence between the effects of priming and 
display quality. However, it remains to be convincingly demonstrated that the model is capable (or 
incapable) of replicating this phenomenon. The literature provides very little insights into this problem, 
as not much published work exists on how a user’s previous experience may affect their experience of 
presence. An brief but interesting idea is presented by Jacobson (2002). Jacobson analyzes the works of 
literary theorists, and deduces that in extremely low-bandwidth presentations of virtual environments, 
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presence is largely attained by a process of selective self-construction on the part of the user (Jacobson, 
2002). The user’s mental models of the VE they are immersed in contribute more to the experience 
than does the actual information received. Jacobson further argues that increasing the amount of 
information presented to the user will in fact detract from the presence experience, especially when that 
information does not match with the mental model which the user holds (Jacobson, 2002). 
 
The evidence which we have collected in experiments 1 and 2 (see Chapters 8 and 9 respectively) seem 
to suggest that Jacobson’s hypothesis that more information about the VE leads to lower presence 
cannot be regarded as a blanket statement which applies to all VE presentation scenarios. Indeed, a 
large body of work appearing after 1991 (such as that by Sheridan, 1992; Slater, Usoh & Steed, 1994; 
Witmer & Singer, 1998; Slater & Steed, 2000; and Schubert, Friedmann & Regenbrecht, 2001, to name 
but a few) which presents both theory and empirical findings to suggest that increasing the amount of 
information about the VE will improve the presence experience. However, our finding that priming will 
lead to lower presence levels in the case of low quality VE displays does provide empirical evidence for 
Jacobson’s hypothesis. 
 
At first glance, this seems like a contradiction; it cannot be the case that more information about the VE 
will lead to both higher and lower presence levels. One might also be tempted to disregard Jacobson’s 
hypothesis (together with the evidence we present to support it), on the basis that there exists more 
published evidence for the idea that providing more information about a VE will lead to higher 
presence levels. We believe that taking such a step would be an error, for two major reasons. Firstly, 
the higher proportion of evidence in favour of what might be called the “more information leads to 
more presence” hypothesis is misleading. Most of the studies which collect such evidence set out from 
the start to show that more VE information loads lead to higher presence levels; very few have 
appeared which attempt to show the converse. Thus the overwhelming weight of evidence in favour of 
the “more information leads to more presence” hypothesis exists, we believe, due to a bias in research 
direction. Secondly, dismissing Jacobson’s hypothesis based on the evidence presented in favour of the 
“more information leads to more presence” hypothesis is an error because the difference which is being 
investigated is not only of information load, but also of information display mode. In the case of 
Jacobson’s hypothesis, the information is presented as text (either spoken of written). In the case of the 
“more information leads to more presence” hypothesis, the information is presented mostly as moving 
images. As has been shown by the muddled results arising from experiment 2 (see Chapter 9 for 
details) and by our arguments against the use of the Presence Questionnaire in text-based VE displays 
(see section 9.8.3), comparing presence results collected from users experiencing these two types of 
display cannot be done without running into a host of difficulties.  
 
We propose that Jacobson’s hypothesis should not be regarded as a rival to the “more information leads 
to more presence” hypothesis. Because Jacobson is referring mostly to extremely low bandwidth 
presentations of VE, we argue, based on our empirical findings, that Jacobson’s hypothesis should be 
applied to the use of low bandwidth displays, while the “more information leads to more presence” 
hypothesis can be applied to the use of higher bandwidth displays. A cynic might argue that this does 
not resolve the problem at all, but rather re-states it in a more satisfying form. However, we take the 
more pragmatic approach and suggest that the use of two hypotheses can be used as a base from which 
to conduct further research and establish the relationship between the two hypotheses fully. 
 
The second major difficulty with the connectionist model of presence (i.e. the implication that presence 
can exist in the absence of high quality immersive displays) comes from the fact that R nodes are 
connected to the action layer, and as such are capable of leading to action node activation. This feature 
comes from the model’s foundation on script theory, as well as the notion that an environmentally 
suitable behaviour can be triggered by any combination of stimulus and priming state. For instance, an 
impressionist’s painting of a scene would be considered to activate more R nodes than O nodes, but 
viewing it would still lead to particular thoughts and actions, even if those are different to the thoughts 
and actions that might occur from viewing a photograph of the same scene. As argued in chapter 3, this 
is a feature of human behaviour regulation mechanisms, and as such should form a part of any 
cognition based explanation of presence. The true difficulty in implying that presence can be produced 
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by low quality, non-immersive displays lies not in the cognitive mechanisms involved or in the way 
that they are modeled, but rather in the way that presence itself is defined. Some authors, such as Winn 
(1993), include the requirement for an immersive display in their definition of presence, while others, 
such as Slater (2000), do not explicitly require immersive displays in their definitions of presence.  
 
This difference in presence conceptualization is also reflected in the creation of presence scales. Slater, 
Usoh & Steed’s scale does not make any queries about the system used to display the VE, and it is thus 
possible for a subject viewing any type of display to score a maximum of 42 points on that scale. The 
Witmer & Singer Presence Questionnaire, on the other hand, includes items which ask about specific 
features of the display system. For instance, the PQ item “How well could you identify sounds?” can 
only achieve a high score if the VE included some form of audio display device; this question has the 
effect of implicitly lowering the presence score of all subjects viewing a VE without an audio display. 
It seems that Witmer & Singer have a model or theory of presence causality (which includes the notion 
that multimodality will always lead to higher levels of presence), and their theory has been expressed in 
the PQ. This means that the measure will give the most satisfactory results in situations which match 
the expectations of presence causality held by Witmer & Singer.  
 
In practice this means that subjects viewing high quality multimodal displays will always report high 
PQ scores, while those viewing text displays will always report lower PQ scores. This difference 
however, is an artifact of the scale and will occur regardless of the presence experienced by the 
subjects. This example is a single instance of a larger class of problems in presence measurement, 
namely the problem of construct validity: no presence scale measures presence as a pure concept, but 
rather to what extent the subjects’ behave in a way similar to what the scale constructor thinks a 
present subject would behave. This difficulty exists to some degree in all psychological measurements 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1996), but in the case of presence, which has no universally agreed upon 
conceptualization, the problem is more serious. This problem is not limited to measures of presence. As 
all work on presence must begin with some definition of the concept, be it implicit or stated, all work 
which is derived from a particular definition of presence will carry with it the assumptions held by that 
definition. 
 
The connectionist model presented in this document uses cognitive presence (explained in detail in 
chapter 4) as its underlying conceptualization of presence. The choice to use cognitive presence was 
made partly due to the raison d’?tre of cognitive presence: it aims to build a bridge between previous 
major concepts of presence. By combining previous approaches to presence, we hoped to ameliorate 
the problems described above somewhat. Sadly, fence-sitting in this way comes at a cost. A major 
drawback to taking a neutral stance is that one is forced to accept the intersection between the various 
presence approaches. This means that a finding can only be regarded as a phenomenon if it exists in all 
major conceptions of presence; in practice, one is forced to dismiss any result which does not repeat 
itself in the major presence measures.  This conservatism doubtless reduces the available amount of 
information for building the model because of the risk of dismissing real phenomena as the artifacts of 
the scales. However, it carries the weighty advantage that all of the phenomena it does include are 
replicated in several measures, thus making the arguments for their existence as real phenomena more 
convincing. 




10.3.1 A final evaluation of the utility of the connectionist model of presence 
 
Based on the discussion in 10.3 above, it is apparent that creating a model of presence is a difficult 
task, not only due to the inherent difficulties in modeling complex cognitive phenomena, but also due 
to the limitations of the contemporary armamentarium of the presence researcher. The model presented 
here is capable of reproducing many of the phenomena found in the literature, as well as some of those 
in the experiments designed to test the model. At the same time however, the model shows 
deficiencies. We suggest that the model should not be considered as an imperfect model displaying 
several weaknesses; rather, we submit that this is simply the first iteration of a cyclical process which is 
inevitable in the modeling process. As flaws are uncovered, it is necessary to consider whether the 
connectionist model is capable of sustaining the modifications required to remove the flaw without 
straining it to the point of inconsistency. Once the required modifications are made, another series of 
tests are required to test the changes, as well as ensure that no new faults have been introduced. At the 
time of writing however, this model presents an empirically tested and theoretically founded method of 
generating predictions of the relative presence levels which VE users can be expected to experience 




Chapter 11  
Methodological lessons learned 
 
Chapter 10 presented an evaluation of the connectionist model of presence, and a critical discussion of 
its usefulness in presence research. This chapter looks at some lessons learned regarding the 
methodology of presence research. We include some conclusions about presence measurement, and 
some general suggestions for the presence research methodologist. 
11.1 Psychometric properties of the Witmer & Singer Presence 
Questionnaire (PQ) 
Psychometric statistics were computed for the PQ as part of the data analysis of experiment 1 
(described in Chapter 8). These included several reliability measures and a validity assessment by 
means of the convergent validity method (Gregory, 1991). The sample size used for this experiment 
(n=101) was modest for the purposes of determining the psychometric properties of a scale (Anastasi, 
1982), and any results found are likely evanescent by comparison to those encountered with a suitably 
large sample. These analyses are performed simply for the purposes giving the reader some insight into 
the quality of the scales used. 
11.1.1 Internal consistency of the PQ 
Section 8.7.6 in Chapter 8 contains the analysis relevant to this section. The internal consistency of a 
scale refers to the degree to which the items measure a single factor only. Internal consistency is 
measured by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, which ranges between zero and one; one 
indicates perfect agreement between items, and zero no agreement between items. The Cronbach’s 
alpha score for the PQ is quite high, being just above 0.9. This indicates that, to a large degree, all the 
PQ items measure same construct. 
 
A high alpha score is usually an indicator that the scale has only one factor (Cronbach, 1960). 
However, the PQ contains a number of factors according to its authors. Admittedly, the factors Witmer 
& Singer refer to are not factors in the statistical sense, but rather in a conceptual sense. These factors
include control, sensory, distraction and realism (Witmer & Singer 1991). Sadly, the high Cronbach’s 
alpha value implies that all items share covariance, and that there is thus only one factor present in the 
scale. This data suggests either that all of the factors of the PQ suggested by Witmer & Singer are 
interrelated, or that their proposition of the existence of these factors is incorrect. This study did not 
collect enough data to evaluate this question effectively; to do so would require a factor analysis with 
sample sizes at least double those used in our study (Howell, 2002) 
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11.1.2 Low reliability items in the PQ 
We assessed the reliability of each item in the scale by means of the item-total correlation. This 
technique determines to what extent a particular item measures the same construct as the rest of the test 
does. It is calculated by correlating the scores of the item being investigated with the total questionnaire 
score excluding the item being investigated. Nunnally (1967) suggests that items displaying an item-
total correlation of less than 0.4 should be excluded from the scale as they are measuring something 
other than that which is being measured by the rest of the scale. The item-total correlations obtained for 
the PQ are shown in table 8-9 in chapter 8. 
 
From that table, it can be seen that a large number of items have adequate item-total correlations, 
according to Nunnally’s criterion. The eight items with low correlations are presented in Table 11-1. 
 
 
Item number Item stem 
17 How well could you manipulate objects in the virtual 
environment? 
19 How much delay did you experience between your actions and 
expected outcomes? 
20 How quickly did you adjust to the virtual environment 
experience? 
22 How much did the visual display quality interfere or distract you from performing assigned tasks or required activities? 
26 
To what extent did the events occurring outside the virtual 
environment distract you from your experience in the virtual 
environment? 
27 
Overall, how much did you focus on using the display and 
control devices instead of the virtual experience and 
experimental tasks? 
29 
How easy was it to identify objects through physical 
interaction; like touching an object, walking over a surface or 
bumping into a wall or object? 
31 How easily did you adjust to the control devices used to interact with the virtual environment? 
Table 11-1: PQ items displaying item-total correlations less than 0.4  
 
An investigation of the items suggests why they produce low item-total correlations. Items 17 and 29 
are both directed at the haptic interface to the virtual environment. The version of the DAVE system 
used in this experiment did not support haptic feedback or other forms of direct manipulation. 
Consequently, the question “How well could you manipulate objects in the virtual environment?” did 
not apply to the environment at all. This may have caused confusion in the subjects, which in turn 
would lead to random answering and thus a reduced correlation. 
Items 20 and 31 may have a reduced correlation due to ambiguities in the stems themselves. The 
phrases “how much” and “how easily” do not provide an absolute baseline for the subjects to compare 
against, and are thus interpreted differently by each subject, which again leads to the introduction of 
randomness in answering and a reduced correlation. For items 22, 26 and 27, it seems reasonable to 
expect a large amount of variance naturally (and hence a reduced correlation), as these items rely on the 
ability to focus attention, which is known to vary greatly form individual to individual (Eysenk & 
Keane, 1991). 
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11.1.3 Construct validity of the PQ 
The construct validity approach establishes that an instrument is measuring the correct construct by 
comparing the instrument’s performance to other, established scales of the same construct, and by 
considering the scale’s performance in relation to the theory of the construct (Anastasi, 1982). We 
consider the construct validity of the PQ by using these two methods: by correlating PQ scores with 
SUS scores, as well as by considering the effect of display quality on PQ scores. 
 
The PQ scores correlate well with SUS scores, achieving a significant r = 0.76 in experiment 1 and  
r = 0.56 in experiment 2. An average r for both groups (weighted by sample size) computes to 0.63. 
Based on these scores, and following the assumption that the SUS measures presence, it can be 
concluded that the PQ contains a large degree of construct validity, as it agrees to a substantial degree 
with SUS scores. 
 
According to a large number of presence researchers (for instance Hendrix & Barfield, 1995; Lessiter 
et al, 2001 and Sheridan 1992), the quality of a display will affect the presence experience directly. 
Specifically, higher degrees of display quality will lead to higher levels of presence. In experiments 1 
and 2, presence levels under the high stimulus quality viewing condition were compared to presence 
levels under the low stimulus quality viewing condition. The manipulation of display quality led to a 
significant difference in PQ scores (see Table 8-6 in Chapter 8 and Table 9-9 in chapter 9 for the 
relevant statistics). This suggests that the PQ is capable of supporting the theoretical underpinnings of 
the construct. 
 
From the strictly data driven, psychometric perspective, the PQ shows a satisfactory degree of construct 
validity. However, the evidence presented above relies on a VR display system which matched the 
conception of display technology held by the authors of the scale. If the PQ is used outside of this 
domain (as is the case in the text display condition used in experiment 2), the PQ’s validity could be 
called into question (see section 9.8.3 in Chapter 9 for a further discussion of this issue).  As discussed 
in section 10.3 in Chapter 10, this restriction of the domains in which the PQ is applicable should not 
be considered as a flaw of the scale, but rather as a conscious design decision of which the scale’s users 
need to remain aware. 
11.2 Psychometric properties of the Slater, Usoh & Steed presence 
scale 
As part of experiment 1, psychometric statistics were computed for the SUS (these are noted in chapter 
8). The statistics and methods are the same used for the PQ (described in section 11.1 above). 
11.2.1 Internal consistency of the SUS 
The statistics related to this analysis are listed in section 8.7.6 in chapter 8. We expect a high 
Cronbach’s alpha score for this scale, as its authors do not suggest that it is multi-factorial. According 
to Nunnally, acceptable Cronbach’s alpha scores range between 0.8 and 1 (Nunnally, 1967). Values 
lower than 0.8 are interpreted as revealing a deficit in the reliability of the scale. By this criterion, the 
SUS shows an unacceptably low Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.77. One possible explanation for this lack 
of reliability might the low number of items in the scale. Anastasi (1982) argues that scale reliability 
comes from scale effectively sampling the behaviour domain of the construct. Each item in a scale 
represents a single data point in this sample, and as such, a large number of items are required to 
sample the behaviour domain adequately and achieve reliability. The SUS contains only six items, 
which represents a very small sample. Adding items to the SUS might correct this shortcoming. 
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11.2.2 Low reliability items in the SUS 
Using the same procedure described in section 11.1.2, each item was analyzed using an item-total 
correlation score. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8-10 (included in chapter 8). Only 
one item (item 4) displays an unacceptably low correlation according to Nunnally’s criterion of 0.4, 
although item 5 achieves only a borderline score. These two items are presented in Table 11-2. 
 
 
Item number Item 
4 
During the time of the experience, which was strongest on the whole, your 
sense of being in the virtual environment, or of being elsewhere? 
 
I had a stronger sense of [Being elsewhere][Being in the virtual 
environment] 
5 
Consider your memory of being in the virtual environment. How similar in 
terms of the structure of the memory is this to the structure of the memory of 
other places you have been today? By ‘structure of the memory’ consider 
things like the extent to which you have a visual memory of the virtual 
environment, whether that memory is in colour, the extent to which the 
memory seems vivid or realistic, its size, location in your imagination, the 
extent to which it is panoramic in your imagination and other such structural 
elements. 
 
I think of the virtual environment as a place in a way similar to other places 
that I’ve been to today [Not at all] [Very much so] 
Table 11-2: SUS items displaying item-total correlations less than or approximately 0.4 
 
Examining the items presented in Table 11-2 reveals some possible explanations to why they produce 
low correlations. Item 4 seems to contain ambiguity brought about by the use of language which is very 
rich in meaning. For instance the phrase “being in” contains several shades of meaning and as such can 
be interpreted in various ways by various people. Also, the item forces a dichotomy between “the 
virtual environment” and “elsewhere”. This implies a dual task for the subject. Firstly, the subject has 
to correctly identify the virtual environment, and then, as a second task, decide the extent of the feeling 
of being in that place. This can lead to confusion, which in turn leads to random answering and a 
reduction in the correlation.  
 
With item 5, the reasons for the marginal item-total correlation are likely different. It is noteworthy that 
this item contains far more words than any of the other items. Item 5 contains 112 words, while the 
average number of words in the other items is only 31 (with a standard deviation of 3.16). Apart from 
this, the instruction itself is confusing. It introduces subjects to the concept structure of memory and 
asks subjects to compare one memory to others based on this concept, which is explained only by 
giving six examples of what constitutes this idea, and suggesting that more properties, which are not 
explained or defined, exist in this idea. Also, some of the examples given, such as “location in 
imagination”, are anything but clear in their meaning, yet are not explained further. It is quite probable 
that subjects interpreted this item in various ways (due to the ambiguity in the item), and thus reduced 
the item-total correlation of this item. If the structure of the VE memory is important to the 
measurement, as is implied by Slater et al, it would have been more salubrious to reliability to reduce 
the complexity of item 5 by decomposing it into several items, each of which was more clearly 
explained. 
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11.2.3 Construct validity of the SUS 
To determine the construct validity of the SUS, we correlate the results with those obtained on the PQ, 
as well as comparing SUS scores obtained by subjects in the high stimulus quality condition with the 
scores obtained by subjects in the low stimulus quality condition. This procedure mirrors the one 
described for the PQ in section 11.1.3 above.  
 
It is necessary to highlight the strategy of using the SUS and PQ to validate each other. Ideally, two 
scales should not be used to validate each other; a third scale should be used, to create a degree of 
independence. However, the central purpose of this work is not to unequivocally establish the validity 
of the scales, but rather to propose and validate the connectionist model of presence. As discussed in 
11.1 above, these analyses of psychometric performance are done only to create in the reader some 
impression of the quality of the measures, and should not be interpreted as rigorous validity analyses of 
the scales. 
 
The SUS scores display a moderate but satisfactory correlation to the PQ scores (a weighted average r 
value of 0.63 for both experiments, as reported in 11.1.3 above). The SUS also displays appropriate 
sensitivity to the manipulation of display quality. As presented in Table 8.5 (in chapter 8) and Table 9-
7 (in chapter 9), the SUS produces higher scores in the high stimulus quality condition. This evidence 
suggests that the SUS demonstrates a suitable level of construct validity. 
11.3 Psychometric properties of the Contents of Consciousness 
Inventory (COCI) 
The COCI is an experimental scale, and as such its psychometric properties are entirely unknown. 
Although not enough data was collected during this project to convincingly demonstrate its 
psychometric properties, there is enough data to make preliminary suggestions about the utility of this 
scale. The determination of the validity and reliability of the COCI were done by the same basic 
method used in 11.1 and 11.2 above.  
11.3.1 Internal consistency of the COCI 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is not suitable for determining the internal consistency of the COCI, 
because COCI scores are dichotomous (the subject either selected the environmentally keyed word, or 
they did not). A suitable substitute exists in the Kuder-Richardson 20 (KR20) formula. The KR20 is 
used as a measure of internal consistency in multiple choice items, and is interpreted in the same way 
as Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Gregory, 1991). The COCI displays a KR20 value of 0.74 which is 
low, as acceptable values range between 0.8 and 1. Although, the reliability of the scale is not 
satisfactory, the value is not so low as to suggest that the COCI is entirely unreliable. As was the case 
with the SUS, the COCI consists of few items (only ten), and it is possible that the addition of more 
items might alleviate this problem to some degree. 
11.3.2 Low reliability items in the COCI 
As in section 11.1.2, each item was analyzed using an item-total correlation score. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 8-11 (included in chapter 8). From this table, it can be seen that a large 
number of items have low item-total correlations (as per Nunnally’s criterion). Five items (items 1, 3, 
4, 5, and 6) displayed low correlations. Investigating these items will not lead to any insights, as the 
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COCI items are simply single words selected randomly. The significant feature of this analysis is the 
large number of items (half of all the items in the scale) which show poor reliability. This finding, 
together with the low KR20 value, can be understood to indicate poor reliability in the COCI. 
11.3.3 Construct validity of the COCI 
The construct validity of the COCI was investigated by the same approach used in 11.1.3 and 11.2.3 
above; COCI scores were correlated with PQ and SUS scores, and the COCI’s performance was 
examined under conditions of varying stimulus quality. 
 
The correlations are reported in Table 8.9 in chapter 8 and Table 9-3 in chapter 9. To compute a single 
correlation across both experiments, a weighted average was calculated to compensate for the 
difference in sample sizes in each experiment. The weighted average correlation between COCI and 
PQ across both experiments is r = 0.21, while the weighted average correlation between COCI and 
SUS across both experiments is r = 0.14. Neither of these correlations is significant, signifying that 
COCI scores are independent of both the PQ and SUS scores. This does not bode well for the validity 
of the COCI, as we have demonstrated in 11.1.3 and 11.2.3 above that the PQ and SUS display 
adequate levels of construct validity. 
 
To further determine the construct validity of the COCI, we examined its sensitivity to changes in 
display quality, as displayed by the PQ and SUS. It should come as no surprise, based on the poor 
correlation between the COCI and the other scales reported above, that the COCI performs poorly in 
detecting this difference. Table 8-8 in chapter 8 and Table 9-4 in chapter 9 show that the COCI was 
unable to detect any difference in presence levels between the subjects in the high stimulus quality 
condition and those in the low stimulus quality condition. The COCI disagrees not only with both of the 
other two established scales of presence, but also with the current understanding of the concept.   
11.3.4 The suitability of the COCI as a presence measure 
The evidence presented in 11.3.1 above suggests that the reliability of the COCI is too low to be 
considered more than a research measure at the moment. By increasing the number of items in the 
scale, it may be possible to increase its reliability. However, it should be noted that it is not always 
possible for a measure to show reliability. Cronbach (1960) notes that if the construct which the scale 
measures displays inherent instability, such as rapid change over time, then the scale cannot be 
expected to display reliability using the conventional measures. It is not yet clear if presence varies in 
this way. Slater (2000) suggests that presence probably changes from minute to minute, but offers no 
empirical evidence. The PQ and SUS are capable of showing high degrees of reliability partly because 
they are cross-sectional measurements – they sample a single moment in time. The COCI, however, is 
a longitudinal measure, as it samples at various points throughout the presence experience. This 
dependence on time will lead to an inherent reduction in reliability. It is therefore possible that 
temporal stability might not apply as a standard to which the COCI should be held. 
 
The question of construct validity is a different issue. All scales are required to display construct 
validity (Gregory, 1991). Section 11.3.3 above presents the evidence for the construct validity of the 
COCI. The low correlation with other presence scales suggests that the COCI measures something 
other than presence. Also, the COCI is not able to support one of the central tenets of presence theory, 
namely the effect of display quality on presence. These two lines of evidence suggest that the COCI 
does not display a great deal of construct validity. 
 
Due mostly to its low construct validity, and partly due to the lack of reliability, the COCI should not 
be regarded as a useful presence measuring instrument. The basic structure of the COCI could be useful 
in the future however. Its most useful features include its longitudinal approach, and its avoidance of 
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introspection. The COCI also shows another interesting and useful property. Examining tables 8-4 and 
9-4 (in chapters 8 and 9 respectively), which show the effect of priming and stimulus quality on COCI, 
it can be seen that priming has a reliable and significant effect on COCI scores. Priming leads to a 
significant difference in COCI scores regardless of the VE which was used, or of the quality of the 
display. This strongly suggests that the COCI can be used as a measure of priming. We have shown 
priming to be a determinant of presence, and so the COCI might still have an important role to play in 
presence research as a priming measure.  
11.4 The implications of priming for presence research methodology 
The evidence collected while testing the model, discussed in chapter 10, strongly suggests that the role 
of priming is to set a mental context, which in turn has a strong effect on perception. From this finding 
it can be inferred that presence is not a direct product of the sensory stimuli presented to a user, but that 
the mental state of the user plays an important part in the perception of virtual environments and the 
subsequent selection of behaviour to operate in those environments. This conclusion is partly in 
contrast to the notion presented by Sheridan, Slater, Witmer & Singer and others that presence is a 
direct product of the combination of sensory stimulation received by a subject’s modalities. It is true 
that the presence experienced by a subject depends a great deal upon the stimuli presented to the 
subject. However, the results presented in chapters 8 and 9 suggest strongly that the mental context in 
which those stimuli are processed can have a significant effect on the outcome of that processing, and 
consequently it has an effect on presence as well. The mental context with which users enter the 
experiment situation is thus a variable which needs to be controlled in an experimental setting, lest it 
reduce the internal validity of the study by becoming a confound (Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
 
11.4.1 Implications for presence research methodology 
If mental context has an effect on the presence experiences, as is argued in 11.4 above, then it is 
necessary to include a control for this in experiments where presence is used as a dependent variable. 
Subjects will enter an experimental situation with a variety of mental states, and it is thus not known if 
the subject’s mental state will increase or decrease their presence experience; this acts as a third 
variable in the design. One possible solution to this problem is to use random assignment. This will 
reduce the possibility of unintended priming producing a noticeable effect in presence by ensuring that 
all groups in the design receive equal numbers of positively primed and negative primed subjects. This 
solution is not entirely satisfactory, as the great degree of variation in mental states will lead to an 
increase in error variance, making it harder to detect small effects in the dependent variable (Howell, 
2002). This problem can be ameliorated by priming all subjects with the same material, and thereby 
reducing the overall level of error variance. Although no two subjects will achieve the same mental 
state from exposure to any particular priming material, the mental states achieved will be similar, and 
this will lead to the overall reduction in error variance. 
11.4.2 Measuring priming 
The priming materials used in experiments 1 and 2 (described in chapters 8 and 9 respectively) seem to 
have been sufficient to induce the primed state and create an effect on the dependent variable. 
However, it should be regarded as necessary to measure the state of priming to ensure that priming has 
indeed taken place. Although no measures currently exist for measuring priming, the COCI shows great 
promise in this regard, as has been argued in section 11.3.4 above. Before the COCI can be used as a 
measure of priming, however, some developments would be advisable: 




1. The low reliability of the COCI should be investigated further. It is necessary to determine if 
priming is a stable construct, or if it varies from moment to moment. This can be done by 
adding items to the COCI, and checking if Cronbach’s alpha coefficient grows. If it does, then 
this indicated that the priming construct is stable, and that the scale can be improved to 
increase its reliability. If not, then the construct is unstable, and reliability should not be 
regarded as a relevant issue in the measurement of priming. 
 
2. Non-verbal variations of the COCI should be considered. The basic COCI method of selecting 
from a list on being shown an ambiguous stimulus can be easily applied to images or even 
sounds. The verbal COCI assumes that the subject understands equally well all the words 
presented in the list, and as such is not suitable for cross-cultural applications, and replications 
are not possible beyond language boundaries. A non-verbal variant could help solve this 
problem. 
 
3. A concerted effort should be made to validate the COCI further. This can be done by creating 
a manipulation which, according to the theory of priming, should affect the mental state of the 
subjects. A group of volunteers would then be subjected to the manipulation, and the COCI 





Chapter 12  
Conclusion 
This dissertation presented our explanatory and predictive tool for presence. We developed the concept 
of cognitive presence, which made use of a cognitive psychology approach in order to combine several 
strands of presence conceptualization. To measure cognitive presence, we developed the Contents of 
Consciousness Inventory, a non-introspective measure which is does not use questionnaires, and is 
administered during the VE experience. We created a cognitive theory to explain and predict our 
concept, by making use of the connectionist architecture proposed by Martindale (1981) and 
McClelland & Rumelhart (1986). We then conducted two experiments, each using a large number of 
participants, to establish the validity of our theory. 
12.1 Achievements 
In section 1.1 of Chapter one, we provided four stated aims of this project. These were: 
 
1. To attempt to unify the various strands of presence conceptualization. We achieved this aim 
by means of a careful analysis of both the presence literature and the cognitive psychology 
literature. We created the concept of cognitive presence, and argued that it is a more powerful 
concept than Lombard & Ditton’s illusion of non-mediation because we have theoretical 
evidence that our concept is composed of the atomic processes of environmental processing. 
 
2. To create a conceptual model to explain and predict cognitive presence. We made use of the 
connectionist modeling paradigm to achieve this aim. The three-layer model we created is 
described in detail in Chapter five. We demonstrated its ability to predict establish presence 
findings by applying it to the studies by Hendrix & Barfield (1995) and Salln?s (1999). 
 
3. To establish the validity of our theory by means of empirical investigation. We designed two 
experiments to test our model, and predicted the findings of these experiments with the model. 
We then conducted the experiments with a large group of subjects (103 observations in 
experiment one and 78 in experiment two). A summary of the findings of these experiments 
can be found in 12.2 below. These experiments largely confirmed the main thrust of our 
theoretical concepts. 
 
4. To create a measure of cognitive presence. We achieved this aim partially. Although we 
successfully created the Contents of Consciousness Inventory, its use in the field indicated that 
it is not a good measure of presence (see section 11.3 of Chapter 11 for a discussion of this 
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12.2 Summary of empirical results 
The two experiments we conducted provided a variety of data to evaluate our main hypotheses as well 
as provide some interesting ancillary information such as the psychometric properties of the presence 
measures we used.  
12.2.1 The effect of display quality on presence 
Between both experiments, we tested the effect of three levels of display quality on presence, as 
measured on three presence scales: the Slater, Usoh & Steed scale (SUS), Witmer & Singer’s Presence 
Questionnaire (PQ), and our own Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI). The three quality 
conditions were: 
 
1. High-graphical quality display, which used radiosity, texture mapping, and positional sound 
 
2. Low quality graphical display, which used Lambertian lighting, no texture mapping and no 
sound 
 
3. Text-based display which used text descriptions of rooms and non-realtime interaction. 
 
We found that the COCI did not respond to changes in display quality. We also found that the high 
quality graphical display consistently produced the highest levels of presence on both the SUS and PQ. 
The text condition produced SUS scores which lay between the high and low quality graphical 
displays, although on the PQ, the text display consistently produced the lowest scores. These findings 
(which include the appropriately primed subjects) are in line with the bulk of the presence literature, 
which suggest that the level of immersion of a VE system directly affects presence. However, if one 
considers only the data which were obtained from subjects which were not appropriately primed, then 
no difference in display quality was apparent. This implies that priming plays an important role in 
facilitating presence differences under conditions of varying display quality. 
12.2.2 The effect of priming on presence 
We used two priming conditions in our experiments. These were: 
 
1. VE relevant priming: before entering the VE, the subject read through a booklet which was 
related to the theme of the virtual environment 
 
2. VE irrelevant priming: before entering the VE, the subject read a booklet unrelated to the 
theme of the virtual environment 
 
As with the results quoted in 12.2.1, the COCI failed to respond to the manipulations; the PQ and SUS, 
however, both responded significantly. We found no main effect with regards to priming and presence; 
that is, we found that priming condition did not directly cause a change in presence scores. However, 
we did find a significant interaction effect between stimulus quality and presence. In the VE irrelevant 
priming condition, there was no difference in presence levels between display quality conditions. In the 
VE relevant priming condition, however, there was a difference. Furthermore, the relevant priming 
increased the score for those in the high quality display condition, and lowered the score for those in 
the low quality display condition. 
CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION 151 
 
 
12.2.3 Psychometric evaluation of the presence measures 
We conducted reliability and validity analyses on all three presence measures used. We used three 
criteria for each measure, namely: 
 
1. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient as a measure of internal consistency (the Kuder-Richardson 20 
formula was used for the COCI, as this uses a hit/miss scoring scheme) 
 
2. Correlations with other presence scales to determine concurrent validity 
 
3. Examination of sensitivity to display quality manipulations to determine construct validity 
 
For the SUS, the Cronbach’s alpha score was unacceptably low, probably due to the low number of 
items in that scale. The SUS did show a significant, positive correlation to the PQ, suggesting that it 
measures the same construct to a degree. Finally, the SUS was able to distinguish the difference 
between presence scores in conditions of differing display quality, as suggested by Slater, Usoh & 
Steed (1995). We conclude that the SUS is capable of measuring presence, although its reliability is in 
question. 
 
The PQ also performed well. It showed a satisfactorily high Cronbach’s alpha score, suggesting that it 
is internally consistent. However, this is a concern due to the fact that a high Cronbach’s alpha score 
suggests the scale measures only one factor, while Witer & Singer state that the PQ in fact measures 
several factors. The PQ correlated well with the SUS, suggesting that it is suitable to measure presence. 
Finally, the PQ was able to distinguish presence scores from two differing display conditions, in line 
with its authors’ expectations (Witmer & Singer, 1998). 
 
The COCI did not perform well. It showed a low Kuder-Richardson 20 score, suggesting that the items 
are not measuring the same construct. The COCI also failed to correlate with either the PQ or the SUS, 
suggesting that it is not measuring the same construct as these scales. Finally, the COCI was not able to 
distinguish between presence scores in differing display quality conditions, as is expected for a 
presence measure.  
12.3 Summary of the validation of the connectionist model 
After completing the experiments, we considered if the evidence collected supported our model. We 
did this by comparing the obtained results, with the results predicted by the model. The first experiment 
aimed to validate the basic structure of the model. For the first experiment we made three predictions: 
 
1. A difference between the High stimulus quality and Low stimulus quality conditions: We 
found a significant difference on two of the three presence measures. 
 
2. A difference between the High stimulus quality/VE relevant priming and the High stimulus 
quality/VE irrelevant priming conditions: We found a significant difference on two of the 
three presence measures. 
 
3. No difference between the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming and the Low stimulus 
quality/VE irrelevant priming conditions: We found no difference with one scale (the PQ), and 
a difference on another (the SUS). The difference created a disadvantage for those subjects in 
the Low stimulus quality/VE relevant priming condition. 
 
Two of the three predictions were supported by the data, with the third being partially supported. We 
conclude that this experiment provides a substantial degree of support for our model.  The second 
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experiment aimed to demonstrate that presence is independent of the medium used to display the 
environment. We generated one prediction with the model; that there would be no difference in 
presence scores collected from a group viewing a text-based display and a group viewing a low-quality 
graphical display, while a group viewing a high-quality graphical display would fare better than both 
the low-quality graphics group and text group. The data collected were somewhat contradictory. The 
SUS displayed the predicted pattern, but the PQ did not. This hypothesis is thus insufficiently 
supported. 
12.4 Contributions of this work 
This dissertation contains several novel contributions. The major theoretical contributions of this 
dissertation are: 
 
1. An attempt to unify the various strands of presence conceptualization by redefining them in 
terms of well-understood psychological processes which ensure environmentally appropriate 
behaviour. We call our concept cognitive presence. 
 
2. A strategy to measure cognitive presence. This is does not require questionnaires or 
introspection, and is administered during the VE experience to minimize memory distortions. 
We call our measure the Contents of Consciousness Inventory (COCI). 
 
3. A conceptual model to explain and predict cognitive presence. This model makes use of a 
connectionist architecture as defined by McClelland & Rumelhart (1986). The model includes 
both top-down and bottom-up processes. This is, we believe, the first model of its kind to give 
equal importance to these two fundamental processes. 
 
4. The discovery of priming as a major determinant of the presence experience. Of particular 
interest is the finding that priming does not act as a simple effect, but rather interacts with 
display fidelity.  
 
To determine the validity of our theoretical analyses and conclusions, we conducted two experiments, 
making use of a large data set (103 observations in the first experiment, and 78 in the second). These 
experiments resulted in a number of empirical contributions: 
 
1. We found that priming (the manipulation of top-down processing) has an interesting and 
powerful effect on presence. Those subjects who were primed to respond to positively to the 
VE responded with higher presence score only if they were viewing the VE with a high quality 
display. However, if the quality of the display was low, positively primed subjects reported 
less presence than those who were not primed for that VE. Those subjects who were not 
primed to respond to the environment reported the same level of presence, regardless of the 
quality of the display. This finding demonstrates not only the power of priming to change 
presence levels, but also shows that detecting presence differences among improperly primed 
subjects could lead to difficulties. 
 
2. We found that, ignoring priming, better quality VE displays lead to more presence. This 
finding replicates the findings by many previous researchers, such as Hendrix & Barfield 
(1995), Slater, Usoh & Steed (1994) and Salln?s (1999). 
 
3. We found that text-based VE displays were generally able to produce presence on a par to that 
produced by low-quality graphical displays. 
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4. We performed psychometric analyses of the presence scales used. We found that Slater, Usoh 
& Steed’s scale (1995) showed good validity, but poor reliability. Witmer & Singer’s 
Presence Questionnaire (1998) showed both good reliability and good validity. Finally, our 
COCI scale showed poor validity and poor reliability. 
12.5 The discovery of priming as a mediator variable in presence 
Perhaps the most striking (and serendipitous) finding of this work is the identification of the effects of 
subject priming on their experiences of presence. Originally, we expected priming to act as an extra 
source of information for subjects, and so we expected it to behave simply as a causal agent (see 
section 7.3 in Chapter seven for a detailed discussion of our expectations in this regard). However, the 
empirical findings show distinctly that priming can act both to increase or decrease presence, 
depending on the quality of the VE display. This finding is unlikely to be a simple experimental 
artifact, as it appeared in both the monastery and hospital VEs, and appeared in measurements taken 
with both Slater, Usoh & Steed’s scale, and with Witmer & Singer’s Presence Questionnaire. 
 
Priming is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, priming is created not by “preparing” the 
subjects for the VE experience by telling them what they will be expecting. Its effect can thus not be 
explained by a simple case of users being disappointed at not finding what they were told about in the 
preparation session The priming manipulation is far more subtle, and has only to refer to the theme of 
the VE in order to be effective. It can thus be best explained as creating a bias in the perceptual 
processes of the subjects before they enter the VE. Secondly, priming is interesting because it is a 
mediator to presence rather than a direct cause. If one maintains display quality constant, and 
manipulates priming, no effect is discernible, because it is not a cause. It operates differentially on 
different levels of a cause variable (in this case, display quality), and can thus only be detected by 
means of a factorial design. As our results show, although it is not a direct cause of presence, it is still 
capable of leading to noticeable and statistically significant differences in presence scores. 
 
The role of top-down processing effects on presence have not been adequately investigated, perhaps 
due to the supremacy of Gibsonian thought in the presence community (see Zahoric & Jenison, 1998 
and Sheridan, 1999 for examples of this type of work). Gibson gave paramount importance to bottom-
up processes in perception, due to his belief that all of the information necessary to operate in an 
environment was available via the senses. This view of perception is not largely adhered to by 
cognitive psychologists, following the demonstrations of the power of top-down processing by Pollack 
& Pickett (1964), Reicher (1969), Williams & Weisstein (1978), and many others. Based on our 
finding, it would seem that Gibson’s ideas might also be of less use to presence research than was once 
believed. 
12.6 Future development of the connectionist model of presence 
The model described in this document presents many opportunities for improvement and further 
investigation. This section presents some directions of research we feel should be followed as a first 
step towards improving the model. We present these suggestions in an order which we believe 
represents their relative importance, beginning with the most pressing. 
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12.6.1 Establishing the independence of O node activation and presence 
As noted in chapter 10 (in section 10.2), the two experiments performed failed to clearly demonstrate 
the independence of presence from O node activation. This issue needs to be addressed with some 
urgency, as the structure of the perceptual analyzers is created under the assumption that O and R node 
activation can be equivalent under the right conditions. 
 
To establish that presence can arise as a result of either O or R node activation, it would be necessary to 
replicate the basic design of experiment 1, but using several levels of priming and stimulus quality 
rather than simply two levels of each. Particularly, it would be necessary to widen the range of each 
variable, to include more extreme cases. For example, for the stimulus quality variable, immersive 
devices such as head-mounted displays could be used to maximize the degree of O node activation, 
while priming could be maximized by the use of multimedia shows rather than simple text. Using 
extreme levels of these variables can be helpful, because this allows one to explore the possibility that 
the independence occurs only at very high or very low levels of stimulus quality. 
 
Based on the findings of such research, it might become necessary to amend the model. If it is found 
that R nodes are not capable of contributing to presence, or that they can only contribute under extreme 
conditions, the necessary changes might be effected by changing the strength of the connections 
between the R nodes and the action layer. If the R nodes do not contribute at all to presence, this might 
be modeled by connecting all R nodes to a small subset of action nodes which represent behaviours that 
are usually unsuitable for operating in an environment. If it is found that R nodes only contribute to 
presence under extreme conditions (e.g. under high levels of R node activation only), this could be 
modeled by reducing the strength of the connections between the R nodes and the action layer. 
12.6.2 Decomposition of the conceptual layer into constituent analyzers 
As described in section 5.2 (in chapter 5), the conceptual layers in the current model represent a more 
complex structure, which was not elaborated on due to a lack of relevant empirical evidence. Modeling 
the contribution of mental state to presence by means of a single source of priming does not allow for 
an understanding of how different elements of cognition, such mental models of environments and 
previous experience, each contributes to presence. Once some components of the conceptual layer have 
been identified, it might be possible to better understand the negative effect of priming on presence in 
low quality displays. Knowing the components which make up the conceptual layers will allow for the 
establishment of a priming theory, which can be used to determine the appropriate type of priming to 
maximize presence for a particular perceptual situation. 
12.6.3 Creation of an action layer activation measure 
The COCI was conceived as a measure of cognitive presence, and the connectionist model mapped 
cognitive presence onto the activation of specific action nodes. However, as discussed in section 11.3 
of Chapter 11, the COCI lacks the required degree of construct validity. This leaves the requirement for 
a measure of cognitive presence unfilled. 
 
Although the other presence measures used in this study lead to satisfactory results, they should not be 
regarded as suitable measures of cognitive presence or of action layer activation. The success of these 
other measures in this role comes from the fact that action layer activation is related to but not 
synonymous with traditional conceptions of presence. These measures doubtless include aspects of their 
own conceptions of presence which are not related to action layer activation (such as the measures of 
display system features in the PQ). These can act as confounds and reduce reliability when used to 
measure action layer activation. It is necessary to search again for a measure of action layer activation.  




As refinement of the connectionist model is by necessity driven by empirical research, it is important to 
have an accurate, direct measure of the degree to which experimental manipulations are affecting the 
model. The basic concept behind the COCI still merits investigation to determine if it is a useful 
method for measuring action layer activation. 
12.6.4 Maturing the COCI into a dedicated priming measure 
As argued in section 11.3.3 and 11.3.4 of Chapter eleven, with some refinements the COCI could be 
used as a measure of priming. The current version of the COCI is already quite effective, but it can 
doubtless be improved. The major flaw of the current COCI seems to be its dependence on the content 
of the VE on which it is to be used, effectively precluding the creation of a “universal COCI” to work 
on any environment. Based on the theory of priming, it seems unlikely that priming can be measured 
without making reference to the content of the mental state, as priming is defined in terms of content 
itself; to say “the subject is primed” is really a contraction of “the subject is primed for x”, and as such 
measuring priming without reference to x is impossible. Requiring a new version of the COCI for each 
environment can however create a serious confound, as each version of the COCI might posses 
differing psychometric qualities.  
 
This problem can be partially circumvented by establishing a rigorous method for creating COCI 
variants. This method would aim to reduce possible error variation associated with the choice of 
particular items over other possible candidate. One solution to this already exists in a related problem 
in psychometrics, namely the parallel forms problem. The problem of parallel forms is to create two 
separate tests of the same subject, with equivalent psychometric properties, and of equal difficulty. The 
standard solution to this problem is to create one test of twice the length, and to use a random selection 
method to select items for each of the two tests. A similar procedure could be applied to the COCI – 
rather than selecting ten words for the test, a longer list is created, and ten words are chosen at random 
from the list. As it is likely that only a subset of all words will be problematic, this method reduces the 
probability that problematic words will be selected for inclusion in the test. 
12.6.5 Find connection strengths and unit functions 
Before a connectionist network can be used to make quantitative predictions, the strengths of the 
connections and the unit functions must be determined (Martindale, 1990). By way of assumption, the 
model currently treats all connections as if they were of equal strength. However, it is unlikely that this 
is the case, due to the effects of learning and experience on connection strength. 
 
An advantage of working with a model that specifies the connection strengths is that it makes it 
possible to incorporate individual differences into the model, which allows the modeling of particular 
networks (i.e. particular people). To successfully predict the presence that a particular individual will 
experience, an “average network” would be used, which models the mean performance of subjects. 
Then, some method of quantifying the difference between the individual in question and the average 
network (such as, for instance, Witmer & Singer’s Immersive Tendencies Questionnaire) can be used 
to calibrate the network for the individual in question. 
 
To determine connection strengths, an accurate measure of each construct attached to a particular 
connection is required. For example, to determine the connection strength between the O node of the 
visual analyzer and the action node encoding visiting a restaurant, a measure of each is required. After 
activating one of the nodes to varying levels, the activation of the other connected nodes can provide 
the required information to determine the strength of the connection as well as the parameters of the 
unit function. 
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12.6.6 Build network simulator for automatic prediction 
Once accurate measures exist and the network parameters have been calculated, it will be possible to 
implement a simulation of the network. This will allow a quick method of predicting presence 
quantitatively for a given set of initial conditions. A simulator can be a useful tool for designers of 
virtual environments, as it would allow them to determine quantitatively what effect a change in the VE 
or priming manipulation would have on the presence experienced by users in that environment. 
 
A network simulator is also a useful tool for research purposes, as it allows detailed examinations of 
the models. With detailed analyses possible, researchers working in applied fields such as VR therapy 
and collaborative shared spaces could quantitatively investigate the relative benefits of presence. Also, 
as detailed analyses of how activation spreads to the conceptual layers would become possible, it would 
become feasible to analyze the possible contribution of presence to performing a particular task, given 




Appendix A  
The DAVE tool 
We developed the DAVE tool to support the experiments described in this dissertation. DAVE is an 
acronym which stands for Dave’s Application for Virtual reality Experiments. DAVE runs on the 
Win32 platform, and has been tested and found to work on Windows 98 sp2, Windows 2000 sp 1 and 
Windows XP. DAVE requires DirectX 7 or later to be installed. Although it is not a requirement, a 
great increase in performance is obtained from using a Direct3D compatible graphics accelerator. We 




Figure A-1: An example of the rendering capabilities of DAVE. This scene can be rendered 
with a refresh rate of 20Hz on an AMD Athlon 700MHz with a GeForce 2MX based graphics 
card. 
A.1 Graphical rendering capabilities 
At DAVE’s core is the Genesis 3D game engine (http://www.genesis3d.com). Genesis 3D was written 
by WildTangent Inc, and released to the public under an open source license in 1998. Genesis 3D has 
the following central features: 





x Texture mapping 
x Soft-edged shadows 
x Soft scene lighting by means of the radiosity method 




DAVE uses these features to implement a scene visualization tool, which rendered the scene from a 
first-person perspective, by displaying a camera which is set 1.7 virtual meters from the floor of the 
scene, to give the illusion of standing in the scene (see Figure A-1 for example). During the 
experiments, the screen refresh rate of DAVE did not fall below 9Hz, and was typically at 18Hz or 
above. 
A.2 Sound rendering capabilities 
The Genesis 3D API provides for stereo sound rendering, and the dynamic modification of sounds. 
DAVE uses this feature to implement two types of sound: ambience sounds and position sounds. 
Ambience sounds are used as aural “filler” for the scene. For example, the medieval monastery scene 
contained the sounds of birds singing, wind blowing and distant thunder as ambience sounds. 
Ambience sounds are chosen randomly from a list provided by the scene designer, and are played with 
random settings for volume, pan and frequency. Position sounds are inserted into particular points in 
the scene by the scene designer. DAVE uses the pan and volume controls provided by Genesis 3D to 
simulate distance attenuation and sound position. This gives the illusion that position sounds are being 
emitted from particular places in the scene. 
A.3 User interaction and navigation 
DAVE allows the users to move around the world by means of the quake keys navigation method 
(Dalgarno & Scott, 2000). This method uses the mouse and keyboard to navigate. The mouse is used to 
change the yaw and pitch parameters of the camera (the mouse x axis controlling yaw, and the y axis 
controlling pitch), while the keyboard is used to move in relation to the camera’s view vector (the W 
and S keys move forwards and backwards along the view vector, while the A and D keys move left and 
right perpendicular to the view vector). As the camera position changes to these inputs, the height of 
the camera is kept at a constant height above the floor of the scene at that point, to create the illusion of 
walking over the scene. The version of DAVE used to display the scenes used for the experiments 
described in this dissertation used a 17” monitor to display the scenes, although we have subsequently 
modified DAVE to display stereo images through the Virtual Research (http://www.virtual 
research.com) VR6 head-mounted display. 
A.4 “Hunt the tokens” game 
DAVE also implements a simple game. The scene designer has the option of placing a number of 
waypoints (referred to as “tokens”) in the scene. The aim of the game is to traverse the path defined by 
these waypoints. In the display, the tokens are displayed as textured brown boxes. DAVE only displays 
one such box at a time; it is placed at the co-ordinates of the next waypoint along the route. Once the 
camera’s position comes within a particular threshold (1 virtual meter) of the waypoint, DAVE plays a 





sound, and sets the current waypoint to the next along the route. The box is then displayed at the 
position of the next waypoint. This gives the illusion of “picking up” each box along the route. 
 
To aid the user to find the tokens, DAVE displays a small compass-style device (which we refer to as 
the “scanner”) on the bottom right corner of the display. This shows the relative bearing to the next 
waypoint, as well as an indication of the token’s relative height by means of three states: 
above/level/below (Figure A-2 shows the scanner at work). The scanner is also capable if indicating 
range to the waypoint, by means of a sound signal. To access this feature, the user clicks the left mouse 
button. While the button is held down, a continuous sound is played, and the pitch of this sound 
indicates the relative distance to waypoint. A low frequency indicates a long distance, a high frequency 




Figure A-2: The scanner used for the "Hunt the Tokens" game can be seen in the bottom right 
of the DAVE display 
A.5 Interaction recording and playback 
DAVE allows for the optional recording of a user’s interaction with the VE, and the subsequent 
playback of this record. This is accomplished by a time sampling of the camera’s position and 
orientation at regular time intervals. These samples are then buffered, and periodically written to the 
disk. With a sampling frequency of 10Hz and a buffer size of 500 samples, the recording mechanism 
does not introduce any noticeable lag into the system. To play the record back, DAVE is started in a 
special mode, which reads the record and linearly interpolates the samples to create a smooth, real-time 
playback of the user’s interaction. This allows for careful examinations of the user’s behaviour in the 
scene. 





A.6 COCI scale implementation 
DAVE also implements the COCI presence measure described in Chapter four of this dissertation. The 
scene designer has the option to include a set of COCI items (of the verbal variety) to display to the 
user. The COCI engine works as a simple finite state machine. At a certain time interval, which has a 
small random component, DAVE enters the COCI display state. It then works through the following 
states: 
 
0. Play the COCI warning sound to the user 
1. Clear the screen and wait 0.2 seconds 
2. Display the word fragment for 0.2 seconds 
3. Clear the screen and wait 0.2 seconds 
4. Present the user the word list (see Figure A-3 for an example list). If state 4 has lasted more 
than 25 seconds, mark this COCI item as unanswered, and return to the scene 
display/interaction state. If the user presses keys F1, F2, F3 or F4, record the key pressed and 




Figure A-3: DAVE displaying the COCI word list 
 
DAVE saves the COCI results file on one of two events. The first is the user pressing the exit key 
(F12). The second is if the last COCI item has been displayed (i.e. state 4 above has completed). This 
ensures that even if a user did not complete the entire set of 10 COCI items, the items which they did 
respond to would be available for analysis later. The responses are tagged with the date and time as 
well as a single letter identification code which is set in a configuration file. This was done to allow the 





Appendix B  
The TIVE tool 
We developed the TIVE tool to support the second experiment described in this dissertation. TIVE is 
an acronym which stands for Text Interface to Virtual Environments. TIVE runs on the Win32 
platform, and has been tested and found to work on Windows 98 sp2, Windows 2000 sp 1 and 
Windows XP. TIVE requires DirectX 5 or later to be installed. We used version 4.0 of the Allegro 
library, and compiled TIVE using Microsoft Visual C++ version 6.0 sp 1. 
B.1 Rendering capabilities 
TIVE was implemented using the Allegro 4.0 game programming library which was written and 
released under the open source license by Shawn Hargreaves (http://www.talula.demon.co.uk/allegro). 




Figure B-1: The TIVE display; Still image on the left, word description on the right 
(the space bar toggles these two displays) 
B.2 User interaction and navigation 
TIVE is a non-realtime display engine. Updates of the engines are initiated only as a response to user 
input events. TIVE displays a single “room” at a time, by means of either a text description only, or a 
text description accompanied by a still image. Included in the display is the set of exits of the current 
room into other rooms. There can be a maximum of six exits from any room: North, South, East, West, 
Up and Down. The user is only shown the exits which the room actually contains (i.e. if a room does 
not have a North exit, then North will not appear in the list of exits). To use an exit, the user presses a 
single key – N for North, S for South, E for East, W for West, U for Up or D for Down. To help the 
user remember the interface, these keys appear on the display. See Figure B-1 for an example. 
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B.3  “Hunt the tokens” game 
TIVE also implements a simple game. The scene designer has the option of placing a number of 
waypoints (referred to as “tokens”) in rooms in the environment. The aim of the game is to traverse the 
path defined by these waypoints. The tokens are not displayed, but the user is notified on entering a 
room which contains a token. TIVE only informs the user of one token at a time; it is placed at the co-
ordinates of the next room along the route. When the user enters the room with the token, a window 
appears informing then that the token has been found, and the current waypoint is set to the next along 
the route. This gives the illusion of “picking up” each token along the route. 
 
To aid the player to find the tokens, TIVE can display a window informing the user of the bearing 
(using compass directions) and relative height of the next token (this window is referred to as the 




Figure B-2: The scanner in TIVE showing the direction to the next token 
B.4 Interaction recording and playback 
TIVE allows for the optional recording of a user’s interaction, and the subsequent playback of this 
record. This is accomplished by recording each keypress made by the player. To play the record back, 
TIVE is started in a special mode, which reads the record and executes the next keypress every fifteen 
seconds. This allows for careful examinations of the user’s behaviour in the scene. 
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B.5 COCI scale implementation 
TIVE implements the COCI presence measure described in Chapter four of this dissertation. The scene 
designer has the option to include a set of COCI items (of the verbal variety) to display to the user. The 
COCI engine works as a simple finite state machine. At a certain time interval, which has a small 
random component, TIVE enters the COCI display state. It then works through the following states: 
 
1. Clear the screen and wait 0.2 seconds 
2. Display the word fragment for 0.2 seconds 
3. Clear the screen and wait 0.2 seconds 
4. Present the user the word list (see Figure B-3 for an example). If state 4 has lasted more than 
25 seconds, mark this COCI item as unanswered, and return to the scene display/interaction 




Figure B-3: TIVE displaying the COCI word list 
 
 
TIVE saves the COCI results file on either of two events. The first is the user pressing the exit key 
(Shift-Q). The second is if the last COCI item has been displayed (i.e. step 4 above has been 
completed). This ensures that even if a user did not complete the entire set of 10 COCI items, the items 
which they did respond to would be available for analysis later. The responses are tagged with the date 
and time as well as a single letter identification code which is set in a configuration file. This was done 




Appendix C  
Images from the Hospital VE 
This appendix shows eight images taken from the high and low stimulus quality versions of the 
Hospital VE used in the experiments described in this dissertation. The VE is not based on any real 
place. In each case, the left-hand image is the high stimulus quality version, and the right-hand image is 
from the low stimulus quality version. Apart from the graphical differences, the high stimulus quality 
version included both positional and ambient sounds, while the low stimulus quality version did not 
include any sound. 
 
 
     
Figure C-1: The outside of the hospital 
 
 
     
Figure C-2: The kitchen of the staff room






     
Figure C-3: Elevators and vending machine (basement, level 0) 
 
     
Figure C-4: Surgical Theater 
 
     
Figure C-5: Passages (ground floor, level 1) 







     
Figure C-6: Eastern stairwell (first floor, level 2) 
 
     
Figure C-7: Consulting room (level 3) 
 
     
Figure C-8: Ward room (level 3)
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Figure C-9: Floorplans for the Hospital VE, Levels 0 and 1 
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Appendix D  
Images from the Monastery VE 
This appendix shows eight images taken from the high and low stimulus quality versions of the 
Monastery VE used in the experiments described in this dissertation. The VE is not based on any real 
place. In each case, the left-hand image is the high stimulus quality version, and the right-hand image is 
from the low stimulus quality version. Apart from the graphical differences, the high stimulus quality 
version included both positional and ambient sounds, while the low stimulus quality version did not 
include any sound. 
 
     
Figure D-1: The entrance and stairs to first floor (level 1) 
 
     
Figure D-2: Dining hall (level 1) 
 
 





     
Figure D-3: Courtyard and chapel (level 1) 
     
Figure D-4: Inside the chapel (level 1) 
     
Figure D-5: Annexure to the chapel (level 1) 





     
Figure D-6: Library (level 2) 
 
     
Figure D-7: One of the bedrooms (first floor, level 2) 
 
     
Figure D-8: Carpentry workshop (level 1) 


















Figure D-9: Floorplans for the Monastery VE, Level 1 


























Appendix E  
Images from the Training VE 
This appendix shows four images and floorplans from the training VE in which each subject learnt the 
controls and conventions of the DAVE engine. The training VE was designed not to fit any particular 




     




     
Figure E-2: Images from the basement


































Appendix F  
Lists of COCI items 
This appendix lists the COCI items used for each of the three environments (hospital, monastery and 
training). The monastery and hospital environments had COCI lists of ten items. The training 
environment only had six COCI items in its list. In each item, the corresponding word fragment is 
shown in italics, and the item keyed to the environment setting is displayed in bold. 
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F.3 Training COCI items 
Note that there was no environment keyed items defined for the training world. The COCI in this world 















































Appendix G  
Questionnaires used 
This appendix contains one copy of each of the questionnaires used in the two experiments. For details 
of which were used for what purpose, please refer to the chapter detailing the appropriate experiment. 
 
G.1 Slater, Usoh & Steed questionnaire (SUS) 




1. Please rate your sense of being in the virtual environment, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 represents 
your normal experience of being in a place. 
 
I had a sense of “being there” in the virtual environment: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very much 
 
 
2. To what extent were there times during the experience when the virtual environment was the reality 
for you? 
 
There were times during the experience when the virtual environment was the reality for me… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At no time     Almost all the time 
 
 
3. When you think back to the experience, do you think of the virtual environment more as images that 
you saw or more as somewhere that you visited? 
 
The virtual environment seems to me to be more like… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Images that I saw    Somewhere that I visited 
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4. During the time of the experience, which was the strongest on the whole, your sense of being in the 
virtual environment or of being elsewhere? 
 
I had a stronger sense of… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being elsewhere    Being in the virtual 
environment 
 
5. Consider your memory of being in the virtual environment. How similar in terms of the structure of 
the memory is this to the structure of the memory of other places you have been today? By ‘structure of 
the memory’ consider things like the extent to which you have a visual memory of the virtual 
environment, whether that memory is in colour, the extent to which the memory seems vivid or 
realistic, its size, location in your imagination, the extent to which it is panoramic in your imagination, 
and other such structural elements.  
 
I think of the virtual environment as a place in a way similar to other places that I’ve been today… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all    Very much so 
 
 
6. During the time of your experience, did you often think to yourself that you were actually in the 
virtual environment? 
 
During the experience I often thought that I was really standing in the virtual environment… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not very often    Very much so 
G.2 Presence Questionnaire (PQ) 
Characterize your experience in the virtual environment by circling the appropriate number on the 
seven point scale, in accordance with the question and descriptive labels. Please consider the entire 
scale when making your responses, as the intermediate levels may apply. Answer the questions 
independently in the order in which they appear. Do not skip questions or return to a previous question 
to change your answer. 
 
WITH REGARD TO THE ENVIRONMENT YOU HAVE JUST EXPERIENCED 
 
 
1. How much were you able to control events? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
2. How responsive was the environment to actions that you initiated (or performed)? 
 












3. How natural did your interactions with the environment seem? 
 







4. How much did the visual aspects of the environment involve you? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
5. How much did the auditory aspects of the environment involve you? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
6. How natural was the mechanism which controlled movement through the environment? 
 







7. How compelling was your sense of objects moving through space? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






8. How much did your experiences in the virtual environment seem consistent with your real world 
experiences? 
 









9. Were you able to anticipate what would happen next in response to the actions that you performed? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
10. How completely were you able to actively survey or search the environment using vision? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
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11. How well could you identify sounds? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
12. How well could you localize sounds? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
13. How well could you actively survey or search the environment using touch? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
14. How compelling was your sense of moving around inside the virtual environment? 
 









15. How closely were you able to examine objects? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL PRETTY CLOSELY VERY CLOSELY 
 
 
16. How well could you examine objects from multiple viewpoints? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT EXTENSIVELY 
 
 
17. How well could you move or manipulate objects in the virtual environment? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT EXTENSIVELY 
 
 
18. How involved were you in the virtual environment experience? 
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19. How much delay did you experience between your actions and expected outcomes? 
 









20. How quickly did you adjust to the virtual environment experience? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




21. How proficient in moving and interacting with the virtual environment did you feel at the end of the 
experience? 
 









22. How much did the visual display quality interfere or distract you from performing assigned tasks or 
required activities? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






23. How much did the control devices interfere with the performance of assigned tasks or with other 
activities? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






24. How well could you concentrate on the assigned tasks or required activities rather than on the 
mechanisms used to perform those tasks or activities? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
25. How completely were your senses engaged in this experience? 
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26. To what extent did events occurring outside the virtual environment distract from your experience 
virtual environment? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL MODERATELY VERY MUCH 
 
 
27. Overall, how much did you focus on using the display and control devices instead of the virtual 
experience and experimental tasks? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL MODERATELY VERY MUCH 
 
 
28. Were you involved in the experimental task to the extent that you lost track of time? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT COMPLETELY 
 
 
29. How easy was it to identify objects through physical interaction; like touching an object, walking 
over a surface, or bumping into a wall or object? 
 







30. Were there moments during the virtual environment experience when you felt completely focused 
on the task? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NONE OCCASIONALLY FREQUENTLY 
 
 
31. How easily did you adjust to the control devices used to interact with the virtual environment? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
DIFFICULT MODERATE EASY 
 
 
32. Was the information provided though different senses in the virtual environment (eg. Vision, 
hearing, touch) consistent? 
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G.3 The Immersive Tendencies Questionnaire (ITQ) 
Indicate your preferred answer by circling the appropriate number. Please consider the entire scale 
when making your responses, as the intermediate levels may apply. For example, if your response is 
once or twice, the number “2” should be marked. If your response is many times but not extremely 
often, then the number “6” should be marked. 
 
1. Do you easily become deeply involved in movies or TV dramas? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
2. Do you ever become so involved in a television program or book that people have problems getting 
you attention? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
3. How mentally alert do you feel at the present time? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT ALERT MODERATELY FULLY ALERT 
 
 
4. Do you ever become so involved in a movie that you are not aware of things happening around you?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
5. How frequently do you find yourself closely identifying with the character in a story line? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
6. Do you ever become so involved in a video game that it is as if you are inside the game rather than 
moving a joystick and watching the screen? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
8. How physically fit do you feel today? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT FIT MODERATELY FIT EXTREMELY FIT 
 
 
APPENDIX G: QUESTIONNAIRES USED 186 
 
 
9. How good are you at blocking out external distractions when you are involved in something? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT VERY GOOD SOMEWHAT GOOD VERY GOOD 
 
 
10. When watching sports, do you ever become so involved in the game that you react as if you were 
one of the players? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
11. Do you ever become so involved in a daydream that you are not aware of things happening around 
you? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
12. Do you ever have dreams that are so real that you feel disoriented when you awake? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
13. When playing sports, do you become so involved in the game that you lose track of time? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
14. How well do you concentrate on enjoyable activities? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL MODERATELY WELL VERY WELL 
 
 
15. How often do you play arcade of video games? (OFTEN should be taken to mean every day or 
every two days, on average) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
16. Have you ever gotten excited during a chase or fight scene on TV or in the movies? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
17. Have you ever gotten scared by something happening on a TV show or in a movie? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
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18. Have you ever remained apprehensive or fearful long after watching a scary movie? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
19. Do you ever become so involved in doing something that you lose all track of time? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
21. Do you ever get involved in projects or tasks, to the exclusion of other activities? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
22. How easily can you switch attention from the activity in which you are currently involved to a new 
and completely different activity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT SO EASILY FAIRLY EASILY QUITE EASILY 
 
23. How often do you try out new restaurants or new foods when presented with the opportunity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
24. How frequently do you volunteer to serve on committees, planning groups or other civic or social 
groups? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
25. How often do you try new things or seek out new experiences? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
26. Given the opportunity, would you travel to a country with a different culture and a different 
language? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER MAYBE ABSOLUTELY 
 
 
27. Do you go on carnival rides or participate in other leisure activities (horse back riding, bungee 
jumping, snow skiing, water sports) for the excitement and thrills they provide? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 





28. How well do you concentrate on disagreeable tasks? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NOT AT ALL MODERATELY WELL VERY WELL 
 
 
29. How often do you play computer games? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
30. How many different video, computer, or arcade games have you become reasonably good at 
playing? 
 
NONE ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE MORE THAN 
FIVE 
 
31. Have you ever felt completely caught up in an experience, aware of everything going on and 
completely open to it all? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY FREQUENTLY 
 
 
32. Have you ever felt completely focused on something, so wrapped up in it that one activity that 
nothing could distract you? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY FREQUENTLY 
 
 
33. How frequently do you get emotionally involved in (angry, sad, or happy) in news stories that you 
see, read or hear? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
 
 
34. Are you easily distracted when involved in an activity or working on a task? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN 
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G.4 Form 100 
XIn no more than 10 words, name/describe the virtual environment you just saw: 
 
 
XHow much fun did you have while in this virtual environment? (circle the number 
below which best describes how much fun you had) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No fun at all A lot of fun 
 
 
XWhat year would you say the virtual environment you just saw was set in?  
 
 




XDid the virtual environment change your mood? If so, what mood did it cause you 
to feel? 
 




XWhat was the weather like in the virtual environment? 
 
 
XHow many other people do you think there were in the virtual environment?  
 
 
XIf you traveled northwards in the virtual environment for an hour, what do you think 
you would find there? 
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G.5 Form 200 
XIn no more than 10 words, name/describe the virtual environment you just saw: 
 
 
XHow much fun did you have while in this virtual environment? (circle the number 
below which best describes how much fun you had) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No fun at all A lot of fun 
          
  
XWhat year would you say the virtual environment you just saw was set in?  
 
 




XDid the virtual environment change your mood? If so, what mood did it cause you 
to feel? 
 




XWhat was the weather like in the virtual environment? 
 
 
XHow many other people do you think there were in the virtual environment?  
 
 
XIf you traveled northwards in the virtual environment for an hour, what do you think 
you would find there? 
 
 
XWhich of the two virtual environments you saw did you most enjoy? (The first one / 




Appendix H  
Priming materials 
This appendix contains the priming materials. Three booklets were constructed: one keyed to the 
monastery, one keyed to the hospital, and one keyed to an unrelated theme. Although the following 
pages contain headers, footers and page numbers, the booklets given to the subjects did not.
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H.2 Hospital-keyed priming booklet 
Understanding the E.R. Maze 
The classic emergency room scene involves an ambulance screeching to a 
halt, a gurney hurtling through the hallway and 5 people frantically working to 
save a person’s life with only seconds to spare. This does happen and it is not 
uncommon, but the majority of cases seen in a typical emergency department 
aren’t quite this 
dramatic. Let’s look at a 
typical case to see how 
the normal flow of an 
emergency room works.  
Imagine that it’s 2AM, 
the kids and pets are 
asleep and you’re 
dreaming about 
whatever it is that you 
dream about. Suddenly 
your ten year old 
daughter wakes you up 
to tell you that her belly 
hurts a lot worse than that little ache she had after dinner. This seems like 
something out of the ordinary, so you call your pediatrician. He tells you to go 
to your local hospital’s Emergency Department. He is concerned about 
appendicitis because her pain is located in the right lower abdomen.  
Triage 
When you arrive at the Emergency Department, your first stop is Triage. This 
is the place where each patient’s condition is prioritized, typically by a nurse, 
into three general categories. The categories are:  
x Immediately life threatening  
x Urgent but not immediately life threatening  
x Less urgent  
This categorization is necessary so that someone with a life threatening 
condition is not kept waiting because they arrived a few minutes later than 
someone with a more routine problem. The triage nurse records your 
daughter’s vital signs (temperature, pulse, respiratory rate and blood 
pressure). She also gets a brief history of her current medical complaints, past 
medical problems, medications and allergies so that she can determine the 
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appropriate triage category for her. Here you find out that your daughter’s 
temperature is 101 degrees F.  
Registration 
Next stop is registration – not very exciting and rarely seen on TV! Here they 
obtain your daughter's vital statistics. You may also provide them with your 
insurance information, Medicare, Medicaid or your H.M.O. card. This step is 
necessary to develop a medical record so that your daughter's medical 
history, lab tests, X-rays, etc., will all be located on one chart that can be 
referenced at any time. The bill will 
also be generated from this 
information. Note that all patients 
must receive a medical screening 
exam regardless of their ability to 
pay.  
If the patient's condition is life-
threatening or if the patient arrives 
by ambulance, this step may be 
completed later at the bedside.  
Examination Room 
Now your daughter is brought back to the exam room. She promptly throws 
up in the bathroom. Perhaps this is more evidence for a diagnosis of 
appendicitis. She is now seen by an emergency department nurse who 
obtains more detailed information. The nurse gets her settled into a patient 
gown so that she can be examined properly and perhaps obtains a urine 
specimen at this time.  
Some Emergency Departments have been 
subdivided into separate areas to better 
serve their patients. These separate areas 
can include - a pediatric ER, a chest pain 
ER, a fast track (for minor injuries and 
illnesses), trauma center (usually for 
severely injured patients) and an 
observation unit (for patients that do not 
require admission but require prolonged 
treatment or many diagnostic tests).  
Once the nurse has finished her tasks, the 
next visitor is an Emergency Medicine 
physician. He gets a more detailed medical 
history about her present illness, past 
medical problems, family history, social history, and a complete review of all 
her body systems. He then formulates a list of possible causes of her 
symptoms. This list is called a differential diagnosis. The most likely 
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diagnosis is then determined by the patient’s symptoms and physical 
examination. If this is inadequate to determine the diagnosis, then diagnostic 
tests are required.  
Diagnostic Tests 
When the tricky diagnosis of appendicitis is considered, blood tests and a 
urinalysis are required. An I.V. line may be inserted at this time so that fluids 
can be given intravenously (through the vein) to replace fluids lost through 
vomiting. The patient’s blood is put into different colored tubes, each with it 
own additive depending on the test being performed:  
x A purple top tube is used for a complete blood count (CBC). A CBC 
measures 1) the adequacy of your red blood cells (to see if you are 
anemic), 2) The number and type of white blood cells (WBC’s) (to 
determine the presence of infection), and 3) a platelet count (platelets 
area blood component necessary for clotting).  
x A red top tube is used to test the serum (the liquid or non cellular half 
of your blood).  
x A blue top tube is used to test your blood’s clotting.  
The tests in your 
daughter’s case indicate 
that your daughter has an 
elevated WBC count. This 
is a sign of a bacterial 
infection, and bacterial 
infections are commonly 
associated with 
appendicitis.  
At this point the 
emergency physician may 
request that your daughter 
not eat or drink anything . 
The reason is that 
appendicitis is treated by 
surgery and an empty stomach is desirable to prevent some complications of 
anesthesia.  
Diagnosis and Treatment 
When the emergency physician has all the information he can obtain, he 
makes a determination of the most likely diagnosis from his differential 
diagnosis. Alternately, he may decide that he does not have enough 
information to make a decision and may require more tests.  
In this case he speaks to a general surgeon - the appropriate consultant in 
this case. The surgeon comes to see your daughter and performs a thorough 
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history, physical exam, and review of her lab data. She examines your 
daughter’s symptoms: pain and tenderness in the right lower abdomen, 
vomiting, low grade fever and elevated WBC count. These symptoms all point 
to appendicitis. The treatment of appendicitis is removal of the appendix, or 
an appendectomy. The surgeon explains the procedure, including the risks 
and benefits. You then sign a consent form to document this and permit her to 
operate on your daughter. You’re nervous, yet relieved because you know 
what the problem is, and that your daughter will be feeling better once her 
appendix is removed.  
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H.3 Neutral priming booklet 
The most spectacular part was climbing into the firebox of a Bulleid 
Pacific, two people at a time. The trick is to grasp a fairly high-up handle 
in each hand, swing both feet into the fire-door opening, transfer hand 
grip to lower handles, ease body further in, turn over and wriggle the 
remaining distance. Inside the firebox we could easily identify the 
components, including the enormous thermic siphons. Coming out of 
the firebox was a slight variation on the entry procedure: squeeze out, 
roll over and get two 
people to help you up. 
Clive did give us one 
warning: on these 
engines, there’s a 
stub lever sticking up 
beside the firebox: it’s 
used for rocking the 
grate. Make sure 
somebody is covering 
it because if you slip, 
you’ll be like the 
engine itself: you’ll 
have a tender behind!  
Another thing we had to learn was the name of each track and which 
signal controlled which road: which switch was controlled from the box 
in the station, and which could be accessed by throwing the point lever 
in the yard, adjacent to the switch. There were the two platform roads in 
the station, the Pump-house siding, the Newick road (which used to be 
the running line to Newick when the Bluebell was a “real” railway), the 
headshunt, and the six yard tracks. There were the starter signals, the 
two signals controlling entrance to the two station roads and their 
shorter counterparts allowing cautious entry even when the track was 
occupied, and “dummy” signals at ground level.  
During the second afternoon we were introduced to “our” locomotive, 
no. 263. It was an 0-4-4 tank engine built in about 1905 for the South-
Eastern and Chatham Railway. From our point of view, it had two 
“interesting” characteristics: it used the regular train vacuum brake 
rather than steam brakes for the engine itself, and it had a steam-
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powered reverser. It was parked over the pit, so we could walk down 
the steps and look underneath at the points that would need lubrication 
and examine the reverser mechanism and dampers.  
At the end of the second day Clive handed us our exam papers, to be 
handed in by Friday. The cover sheet was a list of safety rules and 
regulations which we were to sign as “read and understood”. Back at 
Wayside Cottage, I failed to obey the rule “Look out for metal 
obstructions above your head”. I bent over to unlace my safety shoes in 
the porch, straightened up, hit my head on a metal flower basket, 
staggered back, and banged into and cracked a window pane.  
I was number two, so my first task was to oil the inside and underneath 
stuff: the axle journals, the big end cranks and the oiling points on the 
trailing 4-wheeled bogie. Clive tossed me a long once-white coat, with 
the comment “No need to get your 
overalls dirty!”. I put this on, filled up the 
lubricating can from the large oil-can, 
and went under. First the big ends: to do 
this I had to lay a plank across the pit 
and climb up on it. In this position I was 
bending right across the axle, but it was 
reasonably easy to grab each cork with 
a rag, twist it out, fill up with oil and 
replace the cork. One bearing took an 
incredible amount of oil, but none 
seemed to be leaking out. The other 
needed hardly any oil.  
Then came the wheel bearings, and 
then off to the other end of the 
locomotive. The movement of the bogie 
(truck) is lubricated by four “onions”, 
open-topped onion-shaped steel 
capsules, which hold the oil that is 
siphoned onto the actual bearing surfaces by trimmings. The only 
problem was how to get oil to flow into the onions, since there was no 
room to hold the oiling can high enough for oil to flow. The solution was 
to work with a very full can of oil, and then there was just enough 
gradient for the liquid to flow.  
Eventually, the moment arrived: we had about 140 lb/in? pressure, and 
the engine could be moved, literally under its own steam. We backed up 
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to the headshunt, picked up the smaller brake van, and we were ready 
for practical instruction. First, student no. 1 drove while no. 2 (that’s me) 
fired; then no. 2 drove while no. 3 fired, and so on.  
The student who was learning to fire was introduced to John, who had 
been with the Bluebell Line for 16 years. He showed us how to pick up 
the deceptively small amount of coal on the shovel, make a full swing, 
and turn the shovel’s handle to flip the coal to the desired place on the 
grate. It didn't need much effort for throwing, but that flip! Sometimes 
the coals would stay together in a clump and land in one spot, even if it 
was not quite the right spot, but sometimes they would spray right 
across the full width of the grate. I ran through my repertoire of curses.  
John also showed us how to work the feed-water injector. I'm convinced 
that this is a black art. Turn on the water three-quarters full, turn on the 
steam, knock the water back a little, then on a little more, and the 
injector starts. Well, that's how 
John did it. For me, it was fiddle, 
fiddle, fiddle with the water 
control until John gave it one 
final gentle knock which started 
the injector every time.  
Clive instructed the student 
driver. “Make a brake” was easy: 
move the little black handle to 
turn on steam to the brake 
ejector to create a vacuum. Then 
the reverser, tricky, but not a 
black art because you could see what was happening by looking at the 
brass pointer. The method is: put the reverser lever to forward or back, 
and “blip” the steam control. The brass pointer echoes, on a graduated 
scale, the position of the reversing gear, and if you overshoot you can 
put the lever the other way and “blip” the steam control again. Finally, 
put the lever in the middle.  
After a few tries at the reverser, the student could check the signal (and 
get John to check all was clear on his side), toot the whistle, and push 
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